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Abstract 
The civil-political character of citizenship makes the attitudes and experiences 
of citizens central to an effective examination of social citizenship and 
inequality. With this in mind, this thesis explores the differing ways in which 
those marginalised and validated by the existing citizenship configuration, 
negotiate the institutions and ideals that have come to structure welfare and 
inequality. 
The thesis draws on secondary quantitative data analysis of a large-scale 
national survey and qualitative interviews undertaken in a Northern city of 
England. To examine the ‘divergent discourses and practices of poor and 
better-off citizens’ (Jordan and Redley, 1994: 156), the attitudes and 
experiences of two distinct groups are explored: employed individuals living in 
affluent areas on an income well above the national average, and unemployed 
individuals living in deprived areas below the relative poverty line. Through a 
structured dialogue about their experiences, attitudes and behaviours, this 
thesis examines the everyday language, ideals and practices that underpin 
social citizenship, welfare and inequality.  
The findings of this study confirm that the topographies of social citizenship 
are reflected in the attitudes and identities of those experiencing deprivation 
and affluence. Lived experiences of inequality generate unique forms of 
knowledge about the relationship between structure and agency. This appears 
to inform conceptions of social citizenship, in particular attitudes towards 
welfare, rights and responsibilities. The fixed fragmentation of social politics 
has benefited those validated by the prevailing citizenship paradigm. Those 
able and desiring to proactively engage can alter the terms of citizenship in 
ways that serve their material and discursive ends. By contrast, lived 
experiences of deprivation tend to lead to defensive forms of (dis-) 
engagement without challenging the existing socio-political settlement. The 
findings of this thesis are considered with respect to their significance for 
social policy design and delivery as well as the character of public deliberation 
surrounding inequality. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
This thesis examines the relationship between social citizenship, inequality 
and welfare politics. In recent years, the changing ideals and function of social 
citizenship have intervened on and structured lived experiences of inequality 
in new and patterned ways in the UK. Against the backdrop of fiscal austerity, 
this thesis considers the significance of these developments with respect to 
citizen identity and attitudes towards welfare, rights and responsibilities.  
In 2010, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government inherited a 
relatively high level of public sector debt in the UK. The two primary drivers of 
a growing public deficit were the costs associated with financial sector support 
and revenue losses through reduced outputs (Chote et al., 2010). In spite of 
this, the Coalition government repeatedly cited welfare profligacy as the key 
cause of the budget deficit and a significant barrier to the UK’s economic 
recovery (Farnsworth and Irving, 2012). On this basis, the Coalition 
government cultivated a political mandate for public service and welfare 
reforms alongside cuts to public social expenditure. Since then, a substantial 
restructuring of the welfare state has taken place. Wealthier individuals have 
largely benefited from tax and social security changes whilst low income 
individuals have been worst affected by changes to the coverage and design 
of public services (Lupton et al., 2015). In many respects, this represents a 
continuation of successive welfare reforms that have led to an increasingly 
‘fractured model of social citizenship’ (Lister, 2002a: 108).  
Throughout its term in office, the Coalition government committed to 
modifying, what it saw as a ‘complex and chaotic system, which failed to 
promote work and penalised responsible choices – all at a great cost to hard-
working taxpayers’ (Duncan Smith, 2015: n.p.). As such, there has been a 
concerted effort to move towards a variegated praxis of social citizenship that 
valorises certain forms of civic contribution whilst devaluing others (Deacon 
and Patrick, 2010). The extension and intensification of welfare conditionality 
has, in certain instances, vitiated the character and quality of social rights 
(Dwyer and Wright, 2014; Watts et al., 2014). Since 2010, changes to direct 
taxes, benefits and tax credits have been highly regressive (Brewer et al., 
2011). Overall, absolute poverty and child poverty have grown substantially 
(Crawford et al., 2015). The global financial crisis and ensuing stagnation in 
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real-term median and upper incomes has reduced the extent of relative 
poverty and inequality. However, welfare reforms and substantial cuts to low-
income social security have had a negative impact on income inequality 
overall (Browne and Elming, 2015). With further cuts announced and yet to 
come, child and working age poverty are set to increase significantly in the 
short and long term (Hills, 2015). 
Contrary to much of the evidence on the electoral consequences of welfare 
state retrenchment (cf. Giger and Nelson, 2011), the  Conservatives were able 
to consolidate their political position. A thermostatic effect is normally 
observed where welfare cuts and reforms induce greater support for welfare 
(Soroka and Wlezien, 2005). However, it appears an ‘austerity consensus’ 
(Farnsworth and Irving, 2012) has emerged where the limits and function of 
welfare are being challenged and reformulated. As noted by many, political 
administrations are bound by public opinion towards welfare and inequality 
and are only able to achieve as much as is politically expedient (Bamfield and 
Horton, 2009; Dean, 2013).  
With this in mind, this thesis explores the topographies of social citizenship 
and the differing ways in which citizens make sense of the institutions, 
practices and outcomes that have come to structure deprivation and affluence. 
As Andrea Campbell puts it, public policies and institutions ‘help make 
citizens’ (Campbell, 2003). Invariably then, the structures, status differentials 
and lived experiences arising from state action ‘influence the ways individuals 
understand their rights and responsibilities as members of the political 
community’ (Mettler and Soss, 2004: 61). 
Since 2010, the incumbent political administration has drawn upon 
increasingly ‘individualistic explanations about the moral failings of poor 
people to account for economic inequalities’ (Valentine and Harris, 2014: 89). 
Welfare institutions and policies have increasingly come to individualise the 
causes and consequences of poverty and inequality (Taylor-Gooby, 2013a). 
A series of ‘welfare myths’ surrounding welfare dependency, social and moral 
breakdown and cultures of worklessness have been used to rationalise the 
persistence of poverty and increased unemployment (Hancock and Mooney, 
2013; Jensen, 2013; MacDonald et al., 2014a). This is by no means a novel 
feature of welfare politics in the UK (Prideaux, 2010). The attitudes and 
behaviours of the poor have been an enduring concern of policymakers, 
practitioners and commentators (Welshman, 2013).  
There is a strong heritage of accounts claiming that the poor ‘are miserable 
mainly from their own fault’ (Vincent, 1991: 2). Those living in poverty and 
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without waged labour have frequently been characterised as work-shy or 
lacking in moral integrity. Beatrice and Sydney Webb acknowledged wider 
structural factors at play, but also suggested that ‘destitution in all its forms is 
invariably associated with a defective “citizen-character”, a “failure’ in the 
person who is destitute’ (Webb and Webb, 1912: 8). Whilst it may not have 
been the intention of authors such as Rowntree and the Webbs (Veit-Wilson, 
1986; Ward, 2011) to propagate such an idea, arguments such as this have 
dominated welfare politics. William Beveridge himself believed that the ‘whip 
of starvation’ could reform the moral character and work incentives of the poor 
(Harris, 1998: 2). The underclass proposition suggests that the permissive 
nature of welfare corrupts common mores and ideals surrounding work and 
welfare (Mead, 1986). This idea has proven pervasive in public discourse 
surrounding welfare, unemployment and inequality and has been used to 
justify welfare reforms and cuts to public social expenditure (Dwyer, 2004; 
MacDonald et al., 2014b; Gaffney, 2015). In the UK, there has been an 
ostensible hardening of public attitudes towards welfare, or at least an 
increasing distinction between deserving and undeserving welfare claimants 
(Rowlingson et al., 2010a; Baumberg et al., 2012).  
Many have sought to rebut the claim that the (unemployed) poor demonstrate 
damaging and distinctive orientations towards work, welfare and social 
citizenship (Vincent, 1991; Dean and Taylor-Gooby, 1992; Heath, 1992; 
Gallie, 1994; Marshall et al., 1996; MacDonald et al., 2014a). These studies 
challenge ‘zombie arguments’ and ‘welfare myths’ that pervade policy 
discourse surrounding the poor (MacDonald et al., 2014a). This thesis 
contributes towards this body of evidence by examining the ‘divergent 
discourses and practices of poor and better-off citizens’ (Jordan and Redley, 
1994: 156). Until relatively recently, comparatively little academic attention 
had been paid to the attitudes, and behaviours of the rich. However, there is 
growing recognition of the need to re-focus attention on the experiences and 
motivations of the wealthy in citizenship and welfare debates (Burchardt and 
Propper, 1999; Orton, 2006; Rowlingson and Connor, 2011; Dorling, 2014). 
Within the context of rising poverty and inequality, material affluence and 
capital accumulation are fast becoming recognised as a defining (social) 
policy problem (Sayer, 2014; Savage, 2015). As such, ‘wealthy elites’ have 
become a site of contestation and deliberation in social politics (Dorling, 2011; 
Khan, 2012; Keister, 2014). This thesis contributes fresh empirical and 
conceptual insight to citizenship studies in this regard.  
- 4 - 
A growing body of research has already outlined how people ‘make sense of 
social citizenship’ (e.g. Dwyer, 2002: 273). This thesis analyses the attitudes 
and experiences of both the rich and poor to examine the processes of 
structuration that give rise to inequalities. Social citizenship is essentially a 
relational practice that articulates the preferences and actions of citizens 
through welfare institutions and policies (Somers, 1993; Clarke et al., 2014). 
The inherently civil-political character of citizenship makes the experiences, 
attitudes and practices of citizens particularly important if we are to fully 
understand the existing citizenship configuration and its distributional effects. 
As a result, this thesis explores the experiences and attitudes of those who 
are both marginalised and validated, materially and symbolically, by the 
existing citizenship configuration. In doing so, this thesis offers a novel 
contribution towards understanding the relationship between lived experience, 
public attitudes, social citizenship and inequality.  
1.2 Research Objectives and Methods 
Two linked ideas underpin this thesis. Firstly, the notion that the edifice of 
social citizenship is shaped in large part by the institutions that validate its 
function and ideals. Political rhetoric and social policy mechanisms structure 
the meanings and values attached to social and political life. Secondly, the 
idea that these meanings and values are re-enacted and internalised by 
citizens to produce and propagate dominant conceptions of social citizenship 
in such a way that they become ‘a fundamental identity that…situates the 
individual in society’ (Conover et al., 1991: 805).  
Just as welfare systems are no more than a collection of services and 
transfers, citizenship is no more than the sum of its parts. As socio-legal 
entitlements and concomitant liabilities shift, the praxis and status of 
citizenship changes. Notions of collective belonging and shared identity are 
dynamic that shift with entitlements, obligations and outcomes (Isin and Wood, 
1999). This not only has material consequences, it also has symbolic 
repercussions for those (tacitly or otherwise) conferred citizenship status. The 
distributional and rhetorical dimensions of citizenship affect how members are 
positioned ‘vis-vis non-members, one another, the State and other major 
societal institutions’ (Schram et al., 2010: 743). Depending on the dominant 
paradigm of citizenship, welfare has the literal and figurative capacity to 
include and exclude.  
This thesis explores how citizens negotiate the prevailing social settlement 
and how lived experiences of marginality and validation inform attitudes 
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towards welfare, social citizenship and inequality. To this end, there were four 
key interlinked research objectives of this thesis: 
• To establish whether and how lived experiences of poverty and 
affluence affect citizen identity and orientation.  
• To examine how contingency and validation affect attitudes and 
behaviours related to social citizenship, welfare and inequality.  
• To explore how poverty and affluence generate unique forms of 
knowledge about the structural determinants of socio-economic 
outcome and action. 
• To explore whether, and in what ways, citizens engage with or deviate 
from the dominant ideals and praxis of social citizenship.  
To meet these research objectives, this study explored the attitudes and 
experiences of two distinct groups: employed individuals living in affluent 
areas on an income well above the national average, and unemployed 
individuals living in deprived areas below the relative poverty line. Throughout 
the thesis, these two groups are referred to as Validated Active Citizens and 
Residual Contingent Citizens respectively. Effectively, the trappings of social 
citizenship are bestowed upon the Validated Active Citizen. Their lived 
experiences affirm the figurative and material benefits of engaging in the 
Social Contract. They fulfil the duties of social citizenship by engaging in 
socially and economically rewarded paid employment. Their status and 
belonging is validated through the existing economic and welfare 
configuration. By contrast, Residual Contingent Citizens are subject to very 
different treatment and outcomes. Unable to fulfil the ‘work-biased 
construction of citizenship responsibilities’ (Lister, 2002a: 107), narrow 
conceptions of civic duty invalidate the civic contribution made by many of 
these individuals. Their citizenship status and minimal level of assistance is 
contingent on prescribed behaviours and duties. Their material and symbolic 
position undermines their sense of common belonging and purpose.  
Of course, ‘people’s lives as citizens or (partial citizens) and their relation to 
citizenship are not lived in neat, separate compartments’ (Lister, 2002b: 191). 
These two bimodal categories inevitably oversimplify the dynamic nature of 
citizenship orientation and outcomes. At any one time and across the life 
course, citizens may occupy multiple private and public spaces assuming 
diverse associations and subject positions along the way (Young, 1990). This 
pluralistic ‘differentiated’ conception of citizenship is not rejected as a result of 
the categories outlined above. Rather, it is precisely because these categories 
persist as empirical phenomena, that the attitudes, experiences and practices 
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of these two groups are so significant to pluralistic accounts of citizenship. 
Examination of these two groups highlights the differentiated nature and 
effects of social citizenship within the context of rising inequality. To 
understand any sense of alienation or belonging felt by these two groups, this 
thesis explores the significance of socioeconomic circumstance, but also how 
social policy instruments and political discourse affect citizen status and 
attitude formation.  
This study adopted a mixed-methods approach with an initial phase of 
secondary quantitative data analysis of the 2005 Citizenship Survey, followed 
by qualitative fieldwork to explore the experiences, attitudes and behaviours 
of Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens. The first phase 
of the research project established support for the rights and responsibilities 
of social citizenship and examined the drivers of attitudinal divergence that 
arise out of lived experiences of inequality. The second phase of the project 
involved a series of in-depth, structured ‘scenario-driven’ qualitative 
interviews. Participants were sampled from the Leeds City region and were 
interviewed between February 2013 and January 2014. In total, 28 interviews 
were conducted: 15 interviews with participants notionally identified as 
Residual Contingent Citizens and 13 interviews with participants notionally 
identified as Validated Active Citizens. Scenario-driven interviews were used 
to facilitate an applied discussion about the principles underpinning social 
citizenship. Through a structured dialogue about the rights, responsibilities 
and outcomes of different citizens, it was possible to explore how poverty and 
affluence generate unique experiences and patterns of knowledge that 
underpin ‘theories about the way the world works’ (O'Brien and Penna, 1998: 
3). This enabled a critical examination of the everyday language, ideals and 
institutions that structure social citizenship, welfare and inequality.  
Based on the research objectives and methodological approach of this study, 
this thesis makes two interlinked novel contributions to knowledge in the field 
of citizenship studies and social policy. The first concerns the persistent 
‘imbalance between theoretical and empirical advances in our understanding 
of citizenship’ (Isin et al., 2013: 57). Almost 25 years ago, Conover et al. (1991: 
801) claimed that a great deal of citizenship theorising is ‘conducted in what 
is virtually an empirical void’. Since then, a burgeoning body of literature has 
sought to address the problem that ‘very little is known about the realities of 
how different people understand themselves as citizens’ (Jones and Gaventa, 
2002: 28). Whilst substantial progress has been made, Isin et al. (2013) claim 
that more needs to be done to enrich the field both empirically and 
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conceptually. They outline a research agenda for studies that capture ‘the 
everyday world of citizenship’ (Desforges et al., 2005), the socio-structural 
practices that structure lived citizenship (Lister, 2007c), and how citizens and 
non-citizens experience the inclusive and exclusive tendencies of citizenship 
(Isin et al., 2013: 57). This thesis provides a timely contribution to citizenship 
studies in this regard by presenting new evidence on the inclusionary and 
exclusionary dynamics of social citizenship and what bearing this has on the 
lived experience, identity and orientation of citizens. This evidence is used to 
both challenge and refine citizenship theorising by making empirically driven 
insights about social citizenship, inequality and the contradictions and 
tensions that arise as a result. 
This relates to the second principle contribution of this thesis: the (re) insertion 
of everyday lay accounts into citizenship debates. Many have observed that 
‘grassroots’ views are notably absent from welfare discourse (Dwyer, 2002; 
Lister et al., 2003). In particular, the poor are ‘a group largely ignored in 
citizenship studies’ (Lister, 2007b: 49). However, as an emerging site of social 
scientific and theoretical interest, the everyday lay accounts of the rich are 
also of particular importance (Orton, 2006: 251). By examining the voices of 
the poor alongside the rich, it becomes feasible to do two things. Firstly, it is 
possible to bolster the deliberative character and potential of social 
citizenship, so that the views, experiences and preferences of all citizens are 
heard and accounted for in social politics. Secondly, everyday views provide 
insight into the processes and interpretive practices drawn upon by those 
experiencing validation and marginality. The structured and structuring nature 
of discursive practices can be critically examined within this context to 
establish what bearing social citizenship and inequality have on institutions, 
practices and outcomes. In this respect, this thesis demonstrates the value of 
moving between ‘everyday or lay concepts and meanings and social scientific 
or technical concepts and theories’ (Blaikie, 2007: 90). 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
Organised into nine chapters, this thesis explores the relationships between 
social citizenship, inequality, lived experiences and public attitudes. This 
introductory chapter provides a brief policy background to the thesis. In doing 
so, the empirical and theoretical value of the research is established. The 
chapter also outlines the key research objectives, methodological approach 
and academic contributions made by this study. Chapter two draws upon 
theories of citizenship in a schematic way to demonstrate how gaps in the 
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existing literature have informed the research agenda of this thesis. Rather 
than conceiving of citizenship as a static status conferred through 
membership, this chapter demonstrates the value of a polity-driven approach 
where rights, responsibilities, citizen identity and orientations are understood 
as socially embedded and relational. This ‘horizontal’ conception makes it 
possible to move from normative to explanatory accounts of the relationship 
between social citizenship and inequality. In light of this, the attitudes and 
experiences of citizens assume a renewed importance for public deliberation 
and the (re) configuration of social citizenship.  
Chapter three explores the extent of continuity and change in social security 
policy in the UK. This serves to situate recent welfare reforms and 
developments within context. The chapter focuses particularly on how 
economic inequality and social security affect citizenship rights and identity. It 
also demonstrates how political rhetoric and policy instruments have not only 
shaped dominant ideals underpinning social citizenship but also how this has 
affected socio-economic outcomes. The chapter principally serves to illustrate 
the increasingly variegated praxis and experience of social citizenship in the 
UK. As such the conceptual and empirical categories of Residual Contingent 
Citizens and Validated Active Citizens are more fully introduced and 
elaborated on here. 
Having outlined the theoretical and policy significance of exploring lived 
experiences of social citizenship, chapter four moves on to describe the 
methodology employed for this study. It starts by explaining how key concepts 
were operationalized to make them empirically tractable as well as the 
benefits of employing a mixed-method ‘lived experience’ approach to 
attitudinal research. The chapter then provides details of the secondary 
quantitative data analysis undertaken and the research design, sampling and 
recruitment strategy chosen for qualitative fieldwork. 
Chapters five to eight communicate the key findings of this thesis. Each 
chapter follows on from the last to explain how and why lived experiences 
affect conceptions of social citizenship. These findings are discussed in light 
of relevant empirical research already undertaken. Chapter five explores 
whether attitudes differ between those notionally defined as Residual 
Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens. The chapter starts by 
outlining support for universal entitlements and duties and offers some 
potential explanations. Exploring differences between the two sample groups, 
the chapter then turns to explore how deprivation and other socio-
demographic factors affect attitudes. The chapter concludes by reflecting on 
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how lived experiences of inequality affect citizen identity and attitudes towards 
the figurative and applied potential of social citizenship. Building on findings 
from the last chapter, chapter six demonstrates how those who experience 
deprivation and affluence exhibit a radically different ‘sociological imagination’ 
(Mills, 1959). During the qualitative fieldwork, Residual Contingent Citizens 
and Validated Active Citizens were presented with the same vignettes but 
differed markedly in what they understood to be the structural determinants of 
action, agency and socio-economic outcome. Chapter six draws a number of 
conclusions about the role lived experiences play in knowledge accumulation 
and thus attitude (trans-) formation surrounding social citizenship.  
Chapter seven reflects upon the findings of the previous two chapters to 
examine how lived experiences affect attitudes and behaviours towards the 
constitutive features of social citizenship. In doing so, the chapter considers 
the orientations of those experiencing inclusion and exclusion. The chapter 
explores the extent to which these two groups deviate or conform to the 
current ideals of citizenship that are expressed through and regulated in 
interpersonal, communal and institutional life. Reflecting on the distinctive 
frames of reference and action shaped by welfare policies and citizenship 
practices, chapter eight explores the possible means by which to tackle 
poverty and inequality. Reflecting on the factors contributing towards 
attitudinal divergence, the chapter outlines how, given certain constraints, 
public attitudes might be engineered to galvanise popular support for inclusive 
citizenship practices.  
Finally, chapter nine concludes the thesis by highlighting the key findings that 
have emerged from this study. The chapter reflects upon the findings of this 
thesis to offer a number of implications for theorising public attitudes towards 
social citizenship as well as lived experiences of inequality. Acknowledging 
the limitations of this study, the chapter concludes by suggesting how this 
thesis has contributed towards but also pointed to new research agendas.	
 
 
- 10 - 
Chapter 2: Incorporating the lived experience of deliberative 
citizens into accounts of social citizenship and inequality 
 
 2.1 Introduction 
Social citizenship is shaped in large part by the institutions that validate its 
function and ideals. The centrality of the welfare state in mediating this 
process is demonstrable in the policy instruments that structure the meanings 
and values attached to socio-political life. Beyond the pivotal role of the state 
in articulating the terms of collective membership and identity, citizenship 
reflects and manifests itself through interpersonal, communal and market 
relations. The dynamic relationship between state, civil society and individual 
makes citizenship a site of conflict and change. The tensions and 
transformations that arise are a functional necessity for the efficacy and 
democratic legitimacy of citizenship in both an institutional and procedural 
capacity. The status, rights and duties of citizenship are not conferred in a 
social vacuum but are (re-)constructed in relation to the demands and needs 
of the polity. Whether a passive or active conception of citizenship is taken in 
academic analysis, the ‘dominant paradigm is relatively indifferent to the 
necessary civil-political character of citizenship’ (Roche, 1992: 37). The 
preferences, attitudes and responses of the citizenry are often underplayed, 
overlooked or assumed in theoretical accounts of citizenship (Conover et al., 
1991; Lister et al., 2003). The trade-off between individual interests and the 
common good has been a perennial feature of citizenship debates, but less 
attention has been paid to how this is affected by social citizenship itself, how 
inequality intervenes in this process and ultimately what implications this has 
for the changing nature of social citizenship, deprivation and the potential 
contradictions therein.   
Due to its contextual contingency and character as a contested concept, 
Turner (1993: 11) suggests there is not, as yet, and neither should there be, 
a unitary theory of citizenship. Whilst the multidimensional and multi-layered 
phenomenon of citizenship makes an exhaustive theory problematic, a 
‘systematic’ sociology of citizenship is necessary to understand its 
mechanisms, outcomes and how it may be engineered towards particular 
ideological or normative ends (Clarke et al., 2014). A significant body of 
literature has explored the theoretical and normative terrain of citizenship. 
Indeed, ‘the way we define citizenship is intimately linked to the kind of social 
- 11 - 
and political community we want’ (Mouffe, 1992: 255). Generally, citizenship 
theorists defend or critique an existing ideological account. As a result, a great 
deal of academic attention has centred on debates surrounding normative 
rather than explanatory questions concerning the relationship between social 
citizenship, deprivation and polity preferences. Nevertheless, an expansive 
literature also exists attempting to explain the relations and processes that 
give rise to the prevailing conception of social citizenship, the persistence of 
poverty and inequality, their respective impacts on citizens and the capacity 
for citizens to affect or inhibit change. For the purposes of this thesis, this 
literature will be considered in a schematic way to focus on the domains of 
relevance here. 
This chapter starts by briefly outlining T.H. Marshall’s seminal account of 
Citizenship and Social Class (Marshall, 1950). Reflecting on Marshall’s 
contribution, section 2.2 considers the prospective effects of social citizenship 
on inequality and capitalism. Mindful of the civil-political character of 
citizenship, section 2.2 also touches upon the functional relationship between 
political democracy and the rights and status of citizenship. Section 2.3 
problematises some of the core empirical assumptions that underlie normative 
and ideological accounts of citizenship. To move towards an explanatory 
account of the relationship between inequality and social citizenship, Section 
2.3 suggests that citizenship needs to be understood as a polity-driven 
practice in which citizen identity and rationality are recognised as socially 
embedded. Such an approach exposes empirical gaps in the existing literature 
and informs the research agenda for this thesis. Section 2.4 examines the 
relationship between inequality and social citizenship to consider what affect 
this might have on citizen identity, lived experiences and attitudes. Through a 
citizenship lens, it is possible to understand poverty and inequality as a fluid 
socio-structural relation. Public actions and preferences are expressed 
through institutional and macro-structural mechanisms that in turn shape 
material deficits and accretions. Social citizenship is just one of these 
institutional mechanisms and its distributional effects demonstrate a porous 
dynamic between agency and structure. With this in mind, the final section of 
the chapter reflects upon the plurality of attitudes, experiences and 
orientations that characterise any given polity but particularly one with a rising 
degree of inequality such as the UK. Section 2.5 considers the role of public 
deliberation and what part the lived experiences and attitudes of citizens might 
play in the construction and revision of social citizenship, in particular, its 
emancipatory potential. 
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2.2 The contested function of social citizenship: capitalism, 
democracy and inequality 
T.H. Marshall (1950) offers a historical account of the development and 
evolution of citizenship in Britain. According to Marshall, an understanding of 
British citizenship is ‘dictated by history even more clearly than by logic’ 
(Marshall, 1950: 8). A linear accumulation of rights has occurred with the 
incremental development of each dependent upon the latter. Marshall 
distinguishes between civil, political and social rights assigning the ratification 
of each set to the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century respectively. 
Similarly to Beveridge (1942), Marshall saw the inception of the UK Welfare 
State as an inevitable compromise between the aspirations of a political 
democracy and the vagaries of market capitalism. Citizenship, as defined by 
Marshall, ‘is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. 
All those who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties 
with which that status is endowed’ (Marshall, 1950: 28). According to Marshall, 
the social rights of citizenship help uphold the equality of status articulated 
through membership. These social rights include ‘the whole range from the 
right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to 
the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according 
to the standards prevailing in society’ (Marshall, 1950:10-11). For Marshall, 
equality of status, rights and duties in social citizenship creates a baseline 
from which income inequalities may legitimately arise. Put simply, ‘equality of 
status is more important than equality of income’ (Marshall, 1950: 56). 
Understood in this way, the practice and legislative architecture of social 
citizenship co-exists alongside market-based inequalities. This conception of 
citizenship and its relation to inequality be can be interpreted in three ways.  
Firstly, it could be argued that social citizenship is inherently at odds with the 
principles of a capitalist market economy. Marshall (1950: 29) himself 
suggests that ‘the impact of citizenship on social class should take the form of 
a conflict between opposing principles’. The social rights of citizenship have 
profound (re-)distributional effects on income and wealth, but also enhance 
access to services such as education and healthcare. Depending on the 
content of these rights and their corresponding duties, social citizenship has 
the capacity to transform goods and services from ‘private’ to ‘public’ entities. 
As a result of citizenship, access to these is not so much determined by the 
existing economic capital of individuals, but rather, their membership status 
and ‘performance’ as a citizen. This process grants ‘people a status or worth 
independent of their market value’ (Dwyer, 2004: 84) and therefore cuts 
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through the distributional power and logic of the market economy. Social 
citizenship insulates certain goods and services from the realms of private 
production and consumption and therefore appears to be in an antagonistic 
relationship with capitalism. By its very nature, capitalism results in an 
accumulation of capital for some and a deficiency in capital for others - this 
underlines the basis of the profit logic (Piketty, 2014). Social citizenship 
transforms collective organisation and power relations to undermine the socio-
economic stratification arising from market processes.  
Accordingly, social rights enable recourse from both absolute and relative 
poverty; ‘to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards 
prevailing in society’ (Marshall, 1950: 11). Having said that, inequalities arising 
within the polity are still deemed legitimate ‘provided they are not an 
expression of hereditary privilege’ (Marshall, 1950: 76). This falls neatly within 
the meritocratic parameters of a liberal defence of social citizenship. 
Economic freedom and earned inequality are core principles of an open 
market economy. In practice, these principles intersect with a range of factors 
that extend beyond individual effort such as luck and the non-market 
transference of economic, cultural and social capital. As such, Marshall’s 
liberal defence of social citizenship could be said to challenge the practice, if 
not the principles of market capitalism and the inequalities that fall out as a 
result. 
Secondly, rather than directly tackling market principles and inequalities, 
social citizenship could be said to serve a mitigation role. According to 
Marshall, the status attached to social citizenship offers a means by which to 
‘impose modifications’ (Marshall, 1950: 110) on a capitalist class system that 
re-produces inequality. To understand the legacy and existing topographies 
of social citizenship in the UK, this notion of modification is particularly 
important. Marshall understood there to be an inevitable compromise between 
parliamentary democracy and economic prosperity. Through social 
citizenship, Marshall believed it was possible and indeed desirable to 
moderate but not to considerably infringe upon the functioning of the market. 
Democratic-welfare-capitalism requires the generation and uneven 
distribution of private resources. This phenomenon has to precede the 
conversion of private resources into public goods and their subsequent 
redistribution. With this in mind, Marshall suggests that ‘the hyphenated 
society can succeed only if it is recognised that both the welfare sector and 
the mixed economy are contributing to the creation of welfare’ (Marshall, 1950: 
131). 
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According to neoclassical economics, certain degrees of unearned inequality 
then are to be tolerated if, through the private accumulation and eventual 
distribution of public resources, they contribute to the overall wealth and 
welfare of the polity (cf. Fleischacker, 2009). Marshall argues that this 
distribution of resources cannot intervene on market processes to such an 
extent that the profit logic and motivation of private producers and consumers 
is undermined. Accordingly, social citizenship ameliorates the conditions of 
the free market but does not restrict them to the extent that they cease to 
operate on their own terms. This idea of ‘not biting the hand that feeds you’ is 
particularly limiting for the potential and jurisdiction of social citizenship. As 
discussed in chapter three, this mitigation approach (i.e. primacy of the 
market) has proven particularly pervasive in conceptions of social citizenship 
since the 1980s and has limited the capacity of the state to more effectively 
tackle inequality. If the political aspirations of social citizenship are bound by 
the structural limits imposed by a capitalist market economy, public values and 
ideals also come to operate within the confines of a neoclassical economic 
logic. In turn, this embeds market principles in the legislative entitlements and 
duties prescribed by the state. Social citizenship, then, runs the danger of 
becoming complicit in the maintenance and propagation of inequalities.  
Finally, this leads to the third interpretation of social citizenship as a concept 
functioning to safeguard the sustainability and political legitimacy of the 
capitalist system. Arguably, the interlocution between democracy and 
capitalism made the provision of social rights a functional necessity for the 
maintenance of the free market. Civil rights grant economic freedom, political 
rights guarantee political expression (as opposed to power) and the ‘right to a 
modicum of economic welfare and security’ (Marshall, 1950: 10) placates the 
polity into an acceptance of the capitalist system (Offe, 1985). Due to their 
liberal heritage, it has been suggested that citizenship rights fail to contribute 
towards the effective transformation of civil society: ‘the concept of security 
does not raise civil society above its egoism. On the contrary, security is the 
insurance of its egoism’ (Marx, 1975: 162-163).  Rather than the collective and 
common ownership of social, natural and economic goods, citizenship is 
conceived on the basis of a private property-owning principle that is reflected 
in the rights and duties of common membership (Turner, 1993: 3). Marshall 
(1950: 8) even goes so far as to say that ‘the inequality of social class may be 
acceptable provided the equality of citizenship is recognised’. Perhaps then, 
there are legitimate grounds for pessimism in the capacity of social citizenship 
to meaningfully tackle unjust inequalities arising from the market. 
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Rather than economic transfers, Marshall (1950: 81) considers ‘the major 
social services, such as health and education’ to be the core rights of social 
citizenship. Marshall (1950: 56) suggests that the provision of these services 
helps ensure the effective participation of all citizens irrespective of their socio-
economic circumstance by removing these goods from private or privileged 
areas of consumption (Marshall, 1950: 86). However, there is no necessary 
reason why a distributive mechanism based on criteria other than individual 
capital would, with any certainty, result in equality of access (Hindess, 1993: 
25). In addition, the lack of sufficient attention paid to economic transfers in 
Marshall’s account enshrines a basic level of market dependency in the rights 
and duties of citizenship. If only a ‘modicum’ of welfare and security is 
provided, a ‘white able-bodied male breadwinner model’ will tend to prevail 
over the socio-economic settlement (Prideaux and Roulstone, 2012). 
If ‘the right of the citizen… is the right to equality of opportunity’ (Marshall and 
Bottomore, 1992: 65), social citizenship serves to exercise meritocratic 
influence over the distribution of resources. This is essentially an equal right 
to become unequal through differences in individual ability and effort. 
According to this logic, the agentive capacities of the individual should be the 
primary determinant of inequality. However, inherited talent and ability are 
beyond the realms of individual agency and are thus difficult to compensate 
for in policy instruments (Elias and Jensen, 2014). In fact, it is almost 
impossible to organise a system of distributive justice that is able to separate 
out inherited characteristics and agentive capacities (cf. Dench, 2006). 
Arguably, a pure ‘right to equality of opportunity’ is not practicably feasible and 
if an unrealised conception of this right operates within a liberal paradigm, 
unjust inequities will go unaddressed. If the substance of citizenship cannot 
guarantee a redistribution of resources via significant economic transfers, this 
is particularly problematic for the phenomenon of inequality. Economic 
differences translate into (but are also a reflection of) status differences that 
do indeed ‘cut too deep’ (Marshall, 1950: 76) by undermining notions of 
common belonging and membership. In this sense, social citizenship could be 
said to structure rather than alleviate inequality. 
This section has explored how Marshall’s account of social citizenship can be 
variously interpreted, what implications this has for the phenomenon of 
inequality and its relation to a capitalist market economy. Citizenship can be 
seen as either opposing, mitigating or supporting market-based inequalities 
(Habermas, 1975; Offe, 1982). Perhaps most clear is that, depending on the 
policy domain or time in question, social citizenship has the capacity to do all 
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of these things. These three functions of social citizenship are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive but contingent on the value systems and beliefs 
propagated within a particular welfare domain or political period. Beyond the 
problematic of unearned poverty or wealth, Marshall is reluctant to define and 
confine the function of social citizenship: 
There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and 
duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing 
institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which 
achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be 
directed (Marshall, 1950: 28-29).  
Whilst he does not ‘provide a causal explanation of how citizenship expands’ 
(Turner, 1993: 8), Marshall does capture the dynamics at play between 
citizenship, inequality and the market. Various normative and ideological 
projects have sought to more clearly define ‘the ideal to which we may aspire’ 
(Oldfield, 1990b: 182) and the appropriate principles underpinning the 
relationship between state, civil society and individual. These will now be 
considered to explore their utility in explaining the relationship between 
inequality, institutions and citizens. 
2.3 From normative to empirical accounts of citizenship 
Due to its polysemic nature, citizenship as a concept and practice is highly 
contested (Clarke et al., 2014). Since Ancient Greece, theorists have debated 
the nature of citizenship, as well as the constitution of individuals that make 
up any given polity. Theoretical accounts have tended to focus on the ‘ought’ 
rather than the ‘is’ in citizenship debates (Young, 1990). Ideological or 
normative accounts can expose inadequacies in existing theories or practices 
of citizenship. However, these contributions and their claims about the 
idealised function of citizenship often rest on assumptions about: the mutually 
constitutive relationship between citizenship structures and the polity; how 
individual citizens negotiate and respond to the socio-economic and political 
landscape; and how social relations and outcomes are accommodated within 
citizenship as a concept and practice. These assumptions inform how 
inequality and citizenship are analysed, but also constrain what is deemed 
possible in the citizenship project (Somers, 1993). As a result, some theories 
of citizenship can have less explanatory power when it comes to exploring the 
relationship between lived experiences, inequality and citizenship. 
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Rather than a linear rehearsal of developments in citizenship debates, this 
chapter takes a more schematic approach to focus on the key areas of 
relevance for this thesis. As a result, it has not been necessary to outline 
citizenship theories in chronological order or in significant depth. Of course, 
there is no intention to be ahistorical. It is both recognised and appreciated 
that key contributions to citizenship debates arose out of and in reaction to the 
circumstances of the time as well as pre-existing theories. For example, neo-
republican accounts of citizenship made by key figures such as Amitai Etzioni 
(1995) and Adrian Oldfield (1990a) were responding to the ostensible decline 
in civic and social capital as much as they were responding to the arguments 
of social liberals such as John Rawls (1973). Indeed, many of the seminal 
theories of citizenship draw on empirical material to support their claims. One 
of the earliest Social Contract theorists, Thomas Hobbes ([1651] 1991), 
reflected upon the atrocities of the English Civil War and concluded that 
absolute state sovereignty was necessary to maintain social order and avoid 
a ‘state of nature’ that is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ (Hobbes, 
[1651] 1991: 89). The intention of this chapter is not to discredit such theories 
by misrepresenting their use of evidence. Instead, this chapter demonstrates 
how their selective use of evidence can, at times, limit their analytical capacity 
to understand citizenship as ‘a set of institutionally embedded social practices’ 
(Somers, 1993: 589).  
From classical to post-structural accounts, theories of citizenship are based 
on suppositions and empirical observations that are not necessarily 
generalizable. As previously stated, this is due, in part, to the fact that no 
theory or practice of citizenship is unitary (Turner, 1993). However, it is also 
symptomatic of an approach to citizenship theorising that has tended to gloss 
over the ‘dynamic social relations and political struggle’ that make up 
citizenship (Beyers, 2008: 362). This section explores dominant assumptions 
pertaining to the ‘vertical’ nature of citizenship, the construction of citizenship 
vis-à-vis citizens, and the constitution of individual rationality and citizen 
identity. In doing so, it is possible to identify empirical gaps in the existing 
literature that have shaped the research agenda of this thesis.  
2.3.1 ‘Vertical’ vs. ‘horizontal’ citizenship 
Traditionally, social and political theorists have tended to take a ‘vertical’ 
conception of citizenship (Clarke et al., 2014). Such a treatment views 
citizenship as a status bestowed upon, rather than a process enacted by, 
citizens. This approach focuses on the formalised interactions that exist 
between citizens and the state within the political-legal system. Accordingly, 
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the rights and duties conferred in membership are granted by the state and 
informed by social forces that bear on the structure and prevalence of 
inequality. Arguably, such an approach bypasses the means, and focuses on 
the ends of citizenship. Due to its classical heritage, this view has proven 
particularly influential amongst social liberals (e.g. Marshall, 1950). Whilst 
most social liberals recognise the contingency between civil, political and 
social rights, they concomitantly fail to acknowledge how citizenship, as both 
a status and a process, can only be mediated and formalised through 
individual citizens. The relations, preferences and actions between individuals 
are a key dimension of citizenship (Isin and Wood, 1999). By failing to account 
for this fact, social liberals have tended to take a rather static and overly 
deterministic view of the structures that exist between market, state and polity. 
A top-down characterisation neglects the inherently civil-political character of 
citizenship that extends well beyond formal civil and political engagement.  
A more ‘horizontal’ approach tends to view citizenship as a set of relationships 
among individuals, groups and communities (Clarke et al., 2014). These 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft relations are believed to have a significant 
influence on the construction and development of citizenship (Somers, 1993). 
As such, a more ‘horizontal’ treatment can accommodate citizenship as a 
process as well as a status. Communitarian thinkers have been particularly 
keen to emphasise the role (and value) of social networks, values and 
relations in the construction of citizenship (Barber, 2003). Participation in 
public life and civil society has been a central concern of civic republicans as 
they seek to ‘preserve as much of the autonomy of the political field as 
possible to prevent politics from becoming privatistic or statist’ (Delanty, 2000: 
33). Critiquing the centrality of individual rights in liberal theories of citizenship, 
neo-republicans are concerned with striking a balance between private 
interests, state power and community participation. In doing so, they advance 
an active ideal of citizenship that seeks to function according to common 
rather than individual interests (Oldfield, 1990a).  
Put towards rather different ends, reflexive and post-structural theorists also 
adopt a more horizontal conception of citizenship that seeks to problematize 
and address the purported elision between liberalism and citizenship 
(Habermas, 1975; Mouffe, 1992). Influenced by Gramscian thought, reflexive 
and post-structural accounts of citizenship contend that individuals are (or at 
least should) not be bound by structural arrangements. In this vein, individuals 
have the capacity to affect change in institutions, outcomes and discourses. 
This re-kindling of the public and democratic sphere, contrasts quite markedly 
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with a passive ‘vertical’ notion of citizenship. Re-inserting the ‘horizontal’ 
dimension into citizenship debates gives explanatory depth to studying the 
relationship between citizenship and inequality. Somers (1993) suggests that 
reconceiving of citizenship as an ‘instituted process’ (Polanyi, 1957) rather 
than a status, opens up analytical space to more fully consider the dynamic 
between civil society, citizenship and inequality. 
Analytically, a focus on status is attached to individuals and categories, 
while an "instituted process" focuses on networks of memberships and 
relationality. Thus, the abstractions of state and capitalism, citizenship, 
and social class can be replaced with the concept of contingent 
patterns of relationships and social practices grounded in time and 
space... English citizenship was not granted as a right - it was created 
by the activities of peoples in particular situations who interacted with 
institutions, ideals, and rules of legal power and governmental 
participation… Citizenship rights were relational social practices, not 
‘things’ (Somers, 1993: 611). 
Once understood in this way, citizens, or civil society more broadly, can be 
understood as actively involved in the construction and transformation of 
citizenship. In this sense, citizenship as a practice and process is always ‘in 
the making’ (Balibar, 2009). Whilst civil society is influenced by the parameters 
and conditions imposed, it is equally involved in the reproduction and revision 
of citizenship structures. For example, there is an ineluctable correspondence 
between the rights and duties of social citizenship. A citizen can only claim 
their entitlement to welfare if there is resource to secure it (Plant, 1988: 73). 
The (much-vilified) declaration by Margaret Thatcher that ‘there is no such 
thing as society’ is of significance here. To fully understand her meaning, it is 
important to view the claim in context:  
I think we have gone through a period when too many children and 
people have been given to understand “I have a problem, it is the 
Government's job to cope with it!” or “I have a problem, I will go and get 
a grant to cope with it!” “I am homeless, the Government must house 
me!” and so they are casting their problems on society and who is 
society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women 
and there are families and no government can do anything except 
through people and people look to themselves first. It is our duty to look 
after ourselves and then also to help look after our neighbour and life 
is a reciprocal business and people have got the entitlements too much 
in mind without the obligations… (Thatcher, 1987: 8-10). 
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The primacy of the individual in securing welfare and protecting against risk is 
perhaps most explicit (and problematic) here. However, Thatcher was also 
referring to a category error. One’s rights and responsibilities as a citizen are 
not ordained from an abstract entity such as ‘society’. Rather, they are 
negotiated and realised through socio-economic (trans-) action and political 
arbitration. This is facilitated through individuals, who (whether consenting or 
not) pay tax and exist in and as society. Whilst my claim to the rights of social 
citizenship may well be directed to the State, it is principally derived from other 
citizens. Social citizenship mediates this process through administrative and 
legislative adjudication but this settlement in itself only functions with 
legitimacy as a result of individual cooperation and collective negotiation.  
Of course, despite the equality of status notionally codified in membership, 
citizens are not equally able to support or challenge the character of 
citizenship. Systemic forms of inequality undermine the capacity of some 
individuals to affect change (Isin and Wood, 1999). This is something 
considered in greater detail in chapter seven. However, for the purposes of 
this discussion, it is necessary to consider, more generally, the extent to which 
civil society affects the construction of citizenship. Ideological accounts greatly 
differ in how they view the appropriate role and capacity for civil society to 
shape citizenship institutions.  
2.3.2 Constructing citizenship through citizens 
In Leviathan Thomas Hobbes ([1651] 1991) argues that a Social Contract is 
needed between individual citizens and the state. Under this Social Contract 
all citizens are considered equal with respect to the rights conferred in their 
status but are equally duty-bound to abide by the laws imposed by the state. 
Under the Social Contract, individuals cooperate to fulfil their negative 
responsibilities to one another i.e. self-restraint. In order to maintain social 
order, Thomas Hobbes argues for a system of absolutism. By limiting the 
capacity for individuals to affect the actions and sovereignty of the state, 
Hobbes suggests it is possible to protect the function and value of the Social 
Contract (Hobbes, [1651] 1991). As a classical liberal, John Locke also 
advances the idea that there should be universal rights embodied in the Social 
Contract (Locke, [1690] 1988). According to Locke, all individuals have a 
natural right to life, liberty and property. To protect these natural rights and 
avoid a state of nature, Locke subscribes to the notion of a Social Contract. 
However, contrary to Hobbes, Locke argues that sovereignty ultimately 
resides with the people. Locke stipulates that the polity have the right to affect 
change in state structures and rules if the state defaults on its responsibilities 
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to protect natural rights. According to this logic, obedience to the state should 
be conditional on the state fulfilling its obligations to citizens. Despite this right 
to revolution, classical liberals advance a highly individualistic, passive and 
rather ‘thin’ notion of citizenship (Burchell, 1995). Rather than actively 
engaged in the practice of citizenship, classical liberals saw the polity as 
necessarily constrained and subject to its pre-defined character (Faulks, 
2000). 
Whilst modern social liberals argue for a system that extends well beyond the 
minimal rights and duties embodied in the classical Social Contract, they 
nonetheless adopt a notably passive or private conception of citizenship 
(Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 354). For social liberals such as T.H. Marshall 
(1950) and John Rawls (1973), citizenship is understood as ‘an important but 
occasional identity, a legal status rather than a fact of everyday life’ (Walzer, 
1995: 215). This status establishes the rights and duties of membership and 
as such the character of citizenship is somewhat pre-ordained. According to 
this approach, citizenship principally concerns the governance of laws, norms 
and institutions rather than participation and involvement in their formulation. 
Social liberals deliberate the articulation and distributional effects of these 
laws, norms and institutions in an attempt to reconcile the notional rights of 
citizenship with the tangible inequalities in power and resource arising in 
liberal democracies. Whilst citizenship theorists previously touched upon 
matters of inequality and citizenship, social liberals were the first to 
substantively address questions of distributive justice (Beckett, 2006). That is 
not to say classical theorists overlooked questions of desert, inequality and 
justice. For example, John Locke considered the inequalities arising from 
individual effort (that is, the conversion of natural resources through labour) 
and Jean Jacques Rousseau suggested that a degree of material equality is 
necessary to safeguard the formalised and applied liberties of citizens. 
For social liberals, the social rights of citizenship are a means by which to 
protect the formal equalities and liberties instantiated in membership and in 
certain instances are seen as a necessary precondition of citizenship status 
and participation (Berlin, 1958). As such, social liberals tend to focus on how 
the state, market and civil society respond to and affect the abilities and 
outcomes of individuals. The rights of citizenship are conceived as an end in 
themselves rather than a means to participate in the structuration of 
distributive justice. Whilst Marshall suggests that ‘societies’ ‘create an image 
of ideal citizenship… towards which aspiration can be directed’ (Marshall, 
1950: 28-29), there is little specification of how this occurs or whether the 
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process itself might be a functional necessity or feature of the citizenship ideal. 
John Rawls (1973) goes some way further but restricts his attention to a 
hypothetical process whereby citizens (under certain constraints) agree to the 
conditions and outcomes of distributive justice. In sum, the social liberal model 
underplays the participatory nature and civil-political character of citizenship 
to focus on the more advanced role of the state in social provision.  
In response, neo-liberals such as Friedrich Hayek (1982) and Robert Nozick 
(1974) advocate a minimal role of the state in social provision. According to a 
neo-liberal model of citizenship, the civil and political rights of membership are 
the primary concern of citizens and the state. State interference, beyond 
upholding market exchange and civil law, infringes upon the primacy of 
individual liberty. In this sense, the citizen’s capacity to affect citizenship 
structures is limited to that which is deemed institutionally appropriate in 
protecting libertarian ideals. For example, Nozick (1974) argues that any form 
of welfare available should be delivered philanthropically rather than via some 
institutional mechanism that would obligate citizens to contribute to the welfare 
of others via mandatory taxation. Whilst ‘private redistribution’ may be the 
morally right thing to undertake, it is not morally right to enforce people to do 
this (Wolff, 1991: 12). It is not that forms of collective association or action are 
actively discouraged, rather, community organisation and participation is 
deemed to be well beyond the confines of the state’s jurisdiction and should 
therefore operate at that level. Again, this promulgates a rather passive 
conception of the polity vis-à-vis its relationship with the state. Civil society 
may flourish in shaping the experience and outcomes of citizens, but not in a 
way that interferes with market processes or that which is codified in state 
laws, norms and institutions. Whilst liberal conceptions of citizenship endorse 
the right to participation, this rarely extends beyond the narrow formalised 
systems of political representation (Heater, 2013). As such, (neo-)liberals tend 
to view civil society as operating within the existing boundaries of citizenship, 
rather than actively engaged in its formulation.  
In stark contrast, communitarian and republican accounts of citizenship 
(Oldfield, 1990a; Etzioni, 1995; e.g. Barber, 2003) tend to emphasise more 
participatory and deliberative forms of engagement that shape both the 
objectives and operation of the state. According to republicans, collective 
action and association is, by definition, the substance of citizenship. Without 
a ‘share in the government to the utmost’ (Aristotle., 2001: IV, 63), members 
of a polity are merely subjects rather than citizens. Through a dynamic and 
multi-layered relationship between civil society and the state, socially defined 
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citizenship (Oldfield, 1990b) maintains its legitimacy by operating according to 
the general will of the polity (Rousseau, [1896] 1913). According to this 
approach, the co-construction of rights and responsibilities is supposed to 
ensure the appropriate balance between private interests and the public good. 
Communitarians are principally concerned with the socially embedded nature 
of human action and orientation. For example, Robert Putnam (1993; 2000) 
argues that community participation is necessary for the effective functioning 
of democracy (Delanty, 2000). Neo-republicans, such as Hannah Arendt 
(2013 [1958]) and Adrian Oldfield (1990a) suggest that, beyond the formalised 
rights and duties of membership, participation is an equally if not more 
important component of citizenship. The provisions and conditions laid out in 
citizenship must be constructed in a dialectic with the citizenry. Even the 
passive receipt of citizenship rights must, at least on occasion, be 
accompanied by the ‘activist politics of citizens’ (Walzer, 1995: 217). 
Underlying these accounts of citizenship is an emphasis on the co-dependent 
relationships that exist between individuals and society - the former is 
inevitably shaped by the latter and vice versa (Twine, 1994). 
Placing an emphasis on inclusive participation as the very foundation 
of democratic practice, these approaches suggest a more active notion 
of citizenship: one which recognises the agency of citizens as ‘makers 
and shapers’ rather than as ‘users and choosers’ of interventions or 
services designed by others (Gaventa, 2002: 4). 
With this in mind, the dispositions, ideals and beliefs of the general public are 
particularly important if we are to fully understand and explain the 
institutionalisation and development of citizenship. However, the dominance 
of liberal accounts of citizenship means that the preferences and attitudes of 
citizens are often underplayed or overlooked (Lister et al., 2003). One major 
criticism of communitarian and republican accounts is that they fail to consider 
the degree of diversity in public opinion, life circumstances and identities 
(Beckett, 2006). These differences amount to significant tensions that 
potentially undermine common belonging, purpose and direction. The 
universalising tendencies of liberal citizenship often undermine group-based 
rights, cultures and identities. Multicultural and pluralist theorists suggest that 
these endogenous differences extend across and beyond civil, political and 
social domains and as such this ‘politics of difference’ has to be 
accommodated within the rights, responsibilities and institutions of citizenship 
(Kymlicka, 1995; Joppke, 2001). Whilst reflexive and post-structural accounts 
of citizenship are less willing to essentialise identity, they nonetheless grapple 
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with reconciling the increasingly complex attachments of late modernity with 
a liberal conception of citizenship (Mouffe, 1992; Habermas, 1996)1.   
2.3.3 Citizen identity and rationality 
Many accounts of citizenship offer a specification of how to balance the 
interests and character of the individual with the collective interests and 
associations that are deemed functionally necessary (or ideal). These theories 
tend to rest on ‘taken-for-granted ideas’ (Hopkins, 2009b: 34) about 
citizenship and the constitution of human nature, civic identity and individual 
interests. If the attitudes and behaviours of citizens have a significant bearing 
on the organisation and outcomes of citizenship, it is necessary to explore the 
validity of assumptions about the interests and motivations of citizens as well 
as the formation of individual and citizen identity. The belief that a balance 
needs to be struck between individual and collective interests suggests that 
there is something inconsistent between the two.  
Ancient Greek theorists conceived of citizenship as a status that delineated 
between the private and public sphere as well as the rights of citizens and 
non-citizens (Faulks, 2000).  According to Aristotle, ‘good citizenship’ was 
characterised by self-less interest and participation in public life. Active 
citizenship required individuals to surrender their private preferences or 
interests for the sake of the common good. Such an act was believed to enrich 
the identity and constitution of individual citizens (Heater, 2004). Since the 
ancient conception of citizenship as an active, self-less and collective 
endeavour, various theorists have sought to articulate an appropriate balance 
between private interests and the common good. Liberalism and 
republicanism are the two primary schools of thought that seek to explore how 
effective quotidian citizenship might enable ‘individuals to occupy public 
spaces in a manner that does not compromise their self-identity’ (Painter and 
Philo, 1995: 115). However, these two paradigms greatly differ in their 
conception of rationality, morality and identity. These differences shape the 
institutional and non-institutional measures liberals and republicans deem 
necessary in instantiating their ideal (cf. Oldfield, 1990b).  
Liberal accounts of citizenship tend to view individual identity and moral 
autonomy as logically prior to society. According to Hobbes ([1651] 1991), 
individuals desire ‘felicity’ - the power to exercise one’s agency and attain the 
goods one values. Individuals are essentially self-interested: if given the 
 
1 Section 2.5 considers these contributions to citizenship debates in much further 
detail. 
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chance, they will pursue their own ends with little regard for others due to a 
‘restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death’ (Hobbes, 
[1651] 1991: 70). Individuals elect to enter into a Social Contract to attenuate 
the effects of other peoples’ proclivities to dominate and exploit. Whilst citizens 
may forfeit some aspects of their individual freedom, this is ultimately a 
rational thing to do. With its roots in the classical liberal tradition, social 
liberalism similarly conceives of rationality as informed by self-interest.  
In his seminal work, John Rawls (1973) offers A Theory of Justice that 
attempts to move away from particularist self-interested rationality in social 
co-operation, towards an idea of Justice as Fairness. Rawls offers a 
hypothetical situation that divorces people from any delineating knowledge 
that could result in an unjust or unfair distribution of social goods or resources. 
In this thought experiment, Rawls places people behind what he terms a veil 
of ignorance and behind this, individuals are deprived of a) knowledge about 
their own interests, talents and identity and b) the capacity to outline and 
pursue their ideas about what makes life good or valuable (Swift, 2006). Rawls 
argues that in this original position, individuals will arrive at a conception of 
justice that is fair because there is no particularising knowledge that could 
corrupt the principles informing a fair distribution of resources. Rawls 
proposes that the talents, resources and circumstances into which we are 
born are not arrived at by some principle of merit, they are in fact subject to 
luck. Whilst we may exercise inherited talents or resources to affect personal 
circumstance, it is hard, if not impossible, to distinguish between individual 
effort (desert) and inherited capacities (privilege). By acknowledging this, an 
important question is raised. Is it just that inherited talents or resources may 
be appropriated to the advantage of some and not others? Rawls believes 
‘reasonable citizens’ would generally agree this was not just and would arrive 
at a principle of redistribution to resolve the problem:  
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal 
in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared 
to offer one another fair terms of social cooperation (defined by 
principles and ideas) and they agree to act on those terms, even at the 
cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that others 
also accept the terms. For these terms to be fair terms, citizens offering 
them must reasonably think that those citizens to whom such terms are 
offered might also reasonably accept them (Rawls, 1996: 49-58). 
Rawls believes that there would be a number of principles of agreement. In 
order of priority, the first principle concerns the equal basic rights and liberties 
- 26 - 
of all individuals. The second principle states that any socio-economic 
inequalities that persist within society are to be arranged so that they a) 
emerge under conditions of fair equality of opportunity  and b) are then of 
greatest benefit to the least advantaged. Essentially, Rawls is suggesting that 
an individual’s lived experience, including their material position and the 
accompanying knowledge therein, dictates their political and distributive 
preferences. According to Rawls, ‘ignorance about talents and social 
background models the sense in which people are conceived as equal (Swift, 
2006: 23). 
Communitarians and civic republicans, on the other hand, believe that one’s 
sense of self, rationality and moral autonomy is socially embedded (cf. Taylor, 
1989). Individual identity and capacity for social cooperation is not logically 
prior to society but the contingent product of social and community relations. 
For example, Sandel (1998) questions whether the veil of ignorance is actually 
achievable. He argues that faculties and principles are intrinsic and cannot be 
separated from the values and aspirations that define us (Sandel, 1998). A 
conception of anything must arise from an agent and when the foundational 
aspects of that agent are stripped away there is no recognisable individual 
left. Ultimately, Sandel is questioning whether any original position is possible 
and thus whether impartiality is realistic. Beyond this, Sandel is also offering 
a critique of liberal egalitarianism more generally. Without recognising 
individuals as grounded within culturally-defined communities, Sandel 
believes one ‘fails to capture those loyalties and responsibilities whose moral 
force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from 
understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ (Sandel, 2010: 
224).  In this regard, communitarian and civic republican accounts of 
citizenship suggest that rationality and identity are socially embedded and 
constituted - a desire or compulsion to cooperate cannot exist independently 
of an agent or community. In sum, social liberals suggest that identity and 
morality is logically prior to society - that lived experiences and the knowledge 
accumulated as a result corrupts the morality of individuals. By contrast, 
republicans suggest that individual identity, preferences and moral autonomy 
are only developed through our lived experiences. This thesis will examine 
how lived experiences shape attitudes, preferences and moral autonomy in 
relation to welfare and social citizenship – particularly within the context of 
inequality. 
Liberals and republicans both believe ‘the practice of citizenship may not be a 
natural one for human beings, in the sense that they would not spontaneously 
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engage in it, but it is not thereby inconsistent with what their nature can 
become, and thus not one that they are congenitally unfitted for’ (Oldfield, 
1990b: 187). Just as liberalism emphasises (and attempts to protect against) 
the self-interested tendencies of individuals, republicanism is also concerned 
with protecting against the ‘predatoriness of other individuals’ (Oldfield, 1990b: 
179). However, these two philosophical traditions differ in what they believe 
these systems of restraint should ultimately achieve. For liberalism, citizenship 
as a status entitles members to the same legal rights in order to safeguard the 
autonomy and freedom of individuals. For republicanism, citizenship as a 
practice shapes group identity and rights to further the common good rather 
than protect individual interests. According to this approach, citizenship is 
essentially a civic identity underpinned by a sense of common belonging and 
public culture.  
Whether the ends of either account of citizenship are desirable is greatly 
contested. Liberal and communitarian theories of citizenship each provide 
insight into the relationships that exist between individuals, polities and 
institutions, with distinct values and goals intrinsic to their explanation. 
However, as Beyers suggests, it is important to 
move beyond the fallacy of presuming that the problems of defining 
citizenship can be resolved theoretically or normatively, whether under 
the guide of communitarianism or liberalism… as a phenomena that 
exists vis-à-vis dynamic social relations and political struggle, 
citizenship can only be adequately understood through a context 
specific analysis’  (Beyers, 2008: 362). 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is clear that a ‘horizontal’ account of 
citizenship offers greatest conceptual and analytic space to explore the 
relationship between inequality and the attitudes, behaviours and identity of 
citizens. Civil society and public institutions operate in conjunction to 
legitimate the jurisdiction and effects of social citizenship. Any theory of 
citizenship that divorces a polity’s experience from the structures of 
citizenship, particularly with regard to inequality, fails to account for how 
individuals can come to be engaged in its construction and revision. 
By conceiving of citizenship as a practice, individuals and communities can 
be understood as actively engaged in the construction of their civic rights, 
duties and identity. Doing so makes it possible to explore the complex ways 
in which ‘alternative identities vie for instantiation in the political institutions 
and discourses of society (Purvis and Hunt, 1999: 458). Within the context of 
rising inequality in the UK, it is particularly pertinent to explore how lived 
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experiences of poverty and affluence affect attitudes towards welfare, rights 
and responsibilities. In light of this, the following section considers the 
relationship between inequality and citizenship and its significance for citizen 
identity, attitudes and behaviours.  
2.4 The relationship between inequality and social 
citizenship 
There are inherent tensions underlining the relationship between inequality 
and social citizenship. The presence and experience of inequality may 
compromise the identity, membership and rights of social citizens (Isin and 
Wood, 1999). Equally, social citizenship can serve to moderate inequalities.  
According to liberal egalitarians, the social rights of citizenship help uphold the 
equality of status notionally guaranteed through membership (Marshall, 
1950). Provided inequalities ‘do not cut too deep’ (Marshall, 1950: 75-76), the 
formal rights guaranteed to all legally defined citizens are purported to 
safeguard the status and character of citizenship. However, this ‘liberal’ or 
‘passive’ ideal of citizenship obscures the symbolic, material and political 
inequalities that pervade and destabilise the foundations of citizenship 
(Dickinson et al., 2008). As Jo (2013: 517) notes, ‘behind the veil of ‘universal 
citizenship’ and equality before the law’, there lay systemic forms of 
domination and oppression’ that misrecognise and marginalise those 
supposedly recognised as social citizens. 
As a result, liberal conceptions of citizenship can be poorly equipped to 
analyse and intervene on inequality in a number of important respects. Firstly, 
liberal egalitarians often conceive of inequality as an inevitable and (according 
to meritocratic principles) desirable function of democratic-welfare-capitalism 
(Faulks, 2000; Dench, 2006). Secondly, poverty tends to be treated as a 
peculiarity of the socio-economic configuration rather than an endemic effect 
of the existing socio-structural order (Offe, 1982). Inevitably, institutional 
responses react accordingly by focusing on ‘after-market interventions’. 
Thirdly, the universalising tendencies of liberal citizenship make it difficult to 
accommodate or attend to difference without compromising its integrity 
(Joppke, 2001). Liberal prescriptions of citizenship assign the same rights and 
duties to all members of a politically defined community irrespective of the 
diversity that exists therein. As a result, liberal citizenship ‘propels us towards 
an ideal of transcendence, a greater collectivity in which we get beyond our 
local identities and concerns’ (Phillips, 1991: 81). Such an approach divorces 
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citizenship from the everyday routines, experiences and attachments that give 
it meaning and moral purpose (Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011). After all,   
if citizenship is to mean anything in an everyday sense it should mean 
the ability of individuals to occupy public places in a manner that does 
not compromise their self-identity, let alone obstruct, threaten or even 
harm them more materially (Painter and Philo, 1995: 115). 
For some, the disjuncture between the formal assurances and lived realities 
of liberal citizenship undermine its capacity to recognise the presence and 
character of inequality (Dietz, 1992). Individuals may be notionally recognised 
as full and equal citizens of a given polity, however they may also 
systematically lack the material, political and cultural resources necessary to 
exercise or attain their rights as citizens (Held, 1991). Beyond concealing the 
phenomenon of inequality, a liberal conception of citizenship can also 
obfuscate its causes. As previously stated, liberal egalitarians tend to adopt a 
more ‘vertical’ approach to theorising citizenship (Clarke et al., 2014). This 
restricted consideration of citizenship as an abstract status poses particular 
limitations for analysing inequality. By understanding social citizenship as a 
set of ‘specific social configurations’ (Leca, 1991: 171) it is possible to 
reconsider the origins of inequality and the socio-structural dynamics that give 
rise to it.  
As a practice, citizenship reproduces and reformulates the structures and 
conditions that exist between communities, institutions and markets. As such, 
exploring the phenomenon of inequality through the lens of citizenship, ‘allows 
poverty to be analysed within a framework of institutional relationships’ 
(Jordan, 1996: 81). At its most general, deprivation is not a fixed or isolated 
condition – it is a signifier of socio-economic and political relations within any 
given context. Understood in this way, deprivation can be seen as a relational 
condition – an artefact of systemic processes structured by citizenship. 
Acknowledging the figurative and applied character of social citizenship offers 
an analytical basis through which to understand inequality and the relations 
that result in inclusion or exclusion. Citizenship, as a socio-cultural form, 
captures the relational dimensions of inequality – raising questions about ‘who 
is accepted as a worthy, valuable and responsible member of an everyday 
community’ (Painter and Philo, 1995: 115).  
Whilst citizenship is not a concept immediately recognised as influential in 
daily life, the principles underpinning it prove pervasive in lived experiences 
(Dean and Melrose, 1996; Dwyer, 2002; Lister et al., 2003; Hopkins and 
Blackwood, 2011). For some, it is only through the ‘accumulation of individual 
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practices that citizenships emerge’ (Dickinson et al., 2008: 104; Isin and 
Nielsen, 2008; Clarke et al., 2014). Everyday experiences and encounters are, 
by their nature, derived from individual interpretation. In isolation, citizen’s 
accounts offer valuable insight into experiences of citizenship. In addition 
though, they also help analyse the structuring nature of citizenship and it’s 
bearing on inequality (Dwyer, 2002). Social citizenship shapes, but is also 
bound by socio-political and economic dynamics that alleviate and propagate 
inequality (McEwan, 2000). In certain instances, social citizenship can be 
configured in such a way that it propagates rather than smooths out the 
material and status differentials between citizens (Jordan, 1996: 81-82). With 
this in mind, the phenomenology of deprivation is as much a reflection of 
citizenship arrangements as it is of lived experience. In this sense, the lived 
experience of citizens offers diagnostic insight into the reality of, but also the 
structuring of, inequality. Such an approach opens up analytical space to 
understand social citizenship through lived experiences of inequality and 
equally understand lived experiences of inequality through social citizenship 
(Condor, 2011). 
The presence of poverty within any polity corrupts the material and symbolic 
significance of social citizenship (Lister, 1990; Isin and Wood, 1999). For 
those experiencing deprivation, their lives are often characterised by precarity, 
upheaval and vulnerability (Hooper, 2007). Such an experience makes it 
difficult for these individuals to reconcile their own situation with the apparent 
benefits inhered in social citizenship. Sustained and intense forms of 
deprivation threaten the material and ‘ontological security’ (Giddens, 1991: 
47) of social citizenship:  
Someone who was living in absolute poverty could not be considered 
a citizen in any meaningful sense… their continued exclusion from 
many of the day-to-day practices that are taken for granted by the wider 
population indicates that the full promise of social citizenship remains 
a distant dream for many, and that Marshall’s expansive vision of a 
‘civilised life’ remains an illusion (Dwyer, 2004: 84). 
Those experiencing deprivation in their day-to-day life are, to some extent, 
alienated from the common experiences that underpin and reinforce 
sentiments of collective belonging and mutuality. Deprivation and the 
consequences of it that are negotiated in day to day life compromise self-
definition and a common identity as equal citizens (Hopkins and Blackwood, 
2011).  
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Inclusion and exclusion are a necessary function of all social formations. 
However, what is interesting is to explore the processes that lead to such a 
condition. Once poverty is recognised as both a material condition and a 
corrosive social relation (Lister, 2004), it is possible to capture the material 
and symbolic significance of inequality. Poverty research has tended to focus 
on the material features of deprivation. However, there is an increasing 
appreciation for the social and figurative facets of poverty (e.g. Chase and 
Walker, 2013). Jo (2013: 517) suggests that ‘social needs are inherently 
connected to the broader context of the social, cultural and economic systems 
and institutions at work’.  
In Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, Runciman (1966) goes some way 
to defining poverty according to the views and experiences of individuals. 
Runciman (1966) explores people’s perceptions of their material and non-
material welfare in relation to others.  He claims that people tend to compare 
their situation with a reference group similar to themselves rather than the 
whole of society. This tendency means some are less aware of the extent of 
income inequality and poverty and where they lie on the income distribution. 
Various studies have shown that people tend to make comparisons within their 
own social groups and networks rather than across abstract sociological 
categories (Evans and Kelley, 2004). As a result, people tend to assess their 
socio-economic position and the relative value of their income and wealth 
inaccurately in relation to the rest of the population (e.g.  Toynbee and Walker, 
2009). Those in a position of ostensible deprivation have been known to deny 
their own poverty (Flaherty, 2008; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). Equally, 
people in relative affluence have said that they ‘struggle’ to meet their 
individual or household needs (Hamilton, 2003).  Issues of ‘status anxiety’ (de 
Botton, 2004) can be seen as confounding the credibility of subjective 
perceptions in defining and measuring poverty. Equally, the validity of an 
individual’s judgment ‘may be seriously limited by his or her social experience’ 
(Sen, 2002: 860). However, some have suggested that people’s exposure to 
and thus awareness of poverty and affluence has grown and as a result 
people have become better at making comparisons across different reference 
groups (Pradhan and Ravallion, 2000). Whilst limitations may remain in 
allowing the poor to define themselves, ‘the views and experiences of people 
who consider themselves poor need not be neglected’ (Roll, 1992: 21).  
It is entirely possible and indeed desirable to incorporate subjective 
impressions into an account of inequality (Deleeck and Van den Bosch, 1992). 
One productive way of undertaking this task is to scrutinise subjective 
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impressions within their social context (Sen, 2002: 861). Chase and Walker 
(2013) recently did so by exploring how feelings of shame amongst poor 
people can be conceived as a ‘social fact’ in a consumerist society. The 
authors demonstrate how a ‘self-conscious’ emotion such as shame is 
constructed in reference to an individual’s expectations and circumstance as 
well as the expectations and circumstance of others. Exploring lived 
experiences and attitudes through the lens of social citizenship makes it 
possible to do the same thing. 
By grounding poverty research in the lived experiences of notionally equal 
citizens, it is possible to better understand the processes that shape the 
prevalence and character of inequality. In recent years, increasing attention 
has been paid to the phenomenological and reflexive significance of inequality 
and social citizenship (e.g. Andreouli and Howarth, 2013; Chase and Walker, 
2013; Howarth et al., 2014). Against the backdrop of rising inequality 
(Crawford et al., 2015), it seems particularly pertinent to examine ‘how social 
actors subjectively perceive (or sometimes fail to see) the unequal conditions 
of class and place that frame their biographies’ (MacDonald et al., 2005: 874). 
This thesis examines whether and how individuals experiencing deprivation 
and affluence develop distinctive frames of reference when it comes to their 
attitudes towards welfare, rights and responsibilities. Crucially, any attitudinal 
or behavioural divergence between those experiencing deprivation and 
affluence needs to be ‘understood within a dynamic of inclusion and exclusion’ 
(Jordan, 1996: 111). Examining attitudes and behaviours in relation to social 
citizenship, this thesis explores the orientations of those who experience 
diverse material circumstances, but also who occupy radically different public 
spaces and positions. Importantly, the attitudes, behaviours and orientations 
of citizens will have a bearing on the institutions and processes that structure 
marginality. As such, these attitudes are particularly crucial to understanding 
inequality and particularly how it endures within a political democracy. 
2.5 Deliberative Citizens and Citizenship 
T. H. Marshall (1950: 28) suggests that ‘citizenship is a status bestowed’ upon 
citizens, rather than democratically adjudicated. Many have critiqued 
Marshall’s historicism in that it fails to account for the socio-economic and 
political struggles that secured the rights of citizenship (Turner, 1993). Whilst 
Marshall suggests that the securement of each right is contingent upon the 
latter (civil, political, social), he fails to theorise their relationship and mutual 
dependence in any detailed specification. Importantly, this exposes an 
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inadequacy in Marshall’s conception of collective membership and 
organisation.  
If social citizenship has macro-structural, rather than democratically 
determined origins, citizens are regarded with little, if any, political agency to 
endorse, deliberate or contest ideals about the common good. In a recent 
article, Hay (2014) argues that the state is an analytical abstraction that 
shapes and constrains political agency. Hay’s argument about the state as a 
dynamic institutional complex could also be extended to social citizenship. As 
perhaps the largest and most significant demonstration of the state’s political 
ontology, it could also be argued that social citizenship has ‘no agency per se 
though it can be seen to define and construct a series of contexts within which 
political agency is both authorised… and enacted’ (Hay, 2014: 460). In turn, 
the (uneven) exercise of political agency shapes the configuration of 
citizenship and inequality. Importantly, this political agency should be 
understood as extending well beyond the conventional confines of 
representative democracy.  
Representative democracy enables citizens to exercise their political agency 
by electing representatives to serve their values and interests.  Conceiving of 
political democracy in these terms advances a rather ahistorical and static 
conception of the relation between policy, politics and institutions. In reality, 
the relationship between citizenship, institutions and political agents is much 
more dynamic and contingent. Political, social and economic actors shape the 
institutions and character of citizenship through their day-to-day practices and 
orientations (Barber, 2003). In particular, the attitudes of the general public 
cultivate direction and legitimacy in the institutions of social citizenship: 
the successful operation of institutions and the dispositions of citizens 
in liberal democracies tend naturally to reinforce each other’s 
orientation toward liberal democratic ends… liberal democracies that 
view institutions and dispositions as interacting in a way that is 
reciprocally determining (Purvis and Hunt, 1999: 458). 
Accordingly, institutions need to be understood as a demonstration of 
collective membership and contestation that ‘express ideas and embody a 
continuing approach to resolving the issues which arise’ (Johnson, 1989: 131). 
If institutions promulgate interests and ideals, it is important to establish whose 
interests and ideals these institutions serve. Within the context of inequality, 
institutions may come to serve the interests and ideals of those with the 
greatest social, economic or political agency (Phillips, 1995). Without checks 
and balances, institutions creating inequality may become self-reinforcing. As 
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discussed in chapters seven and eight, the dominant ideals and praxis of 
social citizenship are shaped in the image of polity preferences. Certainly, 
some have a greater capacity than others to exert their influence on social, 
political and economic institutions. How this process intersects with inequality 
is of particular interest for this thesis and is given due consideration in sections 
7.4 and 7.5 later. For the moment though, it is necessary to more fully consider 
how citizenship can be understood ‘as socially and politically constructed, as 
located within cultural formations and inscribed in the conception and 
contestation of political projects’ (Neill, 2011: 4). 
The attitudes, values, interests and ‘truth claims’ of citizens create different 
political projects (Clarke et al., 2014). These political projects give expression 
to what citizen’s believe the ideal socio-political and economic configuration 
should and could be. These political projects extend well beyond formalised 
settings and guide political agency and action on a quotidian basis that, in 
turn, defines and redefines citizenship. Different political projects coalesce to 
instantiate the ‘official, authoritative or dominant conception’ of social 
citizenship (Clarke et al., 2014: 16). In tandem, the state is engaged in a range 
of attempts to define and produce ‘ideal, loyal and dutiful citizens’ (Benei, 
2005: 8). Political actors involved in both processes include political 
representatives, citizens and social movements but also include ‘non-citizens’ 
and those marginalised by the existing socio-political or economic 
configuration. Indeed, citizenship results ‘in part from the practice of those who 
are excluded from it’ (Sassen, 2006: 65). 
How the attitudes and identity of these different actors are negotiated within 
the public sphere, and in accordance with the institutions of social citizenship, 
is of central concern to reflexive and post-structural theorists. Influenced by 
the Marxist tradition, reflexive and post-structural theorists have tended to 
focus on the role of civil society and how this interacts with state institutions, 
power and ideals (cf. Petersen, 1999; McAfee, 2000). According to this 
approach, civil society represents the private interests and associations that 
are negotiated in the public sphere. Sceptical of the social liberal conception 
of citizenship, reflexive and post-structural theorists believe a ‘reinvigoration’ 
of democracy is necessary to ensure civil society is able to avoid instances or 
systemic forms of domination and state hegemony (Habermas, 1996). 
Hegemony occurs either through economic, political or cultural means where 
one group exerts control over another group in a way that subjugates the latter 
and encourages conformity to a particular way of doing, being or seeing 
something (Calhoun, 1992). Contrary to Gramsci’s original conception, post-
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structural theorists such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001) argue 
that these forms of power and domination manifest themselves in competing 
discourses. 
As a reflexive theorist, Jürgen Habermas argues that the development and 
promotion of a ‘deliberative democracy’ is necessary to overcome hegemonic 
forms of domination (Habermas, 1996). To avoid an encroachment of the 
‘system’ onto the ‘lifeworld’, an invigoration of ‘consensual norms’ would help 
inform the direction and character of collective coordination (Calhoun, 1992). 
In this instance ‘system’ refers to systematically structured contexts of social 
interaction and cooperation such as markets and bureaucracies where 
‘instrumental rationality’ prevails to answer questions concerning how to 
efficiently realise an objective. By contrast, ‘lifeworld’ refers to contexts and 
cultural systems of mutual understanding and deference where individuals 
jointly engage in ‘communicative rationality’ and action to consider what 
should be the objectives and ideals that a collective or polity tries to move 
towards:  
Instrumental rationality refers to those practices which are formed 
through institutions and bureaucracies of the state and the economy 
(the ‘system’), and which are the foundations of social stability. 
Communicative rationality refers to those everyday practices of 
everyday people (the ‘lifeworld’), which function to socialize people, 
facilitating a sense of order, social knowledge and cultural 
reproduction. In communicative action individual ‘actors’ are able to 
assert themselves and their knowledge, bringing their private ‘truth 
claims’ into a public space. Communicative rationality, thereby, allows 
individual actors to present their personal truths and measure them 
against the truths of other individuals (Lewis, 2008: 209). 
By examining quotidian experiences and practices of social citizenship in this 
thesis, it has been possible to examine how communicative rationality 
pertaining to inequality and welfare is articulated by the rich and poor.  
Despite starting with divergent viewpoints, Habermas (1996) believes, 
through public deliberation, it is possible to arrive at a conception of the 
common good grounded in ‘consensual norms’ that people would come to 
agree is ‘right’ for everyone (McAfee, 2000). Others have a less utopian view 
of human nature and are sceptical about the commensurability of diverse 
subject positions and attitudes. Given the ineradicability of power relations in 
deliberative democratic settings, post structural theorists such as Mouffe 
(1992) introduce the idea of a ‘radical democracy’ that enables ‘multiple 
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selves’ to engage in political struggle. In particular, this political struggle is 
understood to facilitate collective resistance to hegemonic systems and 
instances of domination (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). For Mouffe, a shared 
definition of the common good is neither possible nor desirable. Public 
deliberation will demarcate the interests and attitudes of ‘multiple selves’. 
Rather than a universitas, driven by a common purpose, Mouffe argues, a 
polity should comprise a societas, as a collection of individuals with shared 
interests. The antagonistic process that characterises this ‘radical democracy’ 
gives expression (and perhaps legitimacy) to the institutions shaping social 
citizenship. Mouffe (1999) argues that this conception of ‘agonistic pluralism’ 
offers a more convincing means by which to instigate and realise the 
democratic ambitions of civil society. 
Whether public deliberation is grounded in ‘consensual norms’ or ‘agonistic 
pluralism’, it is clear that the attitudes and orientations of the general public do 
not operate in a vacuum: they are a key feature of social politics and 
citizenship. If social citizenship is democratically conceived and configured in 
a way that meets the needs and interests of the polity, the institutional and 
structural arrangements by which this occurs must ‘allow for a diversity of 
doctrines and the plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, 
conceptions of the good affirmed by the members of existing democratic 
societies (Rawls, 1985: 225). It is therefore necessary to consider the 
quotidian and informal nature of public deliberation and citizen orientation that 
occurs through lived experiences of social citizenship. This thesis will 
contribute towards such an examination by exploring the attitudes and 
behaviours of deliberative citizens within the context of rising poverty and 
inequality. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the conceptual and analytical value of 
reconceiving of social citizenship as a bottom-up practice rather than a top-
down status (Clarke et al., 2014). Deliberation and negotiation surrounding 
the mores and modalities of citizenship occurs through a collection of 
‘institutionally-embedded social practices’ (Somers, 1993: 589). This not only 
shapes the ideals and effects of social citizenship: it is, in fact, the very basis 
and character of social citizenship. Such a conception suggests the attitudes 
and behaviours of the general public are particularly important if we are to 
understand the relationship between social citizenship and inequality. The 
lived experience of citizens offers insight into the socio-structural dynamics 
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that shape the character of social citizenship and the prevalence and 
experience of inequality.  
To further debates surrounding citizenship, as well as shift from normative to 
empirical accounts, this thesis problematizes the dominant ‘passive’ 
conception of citizenship by attending to the (sometimes constrained) political 
agency of citizenship that is embedded in day-to-day practices (Robins et al., 
2008). The thesis does so by exploring how individual and civic identity is 
derived from institutional and social relations and how lived experiences of 
inequality shape attitudes towards the principles and outcomes of social 
citizenship.  
As previously discussed, inequality has the capacity to undermine citizen 
identity and collective belonging. Social citizenship can have a substantial 
bearing on the extent to which, notionally equal citizens identify with and feel 
a member of a politically defined community (Dwyer, 2010). Chapter three 
examines how the changing praxis of social citizenship has intervened on the 
institutions and processes that propagate inequality. The welfare state, as an 
assemblage of services and financial support, can create or inhibit common 
expectations and experiences. The following chapter outlines how social 
citizenship and its attendant ideals have been articulated and practiced 
through political rhetoric and policy instruments over time. In doing so, it is 
possible to establish the current praxis of social citizenship, how this interacts 
with inequality, and its material and symbolic implications. 
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Chapter 3: The variegated praxis and experience of social 
citizenship in the UK  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter illustrates how the dominant praxis of social citizenship has 
changed over time. Status, rights, and identity are a gestalt of the Social 
Contract (Joppke, 2007). In this spirit, the key features of citizenship cannot 
be considered in isolation. By examining the changing function and 
relationship between rights and responsibilities, it is possible to understand 
how citizenship status and identity is both nurtured and negated by the welfare 
state. This chapter situates welfare reform within its historical context in order 
to moderate some of the claims made about its impact and repercussions for 
social citizenship. To do so, the chapter focuses principally on how social 
citizenship has been articulated through the social security system. Whilst all 
domains of welfare activity have a significant bearing on social rights, the 
ability to fully exercise other social, civil and political rights is dependent on a 
minimum level of income (Torry, 2013). Without this, other rights are rendered 
‘empty moral possessions’ (Melden, 1979: 248). Social security, including 
pensions, makes up the largest share of public social spending in the UK and 
its share of total expenditure has grown substantially over time (Hood and 
Oakley, 2014a). Social security then is the core welfare domain, but it is also 
the most contested. Compared to areas such as health, education and 
housing, social security more clearly demonstrates the relationship between 
rights and responsibilities. Through this lens it is possible to understand how 
social citizenship is articulated, practiced and experienced at both the 
individual and collective level. The social security system is characterised as 
much by continuity as it is by change and this chapter demonstrates how 
political rhetoric and policy instruments have not only shaped dominant ideals 
underpinning social citizenship but also how this has affected socio-economic 
outcomes.  
Examining the case of social security, it is clear that the content and resultant 
experience of social rights has been in a state of flux since 1948. Entitlements 
and duties have shifted according to the political paradigm in vogue, the target 
beneficiary group in question, and the demographic and economic pressures 
bearing down on public finances. The changing enactment and experience of 
social security can be broadly characterised into two episodes: the social 
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democratic period of welfarism (section 3.2) and the post-Keynesian era of 
neo-liberal citizenship (section 3.3). This chapter examines how the rights and 
responsibilities pertaining to social security have changed over the course of 
these two time periods. Doing so, illustrates how a bifurcated system of social 
citizenship has come to authenticate the status and reward the practices of 
some but not others. Section 3.4 reflects on the distributional effects of this 
and, in particular, on the capacity of social security instruments to tackle 
poverty and inequality. Section 3.4 describes two conditions that emerge from 
the shifting logic and impact of welfare: the Validated Active Citizen and the 
Residual Contingent Citizen. These categories are outlined to understand how 
the variegated praxis of social citizenship shapes the identity and status of 
notionally equal citizens. 
3.2 The social democratic period of welfarism  
In 1948, the National Assistance Act was passed, obligating the State ‘to 
assist persons in Great Britain who are without resources to meet their 
requirements’ (HMSO, 1948: 2.4). In many ways, this was the final piece of 
the legislative jigsaw that saw the inception of the UK Welfare State. Prior to 
this, there was little, if any, effective system of social security in the UK. That 
is, the right to a minimum income for citizens was limited to a few industry-
specific workers and war veterans and even then only for a specified period. 
Many resorted to draconian Poor Law provision which was disciplinary and 
punitive, subjecting recipients of ‘help’ to hard labour and a seizure of their 
civil and political liberties (Welshman, 2013). The 1911 National Insurance Act 
came some way to protecting citizens against the precarities of industrialised 
life, with coverage extended to 15.4 million workers by 1938 (Glennerster et 
al., 2004: 79). However, many still lacked a basic right to social security. In 
the 1930s, around 200,000 young unemployed men were sent to work camps 
to undertake heavy manual labour as part of their ‘reconditioning’ (Colledge 
and Field, 1983: 153; Field, 2013). Ultimately, a patchwork of health, 
education and insurance-based services left any public claim to social rights 
an ambition rather than a reality.  
William Beveridge was tasked with mapping these existing services and 
provisions and making recommendations based on his findings. Beveridge 
went beyond the remit of his task and published the Social Insurance and 
Allied Services Report in 1942. Alongside this, political momentum and public 
support was rising for a more comprehensive system of social insurance and 
assistance. This arose largely from the maltreatment of war veterans after the 
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First World War and the destitution witnessed during the Great Depression 
(Fraser, 2003).  Keen to act upon lessons from the 1930s and bolstered by a 
new found sympathy for Socialist Russian sacrifice, the UK was fighting for a 
society antithetical to the Nazi regime; a social democratic polity realised in a 
‘cradle to grave’ plan for all citizens (Sullivan, 1996: 32-37). 
The initial system of social security provision mandated flat rate contributions 
in return for flat rate unemployment benefit. This was paid ‘as of right and 
without means test, so that individuals may build freely upon it’ (Beveridge, 
1942: 7). Beveridge advocated for a minimum level of ‘benefit adequate to all 
normal needs, in duration and in amount’ (Beveridge, 1942: 15). Below this, 
there was a basic safety net for as those not satisfying conditions under the 
National Insurance 1946 Act. Whether on national assistance or national 
insurance, these payments helped move towards a ‘decent minimum standard 
of living for all’ (Addison, 1975: 215-16). However, articulating the ‘decent 
minimum standard’ and the ‘normal needs’ of citizens, greatly limited the 
capacity and scope of social security to ensure effective participation in 
society (Veit-Wilson, 1992). In spite of the consolidation, extension and 
nationalisation of insurance services, there was still a high level of poverty and 
social exclusion (Vincent, 1991). The higher insurance benefit rates that 
Beveridge initially recommended were never introduced. As a result, there 
was little financial difference between national insurance and national 
assistance payments and after some years national assistance became the 
primary mechanism of social security provision (Hughes and Lewis, 1998: 
304-306). Between 1946 and 1953, the number of people in receipt of national 
assistance more than doubled (Lodemel, 1989: 111-113). Efforts were made 
to address this by increasing national insurance benefit rates substantially 
(Rutherford, 2013: 10). However the numbers relying on the National 
Assistance Board remained relatively static until the 1960s (Sullivan, 1996). 
Amidst the ‘re-discovery of poverty’, social security moved towards a more 
rights-based approach in the mid-1960s. The Supplementary Benefits 
Commission replaced the National Assistance Board, and guidance notes 
became codified in law. Whilst far from perfect, this removed some of the 
administrative discretion and stigma associated with claiming and increased 
the justiciability of social security rights (cf. Titmuss, 1971). The value of 
benefits was uprated with a further commitment to target provisions where 
they were most needed through means testing. There was a growing concern 
that the social security system was ‘providing indiscriminate benefits and 
subsidies for citizens, many of whom do not need them and some of whom do 
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not want them’ (Goldman, 1958: 8). The universalism underpinning 
Beveridge’s plan was being challenged.  
With enlarged provision but greater selectivity, the claimant count jumped 
significantly and Harold Wilson declared with some pride; ‘hundreds of 
thousands of the least well off members of the community have now claimed 
their rights’ (Wilson quoted in Timmins, 2001: 227). Quite explicit in this 
statement and the welfare discourse of the time, was the legitimacy of claiming 
a minimum income from the sate. Whilst the punitive and disciplinary condition 
of poverty remained for some, it existed less in the support mechanisms 
delivered by the State and the political rhetoric of the time (Fraser, 2003). 
During the 1970s, increased social security entitlements included an income 
guarantee for pensioners, the introduction and extension of disability and 
disability-related benefits such as attendance allowance, and increased child 
allowance (Hood and Oakley, 2014a). Statutory redundancy payments were 
introduced and targeted benefits were up-rated annually ‘to concentrate better 
care and biggest benefits on those in most need’ (Heath, 1966: 2). For many, 
1948 to 1979 is considered part of the social democratic golden era of welfare 
in the UK (Esping-Andersen, 1994), characterised by a universal rights-based 
approach to social security and an increasingly progressive system of taxation 
(Lowe, 2004). This helped secure the social rights of millions that fulfilled the 
basic needs of many and provided some level of protection from of ‘the 
rigours, vagaries, demands and inequities of the market’ (Clarke, 2005: 452). 
The national insurance system was financed by contributions from individuals, 
employers and the state (Seely, 2014: 5). From the outset there was an explicit 
legislative framework that acknowledged the finite capacity of the State and 
individual to fund and affect the redistribution of economic resources. Having 
said that, ‘Beveridge was skating over the problems of low pay and of what 
could really be achieved without progressive ways of raising money and 
redistribution between classes’ (Glennerster et al., 2004: 163). Nevertheless, 
the tripartite system was founded on the understanding that the ‘institutions 
governing economic life’ (White, 2003: 90) extend well beyond the State, to 
the role of employers as well. Corporation tax was introduced with the passing 
of the Finance Act 1965. Previously, company profits were subject to the same 
tax liabilities as individual incomes with an additional profits tax (Clark and 
Dilnot, 2002: 8). In addition, the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 obligated 
employers to provide redundancy pay. This epitomised the climate of the time 
and the belief that employers should be incorporated into the citizenship 
dialectic:  
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In a period of rapid industrial change it is only elementary justice to 
compensate employees who, through no fault of their own, find that 
their job has disappeared. Directors and senior executives have long 
received a ‘golden handshake’: the same principle of compensation for 
job loss will now be applied to the whole workforce (Labour Party., 
[1964] 2007: 117). 
Despite idealised portayals of the social democratic ‘golden era’ (cf. Pierson, 
1998: 121-128), there was an enduring concern about orientations of the 
unemployed towards work during this period. The duty to undertake paid work 
has always been a cornerstone of the social security system in the UK (Lewis 
and Fink, 2004). Arguably, it was the starting point from which the national 
insurance system was conceived. From the outset, measures were taken to 
remind citizens of their responsibility to be economically self-sufficient: 
The State should offer security for service and contribution. The State 
in organising security should not stifle incentive, opportunity and 
responsibility; in establishing a national minimum it should leave room 
and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual to provide 
more than the minimum for himself and his family (Beveridge, 1942: 6-
7). 
National assistance was initially intended to be a minor part of social security 
provision, with entitlement principally derived from engagement in the paid 
labour market. Because there was very little material difference in receiving 
national assistance and national insurance in the late 1940s, this element of 
conditionality had more symbolic rather than fiscal significance for claimants. 
Whilst social security can be seen as a nod to the interdependency and mutual 
fragility of material circumstance, its design was largely based on the belief 
that citizens can and should be financially autonomous (Beveridge, 1942). 
Relatively high levels of employment of the 1940s and 1950s made 
conditionality and work-contingent benefits a relatively benign feature of the 
social security system. However, despite dramatic changes to the productivity 
and industry base of the UK, unemployment and under-employment was 
increasingly framed as a supply-side issue from the 1960s onwards. This drew 
a figurative (and procedural) line in the sand between the deserving and 
undeserving poor. That is, those deemed to be legitimately claiming their 
entitlements and those largely responsible for their own misfortune. The 
increased rates of unemployment and numbers receiving benefits became a 
moral question. One in which a portion of society, was apparently not only 
failing to meet its economic obligations of citizenship, but also failing to 
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conform to the socially validated forms of behaviour prescribed by the polity. 
Media coverage of benefit fraud and ‘scroungers’ became more frequent and 
political responses pandered to anecdotes rather than evidence (Golding and 
Middleton, 1982). As unemployment and those claiming benefits grew, there 
was a shift in policy towards a more work-centred end to benefit payments. In 
the 1970s, this manifested itself in programmes run by the Manpower Services 
Commission such as the Temporary Employment Subsidy and the Youth 
Opportunities Programme (Timmins, 2001: 350-351). 
Many argue that the period running from 1948 to 1979 was a watershed in the 
British history of welfare – an unremitting expansion of social rights that at 
best provided a minimum income for some and at worst moved closer towards 
achieving such an ambition for others. Changes in the provision of welfare 
incorporated all actors, organisations and institutions into the citizenship 
dialectic, encouraged progressive forms of social assistance and embedded 
a principle of universalism in welfare politics. To some extent, high 
employment rates, a younger population and a less globalised economy made 
all these achievements more politically palatable and feasible (Pierson, 1998: 
121-128; Taylor-Gooby, 2002). Nevertheless, substantive and procedural 
shifts were moving towards a social security system designed to safeguard 
the material and figurative promises of social citizenship. 
3.3 The post-Keynesian era of neo-liberal citizenship 
Following the tumultuous ‘Winter of Discontent’, the Conservatives came to 
power and remained there for 18 years. Thatcher had a minimal and selective 
conception of social rights and believed that public social services should be 
reserved for a residuum of society (Waine, 1991). For example, she 
considered it ‘disgraceful’ that many with the financial means to do so did not 
pay for their own healthcare and insurance (Timmins, 2001: 372). In keeping 
with previous conservative political administrations, Thatcher and Major were 
committed to greater selectivity to target resources where they were most 
needed. As such, means tested benefits rose from 16 per cent to 34 per cent 
of all benefits over the 18 years (Dean, 2013: 260).  
This period is often characterised as one of unprecedented welfare withdrawal 
(Alcock, 1990; Wilding, 1997). In reality though, policy was marked by an ebb 
and flow of social security entitlement. There were admittedly substantial cuts 
in rates and entitlement. Child benefit, earnings-related pensions, 
unemployment and sickness benefit were either reduced or frozen for a 
number of years. Following a ballooning of claims, supplementary payments 
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were replaced by the Social Fund. This transformed the rights-based 
approach previously in place. Caps on the Social Fund meant that claims to 
state assistance were now more discretionary and contingent on sufficient 
local authority resources. The Fowler reviews of social security ended the £30 
death grant (Grover, 2011: 168). Alongside these cuts, Income Support, 
Family Credit and Incapacity Benefit all replaced their predecessors. Higher 
payments for specific circumstances were granted for those in receipt of 
Income Support. Substantial increases in Family Credit helped increase take 
up and alleviated the ‘poverty trap’ by reducing marginal deduction rates (Field 
and Piachaud, 1971). Consolidating and extending the Mobility Allowance and 
Attendance Allowance, Disability Living Allowance was introduced to provide 
greater financial support to households incurring extra financial costs as a 
result of a severe disability (Kennedy, 2011). 
That said, the vast majority of people relying on social security as their main 
source of income found it increasingly difficult to protect their standard of living 
relative to the working population. By linking benefits to prices rather than 
earnings (that then eventually excluded costs associated with rent, mortgage 
interest and local taxes) the government ‘effectively rejected the idea of 
relative poverty’ (Barr and Coulter, 1990: 280-283). Between 1979 and 1996, 
the value of unemployment benefit fell from 21 per cent to 14 per cent of 
average earnings, and for state pensions, it fell from 26 per cent to 17 per cent 
(see Figure 1) (DWP, 2015a). In 1983, Thatcher, paradoxically suggested that 
‘people who are living in need are fully and properly provided for’ (quoted in 
Mack and Lansley, 1985: 1). Perhaps as powerful as the worsening material 
circumstance faced by many, was the rhetoric surrounding poverty and social 
security. As the quote above suggests, there was little appreciation for the 
relative nature of poverty. Social rights were fulfilled in as much as a minimum 
level of support was provided, but whether this support would keep pace with 
rising living standards was another matter. Increasingly, the right to participate 
according to the standards prevailing (Townsend, 1979) was framed as a 
threat to individual incentive propagating the ‘why work’ problem (Glennerster, 
1995: 108). 
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Figure 1: Value of benefits as a proportion of average earnings 1971-2014 
 
Source DWP (2015a), Tables 2.1a, 2.4a, 2.7a, 2.8b, author’s own analysis 
The apparent ‘laxness, excessive generosity, inefficiency and vulnerability to 
exploitation of the welfare system’ (Golding and Middleton, 1982: 109) lead 
some to suggest that the social security system was setting a permissive 
precedent allowing citizens to claim welfare without fulfilling their civic duties 
(Murray, 1990). Concerns about the ‘fecklessness’ of the unemployed and the 
rising cost of welfare, drove a campaign to tackle benefit fraud and embed 
‘active citizenship’ in the welfare system (Welshman, 2008). This political and 
policy paradigm sought to re-imagine the terms upon which social security 
was granted by encouraging citizens to ‘recognise that s/he must accept, first 
and foremost, responsibility for their own (and their family’s) welfare’ (Dwyer, 
1998: 497). Concerns about a ‘culture of dependency’ gained prominence with 
the rise of the New Right. As a result, the late 1980s saw the most significant 
shift towards work-centred social security provision with the introduction of the 
ReStart programme (Sullivan, 1996). This obligated those on unemployment 
benefit for a set period of time to attend an interview. Claimants were offered 
a range of options to assist in their job search. Long-term claimants were 
eventually required to attend a ReStart course and subsequently a workshop 
on actively looking for work. Failure to comply with these requirements 
resulted in benefit sanctions. The Jobseeker’s Act 1995 required claimants to 
be available for and actively seeking work as a condition of their payments 
(National Archives, 2012). 
As the right to social security became increasingly difficult to defend, ‘poor 
work’, characterised by involuntary part-time low-paid employment, became 
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mechanisms of collective organisation that protected many from the precarity 
of low-skilled low-paid work were being dismantled (Griggs and Bennett, 
2009). The benefits of some strikers and their families were stopped or 
reduced, the arbitration of trade unions became increasingly difficult and wage 
councils were dissolved (Timmins, 2001: 508; National Archives, 2012).  
Despite a residual conception of welfare and attempts for a smaller State, 
there were real term increases in social security spending and as a proportion 
of gross domestic product (GDP) between 1979 and 1996 (Hood and Oakley, 
2014a: 4). Social security entitlements both expanded and contracted, 
depending on the target group in question but across the board, the value of 
benefits relative to average earnings fell drastically (see Figure 1) (DWP, 
2015a). Remarkably, the incomes of the very poorest ‘were lower in real terms 
in 1994/95 than they had been in 1979’ (Hills et al., 2009: 1). Between 1979 
and 1997, the gap between the rich and the poor doubled and poverty and 
inequality returned to its pre-WWII levels (Dean, 2013: 261-263). Those 
claiming social security found it increasingly difficult to safeguard an income 
that enabled them to participate in activities deemed ‘customary’ (Townsend, 
1979). Whilst they may have secured the right to a basic minimum, the utility 
of this minimum was becoming increasingly ineffectual in protecting the 
equality of status supposedly guaranteed through membership.  
The period from 1997 to 2010 saw the rise of the ‘Third Way’ in the UK: a 
confluence of liberal market strategies and social democratic social policies 
(Giddens, 1994; Giddens, 1999). Social security reforms centred on the 
activation of social security recipients with the concurrent extension of means-
tested benefits for particular groups (Hills, 1998; Dwyer, 2004). There were 
big real term increases in certain benefits, particularly for pensioners, lone 
parents and working families (see Figure 2) (DWP, 2015a). The vernacular of 
social citizenship shifted further away from rights and towards the concept of 
support (Carmel and Papadopoulos, 2003). There was a move towards 
increased support for those ‘actively seeking work’ and a tailoring of services 
to provide the right services to the right people: ‘staff became ‘personal 
advisors’ not mere providers of benefit cheques’ (Timmins, 2001: 564). 
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Figure 2: Real value of benefit, £ / week at 2014 prices (RPI) 1971-2014 
 
Source: (DWP, 2015a), Tables 2.1a, 2.4a, 2.7a, 2.8b,d,e, author’s own analysis 
In 1996, Job-seeker’s Allowance (JSA) was introduced with entitlement to 
contributory provision capped at 6 months and a range of measures 
introduced to create a compact between claimant and the State that they 
would ‘actively seek work’ (National Archives, 2012). New Labour’s social 
security policy can be seen as a continuation and concentration of efforts to 
tie social security receipt much more closely to work or at least to actively seek 
it. The discursive strategies drawn upon by New Labour were driven by the 
idea that individuals were ‘rationally choosing to live their lives on welfare’ 
(Prideaux, 2010: 301). In the words of Gordon Brown: ‘when they sign on 
benefit, they will be signing up for work’ (Brown, 1997). In 1998, New Labour 
published the Green Paper New ambitions for our country: a new contract for 
welfare which laid out their vision for ‘an active welfare system which helps 
people to help themselves and ensures a proper level of support in times of 
need’ (DSS, 1998: 16). The move towards activation intensified the ‘creeping 
conditionality’ of social rights for many (Dwyer, 2004).  
The New Deals for young people, the long-term unemployed, people aged 
over 25, lone parents and disabled people embedded welfare-to-work within 
the social security system. In 2001, the Employment Service and Benefits 
Agency was combined with existing sanction and support systems to create 
Jobcentre Plus. Employment zones and work-based training were introduced, 
as well as mandatory work-focused interviews for many benefit recipients, 
such as lone parents in receipt of income support (cf. Stewart and Wright, 
2014). Gradually, exemptions from work-centred conditions narrowed (cf. 
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zeitgeist of welfare policy with a series of measures introduced to ‘rebuild the 
welfare state around work’ (DSS, 1998: 23). During the years of New Labour, 
this approach was heavily influenced by the works of Amitai Etzioni (1995). 
Symbolically significant was the renaming of the Department of Social 
Security as the Department of Work and Pensions.  
With his stated ambition to end child poverty within a generation, Tony Blair 
generated political support for increasing social security expenditure (Dean, 
2013). By mobilising resources around the ‘deserving poor’, New Labour 
channelled vast amounts of money towards those at the bottom end of the 
income distribution (Sefton, 2009). Family Credit was replaced with the much 
more generous Working Families Tax Credit. The transition to Working Tax 
Credits and Child Tax Credits increased entitlement for families towards the 
middle of the income distribution. Since then, Tax Credits have accounted for 
the second biggest growth in social security expenditure after Pensions 
(Edmiston, 2011). Child Benefit was increased and unlike many other benefits, 
Child Tax Credit uprating was linked to earnings (DWP, 2015a). Although child 
poverty rates fluctuated, they fell from 34 per cent to 27 per cent between 
1997 and 2010 (see Figure 3) (Crawford et al., 2015). The Minimum Income 
Guarantee and later Pension Credit were also linked to earnings (DWP, 
2015a). Along with winter fuel payments, and concessions including free TV 
licences and reduced travel costs, real value of the basic state pension and 
pension credit increased substantially (DWP, 2015a), the pensioner poverty 
rate fell from 29 per cent to 14 per cent between 1997 and 2011 as a result 
(see Figure 3) (Crawford et al., 2015). Whilst there was relative success in 
targeting the above groups, working-age single people and couples without 
children lost out (Hills et al., 2010). The distinction between deserving and 
undeserving poor was explicit in targeting social security provision, not only 
where it was most needed, but also where it was considered most politically 
viable (Edmiston, 2014b).  
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Figure 3: Proportion of population below 60% median income after housing 
costs 1961-2012 
 
Source: (Crawford et al., 2015), for GB till 1993, UK onwards 
In 1997, Mandelson said ‘judge us after ten years of success in office. For one 
of the fruits of that success will be that Britain has become a more equal 
society’ (Mandelson, 1997: 7). Taking stock of their achievements (and 
failures), New Labour did make significant headway in extending and 
enhancing the rates (and targeting) of social security for particular groups 
(Hills, 2013). It introduced improved support and training for moving into work; 
increased in-work income and employment protection for the low-paid; and 
the rates of benefits for targeted groups (Carmel and Papadopoulos, 2003; 
Brewer and Shephard, 2004). At the same time, it also diminished and 
commodified the social rights of targeted groups by making it increasingly 
difficult to secure a minimum income independent of the labour market 
(Dwyer, 2004). By 2010, social rights were less accorded by your status as a 
citizen and more by your socio-demographic characteristics and by your 
status as a (prospective) worker. The right to a decent income became 
legitimate for some and not others. These developments were symptomatic of 
the Third Way approach and the individualism that pervaded conceptions of 
citizenship responsibilities (Dean, 2004: 79).  
Against the backdrop of the global financial crisis and ensuing economic 
recession, the Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition government came to 
power in 2010. Since then, the Conservative Party has set out to implement 
the ‘the most far-reaching programme of change that the welfare system has 
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significant cuts to social security and increased conditionality for the low-
income working-age population in particular (Dean, 2012; Ginn, 2013; Ridge, 
2013; Stewart and Wright, 2014). Since 2010, a series of reforms have been 
made to benefit structures, entitlements and rates to reduce public spending 
by £21 billion in 2015-16 (HM Treasury, 2015: 30). 
Whilst the Conservative Party initially endorsed a relative understanding of 
poverty, benefit uprating has been moved from the Retail Price Index to 
Consumer Price Index with anticipated savings of £1.1 billion in cash terms in 
2014 and £1.9 billion in 2015 (DWP, 2013b: 1). Again, this has reduced the 
relative value of certain social security payments (see Figures 1 and 2) (DWP, 
2015a). Council Tax Benefit has been abolished, social tenants now face 
financial penalties for under-occupation and a Local Housing Allowance cap 
has been introduced. The transition from Disability Living Allowance to 
Personal Independence Payments is expected to see current claimants lose 
£2,240 million in payments (DWP, 2012b: 8). Crisis Loans have been 
abolished, delayed payments for jobseekers have been introduced and Tax 
Credits have been cut (Hills, 2015; Lupton et al., 2015). Almost thirty years 
after John Moore initially proposed the idea, tapered child benefit was 
introduced in 2013.  
In 2013, an annual benefit cap was introduced for the working age population, 
with only a few groups exempt (primarily those in receipt of disability-related 
payments). The Coalition government introduced the cap so that social 
security payments could not exceed £26,000. In May 2015, the Conservative 
government announced that the benefit cap was being reduced to £23,000 to 
‘incentivise work – so people are always better off after a day at the office or 
factory than they would have been sitting at home’ (Cabinet Office, 2015: 6). 
Since Beveridge’s insurance plan, there has been an enduring concern about 
raising benefits too prodigiously. In the late 1970s concerns were raised that 
‘many lower wage earners, especially those with families would be better off 
unemployed and dependent on supplementary benefit’ (Field et al., 1977: 
231). Thatcher also believed that ‘it’s right to have a large difference between 
those in work and those out of work’ (Thatcher, 1980 quoted in Timmins, 2001: 
375). However, these reforms signal the first explicit attempt at a remedy: a 
range of policies and cuts to reduce the fiscal burden of low-income, working-
age social security (Ginn, 2013).  Changes inclusive of those proposed up 
until 2015 in the UK show the austerity measures proposed and taken to be 
very regressive with those in the middle of the income distribution actually 
being net beneficiaries of reforms undertaken (Brewer et al., 2011; Avram et 
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al., 2013; HM Treasury, 2013). With further cuts announced and yet to come, 
child and working age poverty are set to increase significantly in the short and 
long term (Hills, 2015). 
Throughout its term in office, the coalition government committed to modifying, 
what it saw as a ‘complex and chaotic system, which failed to promote work 
and penalised responsible choices – all at a great cost to hard-working 
taxpayers’ (Duncan Smith, 2015: n.p.). During this period, political discourse 
and media coverage has promoted the idea that: 
income through benefits maintains people on a low income, and can 
even risk bolstering welfare dependency and feeding social 
problems… Work, on the other hand, and the income it brings, can 
change lives’ (DWP, 2012a: 10). 
This has cultivated a political mandate for welfare reforms and activation 
programmes targeted at working-age low-income benefit recipients (Dean, 
2013: 285). As part of their welfare reform programme, the Department for 
Work and Pensions published the White Paper Universal Credit: Welfare that 
Works in 2010 (DWP, 2010a). With this, Universal Credit was introduced to 
consolidate a range of benefits into one assessment and payment. According 
to an early impact assessment, Universal Credit is anticipated to increase 
entitlements by ‘nearly £1.1 billion a year and low-income families will see 
their entitlements rise by more than high-income families’ (Brewer et al., 2012: 
39). However, once fully implemented, Universal Credit will lead to the 
intensification, personalisation and extension of conditionality to recipients of 
social security that were previously exempt (Pennycock and Whittaker, 2012; 
Dwyer and Wright, 2014). Those receiving Universal Credit will be ‘assigned 
to different levels of conditionality based on perceived ability and readiness to 
work’ (Stewart and Wright, 2014: 3). This is coupled with the Work 
Programme, which has increased and extended work placements and job 
search requirements. Non-compliance by particular ‘job-seekers’ now incurs 
tougher and longer (financial) sanctions (CAB, 2013; Webster, 2013). The rate 
and extent of sanctions has increased substantially. For example, the number 
of Jobseeker’s Allowance sanction decisions rose from 439,112 in 2009 to 
605, 595 in 2014 and the number of Employment and Support Allowance 
sanction decisions rose from 18,843 to 36,810 per year during the same 
period (DWP, 2015b).  
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In addition to this, those claiming Employment and Support Allowance are 
having their entitlement re-assessed with many undergoing Work Capability 
Assessments. Whilst a range of maternity, paternity, parental and care 
policies have been introduced to recognise the value of unpaid care and 
domestic work, there are financial and career penalties involved in taking up 
such opportunities (Lewis and Campbell, 2007). These developments are also 
largely restricted to those parents engaged in ‘gainful’ employment. The care 
work of unemployed lone parents has also been delegitimised with restrictions 
and caps applied to income support (Johnsen, 2014). Those subject to such 
treatment are ‘invisible as mothers or moral citizens, and visible only as low 
waged worker citizens’ (Pulkingham et al., 2010: 287). In this instance, the 
work caring for children is only socially validated when financially facilitated by 
an independent labourer (Prideaux, 2005: 128). As such, those involved in 
unpaid domestic and care work have also been systematically marginalised 
from mainstream conceptions of responsible citizenship (Williams, 2001).  
Before David Cameron came to power, he described poverty as a ‘moral 
disgrace’ and suggested that social security should keep pace with rising 
standards of living: ‘in the end the test for our policies will not be how they 
affect the better off, but how they help the worst off in our country’ (Guardian, 
2006: n.p.; cf. Lister and Bennett, 2010). This sentiment has not carried over 
to the policies implemented since 2010. The move towards a more absolute 
understanding of poverty has damaged the rights to social security for those 
most in need of it (Edmiston, 2014b). The ability to secure a minimum income 
has become (even more) contingent on fulfilment of obligations to engage in 
the paid labour market. Some have rather sensationally suggested that the 
current age of austerity and political-economic paradigm signals a ‘post-
welfare consensus’ (Peck, 2010; Chakrabortty, 2013). In spite of all the ‘cuts’: 
‘total Government spending on social security benefits and tax credits is 
forecast to increase from £210 billion in 2013-2014 to around £218 billion 
rather than £220 billion in 2015-16’ (DWP, 2013b: 6). Importantly though, the 
utility of social security for working-age low-income benefit recipients has been 
damaged due to falling benefit rates (see Figures 1 and 2) (DWP, 2015a). In 
May 2015, the Conservative party won an overall majority in the general 
election. They have committed to pursuing a series of cuts to social security, 
extending and increasingly conditionality and reducing the real-term and 
relative value of benefits. As a result, an increasingly liberalised model of 
social rights has been embedded within welfare provision so that one’s claim 
to a minimum income is becoming increasingly contingent on engagement 
- 53 - 
with the paid labour market or one’s status as a ‘deserving citizen’ (DWP, 
2010b; HM Treasury, 2015). 
Since 1979, there has been a dramatic shift in the design, delivery and impact 
of social security. This shift is symptomatic of a major reorientation ‘away from 
redistributive concerns based on expanding welfare rights in a nation-state 
towards more productivist and cost-saving concerns in an open economy’ 
(Jessop, 1993: 17-18). Against the backdrop of contemporary post-Fordist 
welfare capitalism (Burrows and Loader, 1994), Jessop (1993) pointed to the 
emergence of a Schumpeterian workfare state. Jessop (1993) believed this 
new workfare state would focus increasingly on supply-side issues in 
structural competitiveness by promoting individual freedom and flexibility in 
and through social policy instruments. Leaving behind the Keynesian welfare 
paradigm, this observation has been borne out by the changing role and 
distributional effects of social security. 
Means-testing has become an increasingly prominent feature of the social 
security system (Hood and Oakley, 2014a). The growth in expenditure on 
contributory benefits is almost entirely due to increases in the basic state 
pension (Seely, 2014: 4). Benefit uprating has diverged according to the 
benefit and target group in question (Hood and Oakley, 2014b). There has 
been an increasing trend towards selectivity and targeting of social security 
provisions, with working-age, childless and low-income groups losing out the 
most (Hood and Oakley, 2014a; Hills, 2015). 
The rejection of a Keynesian approach to economic and welfare governance 
is clear from the prevailing ‘austerity consensus’ that has dominated political 
and public discourse in recent years (Farnsworth and Irving, 2012). Alongside 
this, there has been an increasing reluctance to incorporate employers into 
the citizenship dialectic. Poor wages and tax benefit measures mean that the 
marginal deduction rates for low-skilled low-paid workers are now much higher 
than for those in secure full-time employment with well-above average 
earnings (Torry, 2013). As a result, the financial benefits of paid work are not 
so apparent for those transitioning from unemployment to low-paid work 
(Shildrick et al., 2012). Gordon Brown pledged to Make Work Pay and a 
statutory national minimum wage was introduced in 1999. However, the real-
term value of this increased until 2006 but has stagnated and fallen thereafter 
(Tobin, 2010; LPC, 2015: 52). The main rate of corporation tax was 52 per 
cent in 1973 but dropped drastically to 33 per cent during the early years of 
Thatcher (HMRC, 2013a). This downward trend continued throughout the 
years of New Labour falling from 31 per cent to 28 per cent and has since 
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fallen to an all-time low of 21 per cent in 2014-15 (HMRC, 2013b; Crawford et 
al., 2015; Pope and Roantree, 2015: 29).  
Policy responses have not only increased conditionality but also increased the 
conditioning of the poor: ‘the more the State gave in the name of the poor, the 
more it denied the poor control over its disbursement’ (Vincent, 1991: 206; 
Jessop, 2002: 260). Measures have increasingly come to centre on individual 
culpability rather than the structural determinants of agency and outcome 
(Wright, 2012). As a result, the structural determinants of unemployment or 
inequality are largely ignored and human agency is narrowly conceived as 
rational and calculated (Prideaux, 2010). Whilst ‘there are still many benefits 
and many groups of claimants for whom the responsibilities to be available for 
and actively seeking work are not relevant’ (Griggs and Bennett, 2009: 21) 
this group is getting smaller. The ‘creeping conditionality’ (Dwyer, 2004) 
imposed by New Labour has developed into a personalised, intensified and 
extended practice targeting more and more low-income recipients that were 
previously exempt (Pennycock and Whittaker, 2012; Dwyer and Wright, 
2014). The centrality of paid work in recognising the responsibilities of social 
citizenship has ultimately delegitimised any deviation from full-time 
employment and denigrated the position of low-income groups. Unless 
previous life-time contribution or sufficiently mitigating circumstances preclude 
citizens from the imperative to actively seek or do paid work, their entitlement 
to even the basic minimum is increasingly brought into question. This has lead 
to a patch-work system of social security and redistribution that undermines 
the right to a minimum income for many of those who most need it. The 
remainder of the chapter examines the distributional effects of this and 
implications for citizenship status and identity. 
3.4 The changing distributional effects of social security 
provision 
In broad brush strokes, it is possible to assess the extent to which the right to 
a minimum income has been fulfilled by examining poverty rates over time. 
Since 1948, absolute poverty has fallen dramatically across all demographic 
groups. Whilst this may suggest that the ‘right to a modicum of welfare and 
security’ has been largely achieved, it tells us very little about how social 
security measures taken have supported the ‘right to live the life of a civilised 
being according to the standards prevailing in society’ (Marshall, 1950: 11). 
Measures of the relative poverty rate are able to capture such an experience 
and more appropriately reflect a maximalist interpretation of social citizenship 
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rights. In 1958, Brian Abel-Smith said that ‘with rising living standards of life, 
a belief in a subsistence minimum is a belief in ever increasing inequality and 
class distinction’ (Abel-Smith, 1958: 69). Even those with a minimal 
conception of social citizenship, believe that the value of the minimum should 
rise with the standards of society (Hayek, 2006). Abject poverty of the type 
witnessed at the turn of the 20th Century has been significantly reduced, but 
relative poverty has grown since the early 1980s (see Figure 3) (Crawford et 
al., 2015). In spite of substantial expansions in social security entitlement from 
1961 onwards, poverty rates for the population as a whole changed very little 
until 1984. From Thatcher’s second term until Major’s departure, relative 
poverty grew from 15 per cent in 1984 to 25 per cent in 1997. Under New 
Labour, significant efforts were made to tackle poverty but at least a fifth of 
the UK population has remained in relative poverty since 1986.  
Between 1961 and 2012, poverty rates for children, working age parents, and 
working age non-parents all increased by 14 percentage points (see Figure 3) 
(Crawford et al., 2015). During the early 1990s, child poverty reached its peak 
at 34 per cent and fell during the early years of New Labour. Pensioner poverty 
fluctuated considerably falling from 41 per cent in 1972 to 13 per cent in 1984 
and then rising back up to 41 per cent in 1989 after the link between earnings 
and pensions was broken. Since then, pensioner poverty has fallen to just 14 
per cent. Overall then, there was an increase in the poverty rate from the early 
1980s onwards.  
Part of the explanation for this was that social security payments struggled to 
keep pace with rising median incomes and the growing income share of the 
top 10 per cent of earners. From 1949 to 1978 the total income share of the 
top 10 per cent of earners fell from 32.3 per cent to 27.8 per cent, reflecting 
the progressive system of taxation in place (Alvaredo et al., 2015). However, 
between 1979 and 1997 the income share of the top 10 per cent of earners 
rose to 38.9 per cent, peaking at 42.6 per cent in 2007 and dropping slightly 
to 39.1 in 2012 (Alvaredo et al., 2015; Atkinson and Ooms, 2015). In 1949, 
the top 1 per cent of earners lost 41.1 per cent of their income due to income 
tax. By 2003, this fell to just 11 per cent (Alvaredo et al., 2015). Within this 
context, it became increasingly difficult for social security payments to 
compensate for the significant rise in inequality. Over the years, there has 
been an increasing policy focus on closing the gap in incomes between the 
bottom and the middle of the income distribution. However, successive 
political administrations have failed to address the increasing gap in income 
between those at the top of the income distribution and everyone else. 
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Irrespective of capability, there has been an increasing lack of political will to 
tackle rising income inequality. Encapsulating New Labour’s position, Peter 
Mandelson famously said: ‘we are intensely relaxed about people getting filthy 
rich as long as they pay their taxes’ (Peter Mandelson quoted in Lister, 2011: 
72).    
Joyce and Sibieta (2013) illustrate that the rise in inequality in the UK is 
principally due to the substantial gains of those at the very top (1 per cent) of 
the income distribution. Beyond the distributional effect of this, it remains to 
be seen what effect this may have on what is (normatively at least) deemed 
to be the ‘standards prevailing in society’ (Marshall, 1950: 11). Between 1961 
and 2012, the income ratio between the 90th and 10th percentile of the income 
distribution rose from 3.2 to 3.9, the income ratio between the 90th and 50th 
percentile rose from 1.7 to 2.0 and perhaps most significantly the income ratio 
between 50th and 10th percentile rose from 1.9 to 2.0 (Crawford et al., 2015). 
Over the last 50 years, income redistribution measures have not only failed to 
reduce income inequality between the extreme ends of the income 
distribution, they have also failed to close the gap between the bottom and 
middle of the income distribution. As a result, the right to participate according 
to the standards prevailing in society has not been enhanced at an aggregate 
level. 
The efficacy of social transfers in providing a decent income can be measured 
by looking at the real value of payments over time. The following statistics are 
drawn from the Annual Abstract of Statistics and are summarised in Figures 1 
and 2 above (DWP, 2015a). Since 1971, the value of the Basic State Pension 
has risen in real terms from £75 to £113. Unemployment benefit rose 
dramatically until 1972 and has fluctuated since (DWP, 2015a).  Uprating of 
Child Benefit for the first child initially increased in real terms but its value 
peaked at £24 in 2009 and has gradually fallen since. Due to shifting 
entitlements, the real value of Income Support varies significantly depending 
on the circumstances of the claimant. Income support for single people aged 
over 25 has changed very little since 1989 but fell to its lowest level of £57 in 
2014. By contrast, the real value of Income Support for a couple with 1 child 
has seen substantial increases and fluctuations: it was worth £167 in 1997, 
peaked at £215 in 2009 and has since fallen to £197 in 2014. Between 1971 
and 2014, the value of the Basic State Pension fell from 20.9 per cent to 18.2 
per cent of average earnings and unemployment benefit from 20.9 per cent to 
11.7 per cent. Between 1988 and 2014, Income Support for single people 
aged over 25 fell from 15.3 per cent to 11.7 per cent. Child Benefit initially rose 
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to 4.4 per cent but has since fallen to 3.3 per cent of average earnings. All this 
would suggest a cumulative degradation of the financial position of those 
reliant on social security, but in particular working-age individuals that are on 
a low-income, single and childless. Of course, it’s important to acknowledge 
that very often these payments do not exist in isolation. Expansions in 
entitlement and a proliferation in the schema of benefit provision have 
increased claims to passport benefits that help either top up incomes or 
subsidise the cost of living.  
Spending on social security has risen exponentially, rising from 4 per cent of 
GDP in 1948 to 13.4 per cent of GDP in 2012, increasing in real-terms for 55 
consecutive years (Crawford et al., 2015). In 1948-9, total benefit expenditure 
was £13 billion (in 2012-13 prices) and total benefit expenditure is forecast to 
be £163 billion in 2012-13 (DWP, 2013a). It would seem that this vast increase 
in social security spending illustrates, at least at some level, the commitment 
of the State to provide a minimum income. However, increases in social 
expenditure have not lead to a reduction in relative poverty. To the contrary, 
relative poverty has increased. Increased means-testing was designed to 
target resources where they were most needed. However, there has been a 
mismatch between political rhetoric and policy implementation over the last 
thirty-five years.  
Those in the middle of the income distribution have disproportionately 
benefited from expansions in social security spending and activity (see Figure 
4). Between 1977 and 2012, the average proportion of income received in 
benefits by those in the middle of the income distribution doubled from 12 per 
cent to 24 per cent. During the same period, the average share of income 
received by those at the bottom of the income distribution rose from 61 per 
cent in 1977 to 71 per cent in 1986 but dropped to 58 per cent in 2012. Despite 
exponential increases in income for the top 20 per cent of earners in the UK, 
this group has maintained around 3 per cent of their gross income from cash 
benefits. On average this amounts to an extra £2,218 a year for the richest 
households when comparing cash payments between 1977 and 2012. 
Compared to 1977, those at the bottom of the income distribution have 
received an extra £6,403 a year on average and those in the middle have 
received an extra £6,660 a year on average (ONS, 2013).  
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Figure 4: Average proportion of gross income made up of direct cash benefits 
for 3 groups across the income distribution 1977-2012  
 
Source: (ONS, 2013), author’s own analysis 
As a result, there is now very little nominal difference in the amount of direct 
cash benefits received by those at the bottom and those in the middle of the 
income distribution. In 1983, Deacon and Bradshaw claimed that ‘the paradox 
of the means-test is that it has a discredited past and an expanding future’ 
(Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983: 204). It should be borne in mind that means-
testing became more prominent amid the rediscovery of poverty and the 
realisation that the diversity of people’s needs and circumstances 
necessitated a more targeted system of provision with higher rates of benefits 
and contributions. The system of flat rate contributions in return for flat rate 
benefits was minimal and could not generate enough to effectively tackle 
poverty (Townsend and Abel-Smith, 1965). Whilst the means test attaches 
stigma to social security receipt; it has also helped increase the level of 
payments to certain groups. Universal and contributory systems are often 
advocated as the ideal because they generate collective political support for 
collective benefits (Horton and Gregory, 2009; Torry, 2013). 
The idea here is that if the middle classes benefit from programmes, 
then they will use their not inconsiderable political skills to obtain more 
resources for those programmes or to defend them in periods of decline 
(Goodin and Le Grand, 1987: 210). 
However, in spite of receiving a growing proportion of social security 
expenditure since 1977, attitudes towards welfare and particular recipients of 
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seminal work on the ‘paradox of re-distribution’, Korpi and Palme (1998) 
suggest that means-testing leads to less redistribution and this would appear 
to be the case here. Poorly targeted social security provision has meant 
resources are not meeting those most in need of them and payments are not 
keeping pace with living standards. Abandoning flat-rate contributions for flat-
rate benefits, the social security system has moved away from a principle of 
universalism towards targeted provision with contingent generosity and 
entitlement.  
Nevertheless, this evidence jolts with the common characterisation of the 
population as ‘divided into people who ‘depend on’ state support (such as the 
unemployed, single parents, invalids [sic] and retired people), and people who 
support and insure themselves out of their own income and property’ (Jordan 
and Redley, 1994: 154). In reality, all social citizens, over the course of their 
lifetime make claims on welfare (Titmuss, 1958). How this is experienced, 
though, will greatly differ. For those solely reliant on mean-tested benefits, a 
residual ‘minimalist’ interpretation of social rights is principally their reality. For 
those with sufficient capital and prior earnings, a more relative and ‘thick’ 
conception of social rights is experienced. This differentiated provision and 
experience of social rights invariably affects the status and identity of citizens. 
This is a key area of examination covered in chapters five, six and seven but 
is first elaborated on below. 
3.5 Citizenship Status and Identity: Validation and 
Contingency  
The distributional and symbolic dimensions of citizenship affect how members 
are positioned ‘vis-à-vis non-members, one another, the State and other major 
societal institutions’ (Schram et al., 2010). Depending on the dominant 
paradigm of citizenship, welfare has the material and figurative capacity to 
include and exclude. Reflecting on the provision of free school meals at the 
turn of the century, Gray (1908) suggests that:  
The school dinner is an education in citizenship. Without a word being 
said, the child gradually absorbs the knowledge of its own dependence 
on and place in social life. He finds himself a guest at the common table 
of the nation (Gray, 1908: 168). 
The same can be said of the collective heritage and efforts arising from welfare 
provision more generally. The transition from philanthropic discretion to 
statutory entitlement inculcated a sense of common belonging and 
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interdependence in social and economic life (Griggs and Bennett, 2009). 
Welfare provision sought to protect against and moderate the excesses of the 
market. Whilst the philanthropic provision of free school meals for poor 
children provided crucial relief, it also obfuscated the structural determinants 
of its necessity. In other words, assistance made it less urgent or necessary 
to question why children were malnourished or why their families suffered 
economic hardship. The tripartite system of the 1940s and 1950s offered 
some attempt beyond perfunctory provision to readdress the distributional 
effects of the market. No longer were benefit recipients ‘guests’, they were 
‘members’ of an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2006).  
Since then, the right to social security has become ever more contingent on 
fulfilling work-related obligations. The entrenchment of private patriarchal 
responsibility (Williams, 2001) has served to vitiate the right to social 
protection. Escalating inequality and poverty has compromised the notion that 
we are at a ‘common table of the nation’. The growing gap between the richest 
and poorest citizens marks a move towards what Malcolm Dean has 
described as a ‘drawbridge society’ (Dean, 2013: 246). A society in which the 
‘winners’ have isolated themselves from the ‘losers’. Paid work and 
independence from the State and others is broadly construed as responsible 
citizenship. Within such a paradigm, the structural determinants of behaviour 
and outcomes are largely ignored (Orton, 2009).  
The rise of neo-liberalism has had a two-fold mutually degradating effect on 
welfare and welfare outcomes. Firstly, the rise of free-market individualism 
threatens the efficacy of welfare instruments. As illustrated in the case of 
social security transfers: social security policies struggle to address rising 
inequalities and consequent poverty arising from the market (Hills, 2013). 
Under these conditions, the capacity of welfare to affect life and resource 
outcomes becomes tangential to the power of the free market to determine 
the distribution and allocation of social goods. Secondly, neo-liberalism has 
not only damaged welfare outcomes, it has also compromised the notion and 
function of welfare itself. Public services have increasingly come to operate 
according to market rather than social or ethical imperatives. Entitlement to a 
satiated understanding of social rights is not so much dictated by virtue of 
one’s status as a citizen. It is not even dictated according to the needs of the 
polity as increased means-testing would have us believe. Rather, social goods 
are predicated on one’s capacity and success in ‘earning’ citizenship status 
through paid civic contribution (Van Houdt et al., 2011). Hegemonic ideals of 
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the virtuous citizen centre on work, self-sufficiency and existing capital. 
Welfare, then, increasingly comes to operate according to market principles.  
King and Waldron (1988: 436) argue that welfare provision helps constitute 
‘what it is to be a member of society’. In a rather different context, Kymlicka 
observes that ‘if citizenship is differentiated, it no longer proves a shared 
experience of common status’ (Kymlicka, 1995: 174). Nonetheless the point 
stands, the individualisation and liberalisation of welfare has resulted in a 
bifurcated system and experience of citizenship. What it means to be a citizen 
varies according to exposure to market-based inequalities, but also how 
welfare positions citizens within the polity. The current design and delivery of 
welfare configures citizenship in such a way that it propagates rather than 
smooths out the status differentials between citizens. In Money for Everyone 
(2013), Malcolm Torry makes the case for a universal citizens income and 
highlights some of the pitfalls of means-testing:  
Means-testing divides society into the means-tested and the non-
means-tested; into those whose choices in the labour market are 
constrained by means-tested benefits regulations and those whose 
choices in the labour market are relatively unconstrained. These 
divisions in our society add up to a serious social rift (Torry, 2013: 171). 
Postulated as such, welfare provision can, in certain instances, delineate 
citizen status and identity as much as market-based inequalities. Not only is 
this true in statutory entitlements, but also in the conditions placed on benefit 
receipt. Taken as a whole, the status of citizenship has changed dramatically 
over time so that rights and duties are no longer synergetic for a portion of the 
polity. Rodger (1992) suggests that there is much to be gleaned from social 
closure theory in this respect. Weber’s theory of social closure explains the 
process by which open and closed relations are created vis-à-vis class and 
collective action (Parkin, 2007 [1974]; cf. Weber, 2013). Taking a more 
expansive approach beyond private capital, Rodger explores how the State 
can be understood as a principal actor that ‘systematically structures 
marginality for the poor in society’ (Rodger, 1992: 45). The open and closed 
relations of citizenship, then, are created and sustained by the rights, 
responsibilities and ideals of social citizenship. This process results in a 
distinction between what could be termed here as the Validated Active Citizen 
and the Residual Contingent Citizen. Based on the discussion above and 
existing literature, these two proposed conditions are operationalized and 
examined in subsequent chapters. In part, the discussion below represents a 
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brief anticipation of how these two conditions might be experienced by citizens 
given the existing political-economic paradigm and welfare landscape. 
Effectively, the trappings of social citizenship are bestowed upon the Validated 
Active Citizen. Their lived experiences affirm the figurative and material 
benefits of engaging in the Social Contract. They fulfil the duties of social 
citizenship by engaging in socially and economically rewarded paid 
employment. Their status and belonging is validated in the structure and 
design of the economy and welfare. Their identity and ideals centre on self-
perceived independence from the State and others. Their own efforts for 
material security obscure them from the structural effects of their privilege. In 
sum, they benefit from the trappings of a hegemonic and organisational 
framework that has been designed in their name.  
By contrast, the Residual Contingent Citizen experiences very different 
treatment and outcomes. Their social rights are minimal and ‘thin’ (Dean, 
2010). The State provides residual social provisions and any extension 
beyond this is deemed welfare profligacy and a threat to individual incentive. 
Underlying a residual realisation of welfare is a previously implicit but 
increasingly explicit belief that poverty and poverty alleviation lies in the hands 
of those subject to it. The ascendency of neo-liberal citizenship has privatised 
both risk and reward (Clarke, 2004: 33), negating the structural factors that 
impinge on decision-making and life outcomes. Narrow conceptions of civic 
duty invalidate the unpaid care, domestic and social work undertaken and 
assume a moral corruptness possessed by many in receipt of welfare. Their 
citizenship is contingent on a minimal level of assistance. They are once again 
‘guests’ rather than ‘members’ at the ‘common table of the nation’.  
Interpreting this group as ‘conditional citizens’ (Dwyer, 1998) can only be 
accurate if the structures that they operate within are conducive to effective 
social and citizen mobility. Analytically, conformity should lead to citizenship. 
However, the current ‘age of austerity’ has slashed welfare entitlement and 
increased governmentality in activation and poverty alleviation measures 
(Hancock and Mooney, 2013; Wilkinson, 2013; Cromby and Willis, 2014). This 
has stripped away crucial mechanisms that would otherwise enable citizens 
to move from subjects to full citizen members. Not only does the dominant 
paradigm invalidate a sense of belonging or legitimacy they may feel as 
citizens, it also makes it hard to move into a space and condition in which they 
would be recognised as such. Their status is contingent rather than 
conditional, in that their capacity to attain full and meaningful citizenship status 
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is possible but less certain than merely administrative requirements being met 
(Dwyer, 1998).  
Welfare provision and its underlying principles constitute a dominant praxis of 
citizenship. The assumed rationalities of political, economic and social life can 
result in what Jean Harvey describes as Civilized Oppression. She suggests 
the ‘common sense’ workings of daily life can form:  
‘…long-term patterns of exclusion, subordination, and denigration that 
can have a devastating cumulative impact, not only on the 
psychological well-being of the victims, but also on their opportunities, 
life-path, and chances of fulfilment in various ventures that involve 
others. Civilized oppression, then, poses a special challenge in that 
apparently trivial acts that often pass under the social radar screen can 
wreck the lives of those systematically at the receiving end. For the 
non-oppressed the perceived triviality is a barrier to taking the claims 
about oppression seriously’ (Harvey, 2010: 15). 
Whilst ‘welfare provision is now conceived of as a core element of citizenship 
in Western society’ (King and Waldron, 1988: 417), it can also be used to 
mollify the problematic condition of deprivation and avoid social disorder 
(Titmuss, 1971: 115; Piven and Cloward, 1993). Even if the rights of social 
citizenship are not fulfilled, the ‘myth’ of their attainment proves pervasive in 
the formation of collective citizenship identity (Roche, 1992). The provision of 
meagre benefits placates pleas against such injustice with the rhetorical 
justification that ‘something is being done’. For those unable or choosing not 
to conform to hegemonic conceptions of responsible and worthy citizenship, 
the lived experience of deprivation can be both materially and symbolically 
alienating. This is something to be further explored in chapters five, six and 
seven. The dominant paradigm of social citizenship isolates those subject to 
deprivation from the rest of society: ‘the excluded are often characterised as 
individual failures, in need of ethical reconstruction and re-attachment to the 
virtuous community before they may be accepted into the citizenship fold’ 
(Hart, 2009b: 643). Increasingly, the function of the State centres on 
addressing moral rather than economic deficits. As such, sustained and 
intense forms of deprivation threaten the material and ‘ontological security’ 
(Giddens, 1991: 47) of citizenship. 
The categories of Validated Active Citizen and Residual Contingent Citizen 
have been described here in rather absolute terms. It should be borne in mind 
that whilst this distinction is very much real in the structuring and outcomes of 
citizenship, it has principally been used here as a heuristic device. Reflecting 
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on the current nature of rights and responsibilities, this distinction helps 
explain how citizens are positioned within the polity and how this shapes their 
lived experience. A bimodal understanding of this process does inevitably 
simplify the multiplicity of citizen’s lived experiences. A confluence of factors 
will determine how one is subjected by and positioned according to the 
dominant welfare paradigm. In reality, citizens have multiple, overlapping and 
conflicting citizenships (Oliver and Heater, 1994; Isin and Wood, 1999). The 
point of focus here, however, is on the bifurcating function of social citizenship 
currently propagated by state apparatus.  
As illustrated in the case of child and pensioner poverty, the legitimacy of a 
claim to social rights changes across the life course. In addition, the extent to 
which these statuses apply across different welfare domains will largely rest 
on how universally a particular social right is conceived. At present, healthcare 
and education is less informed by the distinction between validated and 
contingent citizen. Having said that, access to and quality of education and 
health services is highly correlated with the income and capital of recipients 
(Tudor Hart, 1971; Matthews and Hastings, 2013). Within this context, even 
rights conventionally understood as universal and egalitarian can be seen as 
undergoing a process of 'privatisation' (Clarke, 2004). These positions can be 
understood as two ends of continuum where sites of tension arise that push 
citizens towards one end or the other. For some, the extent of fluidity is 
extremely limited so that ‘poverty means the exclusion from living standards, 
the lifestyles and the fellowship of one’s fellow citizens’ (Donnison, 1981: 226). 
Escape from this condition is not only stifled by socio-economic structures but 
also aggravated by the hegemonic paradigm of social citizenship and welfare 
governance.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated how the  dimensions of social citizenship have 
changed over time. In doing so, it is apparent that through welfare politics, 
policies and discourse, citizenship is ‘a much more differentiated and far less 
homogenous concept than has been presupposed by political theorists’ 
(Parekh, 1990: 702). Based on this, there is both empirical and conceptual 
warrant to explore lived experiences of the current hegemonic conception of 
citizenship; how those subjected to deprivation position themselves; but 
perhaps most importantly, how they interpret and negotiate a welfare 
landscape that has increasingly structured their marginality (Rodger, 1992). In 
order to do this, it is necessary to explore the experiences and attitudes of 
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both Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens. In exploring 
and contrasting their lived experiences, the thesis does not intend to detract 
from or simplify the multi-layered nature of citizenship and identity (Ellison, 
1999a; Isin and Wood, 1999). Indeed, there are multiple areas of conflict and 
congruence in how citizens negotiate citizenship and welfare. Rather, this 
empirical study helps:  
uncover and challenge the cultural and institutional practices that 
support fixed notions or normative assumptions of ‘ideal’ citizenship, 
which serve to exclude citizens who may differ from these norms. (Hart, 
2009b: 645). 
Adopting a ‘cultural citizenship’ approach (Hart, 2009a), this empirical study 
explores how the ostensible winners and losers of the current socio-economic 
system and welfare configuration negotiate the rights, responsibilities and 
status of social citizenship. Chapters five, six and seven of this thesis explore 
differences in the attitudes and experiences of Residual Contingent Citizens 
and Validated Active Citizens. These chapters examine whether and how lived 
experiences of material and status inequality, shape citizen identity and 
orientation. In particular, how poverty and affluence nurture distinctive frames 
of reference and knowledge surrounding social citizenship and the structural 
determinants of socio-economic outcome and action. Doing so makes it 
possible to reflect upon and engage with the existing empirical and theoretical 
literature in this area. Before doing so though, chapter four outlines the 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodological approach taken for this study as well 
as the practical and theoretical considerations that have informed the research 
process. As discussed in chapter two, to understand the relationship between 
social citizenship and inequality, citizenship needs to be conceived as a 
bottom-up process rather than a purely top-down status (Clarke et al., 2014). 
The experiences, attitudes and behaviours of the general public are 
particularly important in this regard. This study explored the extant realities of 
social citizenship that emerge as a result of rising poverty and inequality. As 
illustrated in chapters two and three, further in-depth empirical research is 
needed to consider exactly how people understand and identify with social 
citizenship and how this changes according to experiences of validation and 
contingency. With that in mind, this thesis sought to answer the following 
research questions:  
• Do lived experiences of poverty and affluence affect citizen identity and 
orientation? If so, how?  
• In what ways do these experiences affect attitudes and behaviours 
related to social citizenship, welfare and inequality?  
• How do lived experiences of poverty and affluence affect knowledge 
about the structural determinants of socio-economic outcome and 
action? 
• To what extent do ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ citizens engage with or deviate from 
the dominant ideals and praxis of social citizenship?  
In tandem with the aforementioned research questions, the study sought to 
explore how, in light of the determinants of attitudinal divergence, it might be 
possible to galvanise support for policies designed to tackle poverty and 
inequality. To answer these research questions, this empirical study adopted 
a mixed-methods approach with an initial phase of secondary quantitative 
data analysis of the Citizenship Survey 2005, followed by a series of in-depth, 
structured and ‘scenario-driven’ qualitative interviews. Undertaking a two-
stage research design, made it possible to move from nomothetic to 
idiographic consideration of phenomena; from causal inferences to theoretical 
accounts.  
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This chapter describes the key stages of the research process as they broadly 
occurred in sequence. The first stage, and challenge, of the research was to 
operationalize the categories of Residual Contingent Citizen and Validated 
Active Citizen developed in chapter three. The second section of the chapter 
outlines the selection criteria employed to make these categories conceptually 
cogent and empirically tractable with the phenomena of poverty, affluence, 
deprivation and inequality. The third section outlines the mixed-methods ‘lived 
experience’ approach developed for this project and the benefits of such a 
method. The fourth section provides some detail regarding the Citizenship 
Survey 2005, which was the principle data source used to undertake 
secondary quantitative data analysis. This section describes the data 
preparation, domains of analysis and statistical tests undertaken. The fifth 
section outlines the qualitative research phase of the project, including details 
regarding sampling, recruitment, the design of the interview format and 
process, data handling and analysis and due ethical considerations. The final 
section summarises the overall methodological approach taken for the project.  
4.2 Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated Active 
Citizens: operationalizing concepts 
The aim of this study was to explore how individuals, who are categorically 
included or excluded from dominant discourses and praxes of social 
citizenship, experience and make sense of inequality. The categories of 
Residual Contingent Citizen and Validated Active Citizen developed in chapter 
three were operationalized in such a way to ensure that they were 
conceptually and empirically tractable with phenomena observed in the world.  
Rather than a definition of deprivation and affluence that focuses solely on 
material resources, this study captures the phenomenological and relational 
significance of differing socioeconomic circumstance. In doing so, attitudinal 
divergence between those experiencing deprivation and affluence can be 
understood within the context of rising structural inequality. With this in mind, 
the definition of deprivation advanced by Peter Townsend is perhaps of most 
use: 
people can be said to be deprived if they lack the types of diet, clothing, 
housing, environmental, educational, working and social conditions, 
activities and facilities which are customary, or at least widely 
encouraged or approved, in the society to which they belong 
(Townsend, 1979: 413). 
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Residual Contingent Citizens not only lack the material resources to meet their 
basic needs, their disadvantage is also ‘relative to the local community or the 
wider society’ to which they belong (Townsend, 1987: 125). Their deprivation 
is conceived in relation to the common or shared standards of social 
citizenship notionally guaranteed through membership. In this sense, all those 
that fall below these shared standards lack the right ‘to share to the full in the 
social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the 
standards prevailing in society’ (Marshall, 1950: 11). These standards are 
multi-dimensional and extend to the lived environment of individuals and their 
capacity to engage with the dominant ideals and practices of social 
citizenship. With this in mind, three selection criteria were used to distinguish 
between Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens: 
employment status, household income and area deprivation. 
Exploring how validation and contingency affect citizen identity and 
orientation, this study examined the attitudes, experiences and behaviours of 
two groups: those that were a) unemployed, living in deprived areas and below 
the poverty line, and b) employed, living in affluent areas with earnings above 
the national average: 
Figure 5: Selection criteria for Validated Active Citizens and Residual 
Contingent Citizens 
As discussed in chapter three, the distinction between Residual Contingent 
Citizens and Validated Active Citizens is between those that lack, and those 
with more than, ‘a sufficiently generous share of the social product’ (White, 
2003: 17). By virtue of their economic status and material circumstance, it is 
believed Residual Contingent Citizens cannot fully engage with dominant 
ideals and practices of social citizenship that predicate engagement in the 
paid labour market and that make (often false) assumptions about the lived 
experience and benefits of social citizenship. For Validated Active Citizens, 
their employment and lived environment affirm the material and symbolic 
•Unemployed
•Living in top 30% of Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
(most deprived areas)






•Living in bottom 30% of Index of Multiple Deprivation 
(IMD) (most affluent areas)
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benefits of subscribing to the dominant ideals and practices of social 
citizenship. 
The three selection criteria were chosen because it was believed these 
coalesce in a way that creates severely ‘deprived’ and ‘affluent’ situations in 
which individuals occupy radically different ‘citizenship spaces’ in relation to 
one another (Painter and Philo, 1995). Whilst the secondary quantitative data 
analysis and qualitative interviews explored each of these geo-demographic 
characteristics in isolation and their relative significance for attitudes and 
experiences in relation to social citizenship, their compounding effects were 
of particular interest for this study. As such, the majority of the analysis 
undertaken focused on these two distinct sample groups. Hereafter, the 
nomenclature employed to refer to these two groups changes according to the 
dimension of deprivation or affluence under consideration and the symbolic 
and relational significance of their experiences, attitudes and behaviours.  
Rather than looking at all those that fell above and below a certain income or 
area deprivation threshold (i.e. the ‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’), compound selection 
criteria were used to create a large enough material and symbolic distance 
between the two sample groups. This study aimed to explore attitudes and 
experiences related to social citizenship within the context of rising poverty 
and inequality. Exploring deprivation and relative affluence through the lens 
of citizenship, makes it possible to analyse these phenomena ‘within a 
framework of institutional relationships’ (Jordan, 1996: 81). Understood in this 
way, poverty and wealth can be seen as a relational condition that is 
essentially an artefact of systemic processes and a manifestation of 
citizenship structures. Exploring the attitudes and experiences of Residual 
Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens offers two linked 
opportunities in this regard. Firstly, it makes it possible to contribute to an area 
of study that has, until recently, received relatively little attention: the study of 
the ‘rich’ and ‘elite’ (Sayer, 2014). Given their sociological and policy 
significance, the characteristics, attitudes and behaviours of this elusive social 
group have been rather neglected in the social sciences (Rowlingson and 
Connor, 2011). This study contributes towards the relative dearth of empirical 
research in this area (Khan, 2012). Secondly, studying relative poverty and 
affluence alongside one another provides analytical depth to examining the 
relationship between inequality and citizenship. Exploring experiences and 
attitudes of ‘the poor’ in reference to material wealth problematizes the 
assumption that ‘resources are always scarce [and therefore], hard choices 
have to be made’ about their distribution (Walzer, 1995: 66). Examining 
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material deficits alongside material accretions stimulates critical consideration 
of the distributional role of social citizenship and challenges ideas surrounding 
the function and limits of welfare.  
Particularly in the initial phase of secondary quantitative data analysis of the 
Citizenship Survey 2005 and the recruitment of participants for qualitative 
fieldwork, effective measurement and analysis depended greatly on the 
selection and construction of variables. The sample selection variables were 
chosen carefully to operationalise the aforementioned concepts, but it is 
important to acknowledge that these were used (and understood) as proxy 
rather than definitive measures. Further detail on the content of these 
variables and the logic of their selection is outlined below:  
Employment status: In this study, a binary distinction was made between 
those that did and did not engage in the paid labour market. Those engaging 
in part-time work, apprenticeships, and so on were excluded from the study. 
Individuals engaged in unpaid domestic labour, full-time education or of 
pensioner age were classified as unemployed for the purposes of this study. 
It was believed the focus on paid employment in citizenship and welfare 
discourse precluded them from full validation or ‘active’ status. Individualistic 
patriarchal conceptions of social citizenship are dominant within the UK 
(Williams and Deacon, 2004). As a result, moral conduct and civic virtues are 
often imagined or lived in such terms. With this in mind, employment status is 
understood to be a significant determinant of whether individuals can engage 
and identify with the dominant ideals and praxis of social citizenship. In 
addition, research identifies unemployment as a significant factor that means 
individuals can be excluded from customary ‘living patterns and activities’ 
(Murphy and Athanasou, 1999). 
Area Deprivation: Area deprivation (and affluence) was measured using the 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). This is an official statistics publication 
commissioned by the Department for Communities and Local Government. It 
is a relative ranking of small geographical areas (Lower Super Output Areas - 
LSOAs) according to their level of deprivation (DCLG, 2011; McLennan et al., 
2011). Administrative data is used to arrive at the IMD, which is essentially a 
composite indicator that measures deprivation in various aspects of daily life: 
education, income, crime, employment, health, housing and local public 
services. Originally developed by the Social Disadvantage Research Centre 
at the University of Oxford, the IMD reflects a commitment to Townsend’s 
explanation of deprivation: 
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people are in poverty if they lack the financial resources to meet their 
needs and escape deprivation, whereas people can be deprived due 
to a lack of resources of all kinds, not just financial. Following 
Townsend, deprivation should be defined in a broad way to encompass 
a wide range of aspects of an individual’s living conditions (McLennan 
et al., 2011: 8).  
The IMD does not measure the deprivation of an area as such, rather, the 
proportion of people experiencing deprivation within that area. For the 
purposes of this study, people living in the top 30 per cent of the IMD (deprived 
areas) and the bottom 30 per cent of the IMD (affluent areas) were included 
to identify those occupying radically different ‘spaces of citizenship’ (Painter 
and Philo, 1995). During analysis of the Citizenship Survey 2005, a derived 
variable based on respondents’ household postcodes was used to identify 
those living in relatively ‘deprived’ and ‘affluent’ areas. This derived variable is 
based on the IMD data published in 2004. For qualitative interviews, 
participants were recruited from the top 30 per cent and bottom 30 per cent of 
the IMD published in 2010. This was the most recent publication IMD data 
available at the time qualitative fieldwork was undertaken. 
Income: Those on an income of 60 per cent below the median are 
conventionally understood to be in relative poverty (Hills et al., 2010). With 
this in mind, this study explores the differences in attitudes, experiences and 
behaviours of those that have an equivalised net household income below 60 
per cent of the median and those that have an above average (mean) 
equivalised net household income.  
Due to constraints on sample size, it was not possible to undertake secondary 
quantitative analysis exclusively on those with an equivalised household 
income that was considerably above the mean. Whilst the Citizenship Survey 
2005 benefits from a relatively large sample size, the compound selection 
criterion employed in this study significantly reduce those subjects satisfying 
all three selection criteria. If a higher income threshold were to be used, the 
sample size for the Validated Active Citizens category would have been so 
substantially reduced as to make it near impossible to undertake statistically 
significant or robust quantitative analysis. As such, it has been necessary to 
compromise with an above average (mean) income for the upper income 
threshold. However, as discussed in section 4.5 of this chapter, significant 
attempts were made to recruit participants for qualitative fieldwork that 
represented those at the two most extreme ends of the income distribution.  
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For qualitative fieldwork, it was relatively straightforward to identify whether 
participants satisfied the income selection criterion outlined above. 
Prospective participants were asked about their net household income (before 
housing costs), their relationship status and whether they had any children 
before being interviewed. In conjunction with the most recent data available 
at the time of recruitment (DWP, 2012c), this information was used to establish 
the financial situation of respondents.  
Identifying the two sample groups for secondary quantitative data analysis 
proved to be more challenging. To arrive at a measure of household income, 
a new income variable was constructed from the data available in the 
Citizenship Survey 2005 so that household income counted as just the 
respondent’s income if they were single. However, if a respondent was 
cohabiting with a partner or spouse, the incomes of both parties were 
aggregated to count as household income. Of course, an assumption is being 
made that the cumulative income of a couple is ‘fairly shared’ between them 
which is a potential limitation of the secondary quantitative analysis (Vogler, 
1989). The Citizenship Survey 2005 only provided an ordinal measure of 
income as opposed to a continuous variable, so it was not possible to identify 
income with absolute precision. As a result, a mid-point range of a 
respondent’s income (and their partner’s or spouse’s income if applicable) 
was used to calculate household income. This method has been used 
previously (Smith, 2004b; Vizard, 2010). Only a gross income measure was 
available in the Citizenship Survey 2005, which included income from 
earnings, self-employment, benefits, pensions, and interest. The typical rates 
of taxation for the period 2005/2006 were applied to the mid-range of 
individual level gross income before these variables were aggregated to 
construct a net household income variable. 
The most common thresholds of equivalised net household income are based 
on a couple living together with no children (DWP, 2014: 12). To reflect the 
relative utility of a respondent’s income, equivalised net household income 
thresholds were constructed based on the relationship status of a respondent 
and the number children they had. Official statistics for 2005-2006 (DWP, 
2007) were used to categorise respondents based on their circumstances and 
then establish if they had an equivalised net household income below 60 per 
cent of the median or an above average (mean) equivalised net household 
income. 
This section has elaborated on the indicators employed to operationalize the 
concepts and lived realities of Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated 
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Active Citizens in this study. Area deprivation, income and employment status 
were applied as compound selection criteria to capture the perspicuous 
material differences between these two groups. The selection criteria chosen 
are powerful determinants of social inclusion and exclusion in isolation 
(Townsend, 1979; Buck, 2001; JRF, 2014). Combined together however, they 
aim to capture the markedly different lived experiences of social citizenship 
and inequality. In doing so, it becomes possible to explore the effects of lived 
experience on attitudes towards rights, responsibilities and welfare.  
4.3 Explaining attitudinal divergence: a mixed methods ‘lived 
experience’ approach 
Quantitative attitudinal research has frequently attempted to: track changes in 
public opinion over time; explain drivers of difference; and identify covariance 
with socio-economic policies, media coverage and political discourse. There 
is much to be gleaned from quantitative attitudinal research on welfare, 
inequality and citizenship in this area and much of this literature is 
incorporated into this thesis. However many still conclude that attitudes are 
‘complex, ambiguous and contradictory’ (Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Orton and 
Rowlingson, 2007: 40; Humpage, 2008b). Such studies recognise the finite 
potential of survey research in its capacity to capture the complexity of 
people’s reasoning and judgements. Very often, attitudes of respondents can 
appear to lack continuity and internal logic (Taylor-Gooby, 1982). However, 
Humpage (2008b: 227) argues that ‘contradictions in public opinion are not 
necessarily the result of ‘illogical’ thinking but rather demonstrate how ‘the 
public’ draw upon conflicting sets of traditions and moral repertoires when 
thinking about political issues’. As in any realm of social or personal life, our 
intuitions, desires and needs may appear ambivalent but are actually quite 
cogent. The mediating factors that explain these contradictions are of principle 
interest if we are to better identify and understand attitudinal differences 
between Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens. 
For the Citizenship Survey 2005 alone, the appropriate interpretation of, and 
meaning behind, attitudes is open to conjecture. Whilst secondary quantitative 
data analysis can help to identify differences in attitudes, it can only tell part 
of the story, and in some respects, the least insightful part. What is interesting 
about a person’s attitude is often not the attitude in isolation but how that 
attitude is informed by socio-economic and political structures, and the 
principles from which it has been derived. In this instance, the underlying 
meaning behind and drivers of statistical observations could only be explored 
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rather than established. However, it is hoped the integration of qualitative data 
contributes towards a richer understanding of differing attitudes and ‘moral 
repertoires’ in this instance (Dean, 2004; Humpage, 2008b: 227). A mixed 
methods approach is the best means by which to ‘ascertain what – to put it 
provocatively - people really think… by pointing towards a research agenda 
better able to explore how people construct and justify their beliefs’ (Skilling, 
2013: 18-19). With this in mind, this thesis examines attitudinal differences in 
a way that incorporates both quantitative and qualitative data to offer some 
measure of explanation.  
Existing attitudinal research (particularly quantitative data analysis) has 
tended to neglect the significance of lived experience in shaping attitudes 
towards welfare, inequality and social citizenship. Attitudinal differences 
observed between socio-demographic and economic groups are repeatedly 
explained by self-interested rationalities (Roberts, 1977; Iversen and Soskice, 
2001; Linos and West, 2003; Cusack et al., 2006; Lelkes, 2009) or conflate 
material position with material interest (Evans, 1993; Brooks et al., 2006; 
Brooks and Svallfors, 2010: 208; Evans and de Graaf, 2013). 
Dean and Melrose (1999: 98) propose that people’s support for social 
citizenship is motivated by their own class interests. Various studies have also 
shown that ‘richer people are more averse to redistribution’ than lower income 
groups who have much more to gain (Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Sefton, 
2005; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009: 3). In addition, Park et al.’s (2007) analysis 
of public attitudes found that unemployed, low-income and benefit groups are 
more likely to problematize inequality and support redistribution. When 
presented with conflicting evidence to the self-interested hypothesis, 
researchers still attempt to explain this discrepancy in terms of rational utility:  
But self-interest cannot explain views about redistribution entirely, 
given that a quarter of those on higher incomes, who say when asked 
that they put themselves first over others, still support redistribution. 
Perhaps some of these see it in their own best interests to reduce 
inequality (for reasons of social cohesion or economic performance 
(Rowlingson et al., 2010b: 3).  
These studies presuppose that if a person on a high income does not support 
redistribution or an elderly person does not endorse free child-care, that this 
is in some way a signifier of self-interest. Support for policies or principles that 
may not work in the material interests of respondents are equally 
characterised as altruistic (Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Papadakis and Bean, 
1993; Groskind, 1994; Van Oorschot, 2000). Attitudinal differences can be 
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described as egocentric or altruistic given the material position of 
respondents. However, this is not necessarily the cause of attitudinal 
difference and conflating material position with self-interest is potentially 
attributing causative explanation to the characteristic of an attitude. Rational 
class theories appear to pervade much of the analysis explaining attitudinal 
differences in relation to welfare and social citizenship (cf. Sumino, 2014). In 
reality, there is a range of factors attendant to material position that also play 
a role in shaping conceptions of social citizenship (Taylor-Gooby, 1985; 
Jordan, 1996). In fact, a review of attitudinal research in this area found that 
self-interest performs particularly poorly in terms of predicting political and 
social attitudes (Kinder, 1998). 
Similarly to other research, Kearns et al. (2014) equate material position with 
self-interest. Yet, the study fruitfully illustrates that lived experiences greatly 
affect attitudes, particularly the nexus between knowledge and attitude 
formation. Recent empirical research suggests that higher social class and 
income helps predict self-interested attitudes and behaviours (Piff, 2014; 
Powdthavee and Oswald, 2014). A systematic review of the empirical 
literature (Kraus et al., 2012) concludes that a person’s material position 
affects their lived experiences: the authors claim this can obscure or magnify 
the structural determinants of their situation which in turn shapes their 
attitudes towards themselves and others. Material position then could be as 
much a measure of knowledge as it could be of egocentricity. Covariance 
between higher ‘material position’ and lower support for inclusive social 
citizenship is not purely or even necessarily explained by self-interest. In sum, 
much of the existing evidence overplays the significance of utility judgments 
and neglects the potential effects of lived experience.  
To offer a nuanced account of attitudinal difference it is necessary to 
disentangle the respective and collective effects of material position, 
knowledge, self-interest, and lived experience. The interplay between 
individual characteristics, lived experiences and welfare institutions has been 
successfully theorised (e.g. Isin and Wood, 1999). However, much of the 
existing empirical research talks quite separately about the determinants of 
public attitudes (for example: Fraile and Ferrer, 2005). This thesis seeks to 
remedy this and account for the ways in which lived experiences could figure 
in the reasoning and judgments of the general public.   
Attitudinal differences related to social citizenship have been variously 
explained according to: welfare regimes and structural and institutional 
characteristics (Svallfors, 2012; Wlezien and Soroka, 2012), individual and 
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group characteristics (Brooks and Svallfors, 2010; Evans and de Graaf, 2013), 
ideological and value systems (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004; Kulin and Seymer, 
2014) and knowledge (Sefton, 2005). Mau (2000: 2) attempts to reconcile 
some of the different factors at play:  
The institutional architecture is viewed as a decisive component which 
conditions the self-interest motives of the population. But moreover, it 
carries ideological and ideational notions which influence likewise the 
orientations of the general public.  
The lived experience of citizens is not explicitly accounted for here but the 
experiential literature illustrates how central this is to any understanding of 
attitude formation. Alongside individual and group characteristics, the 
institutional landscape of a welfare regime structures the lived experiences of 
citizens. These lived experiences intervene on knowledge accumulation and 
value systems that underpin attitude formation. With this in mind, it is 
important to utilise and re-examine the mass of evidence on attitudinal 
divergence in a way that attends to the significance of lived experience and 
the relationship between inequality and social citizenship. 
4.4 Secondary Quantitative Data Analysis 
For the first phase of the research process, secondary quantitative data 
analysis of the 2005 Citizenship Survey was undertaken. This survey was 
biennial from 2001 to 2007 and moved to a continuous design from 2007 to 
2011. The 2005 Citizenship Survey dataset was downloaded on 13th 
November 2011 from the UK Data Archive.  
The 2005 Citizenship Survey is a nationally representative survey of England 
and Wales, with a core sample of 9,691 and an ethnic minority boost of 4,390 
(Michaelson et al., 2006: 15). A pre-designed weight to account for non-
response or selection bias was applied where appropriate. Owing to the large-
scale of the survey, the multi-stage random probability sampling method 
ensured a highly representative sample of England and Wales. The response 
rate for the core sample was 63 per cent (Michaelson et al., 2006: 16)  
Secondary quantitative data analysis can in certain cases be ‘perfect’ for 
research questions pursued (Hakim, 1982). In this instance, the quantitative 
dataset in question presented a unique opportunity to consider some of the 
core research questions of this thesis. Specifically, the data included in the 
2005 Citizenship Survey made it possible to establish whether and how much 
Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens differed in their 
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experiences and attitudes in relation to social citizenship, welfare and 
inequality. This particular dataset was selected because it is the only recent 
survey (known to the researcher) that directly covers questions pertaining to 
core areas of the thesis. There are many national surveys that explore 
attitudes towards welfare, rights and responsibilities. Perhaps the most 
contemporary and notable example is the annual British Social Attitudes 
survey run by NatCen Social Research. However, the questions asked often 
focus on levels of inequality, government spending, benefits and public 
services. Whilst it might be possible to infer conceptions of social citizenship 
from this data, it was felt that direct and explicit questions concerning the key 
features of social citizenship would be more appropriate. The complexity and 
contradictions inherent in welfare attitudes made it all the more pertinent to 
obtain data that directly explored the rights and responsibilities of social 
citizenship. The 2005 Citizenship Survey and its dedicated module on rights 
and responsibilities appealed in this regard. In addition, this was the only 
dataset that was large enough to accommodate the statistical tests required 
for this study. 
Given the time at which data for this survey was collected, it is important to 
recognise its inevitable limitations. Perhaps, most crucially, findings from the 
quantitative data analysis are not necessarily representative of contemporary 
conceptions of social citizenship. Having said that, given the size of the 
dataset and the level of generality at which the questions are asked, it is 
possible to make a number of inferences about attitudes towards social 
citizenship and the causes of attitudinal difference more generally. The mixed-
methods research design also seeks to overcome this by drawing on 
contemporary qualitative data to interrogate and enrich statistical 
observations. 
The dataset includes a number of relevant questions on the rights and 
responsibilities of social citizenship. Specifically, the survey includes 
questions on the following rights: 
• To have access to free education for children.  
• To be looked after by the State if you cannot look after yourself.  
• To be treated fairly and equally.  
• To have free health-care if you need it.  
• To have a job.  
With respect to these, respondents were asked if they thought they should 
have any of these rights and whether they felt they currently have any of these 
rights (see Appendix A.1). Notably, respondents were asked which rights and 
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duties should be held and performed by everyone living in the UK. Prior to 
being asked, respondents were encouraged to view rights as entitlements: 
Now some questions about the rights of people living in the UK. By 
rights I mean the things that people are entitled to if they live in this 
country. Which of the rights, if any, listed below do you think you should 
have as someone living in the UK? (Michaelson et al., 2006: 76) 
The definition of a right suggests that citizens have either a legal, social or 
moral entitlement (Ashford, 2007; Tomalty, 2010). As such, it is reasonable to 
assume that when a respondent expresses support for a right in this instance, 
it is an expression of support for a universal entitlement. When gauging 
support for rights, the question asks about people living in the UK rather than 
UK residents or citizens, which are legally and normatively different. This may 
also be a significant factor that affects how individuals interpret the rights 
attached to social citizenship.  
Of course, it should be borne in mind that some respondents could be 
interpreting the question differently. Potentially, people's expression of 
support in this context might not be based on some abstract principle but 
rather on a desire or need for these rights. The question asks which rights 
respondents think you should have as someone living in the UK, rather than 
which rights you think someone living in the UK should have. As a result, some 
people’s expression of support could be self-referential. Nevertheless, from 
these questions it was possible to establish the extent to which the 
(aforementioned) rights of social citizenship were both supported and indeed 
‘felt’ by Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens.  
The unique module of the 2005 Citizenship Survey also included questions on 
responsibilities, and whether any of the following should be the responsibility 
of everyone living in the UK: 
• To help and protect your family. 
• To raise children properly.  
• To work to provide for yourself. 
• To behave responsibly.  
• To help others.  
Emphasis on universalism over particularity extends even further to the duties 
of social citizenship. When asked about what should be the responsibilities of 
people living in the UK, respondents were asked which duties ‘all people are 
obliged to do’. Namely, they were asked to identify a range of universal duties 
that all citizens should have. This could have affected support for 
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responsibilities as people’s reasoning may be based on their own perceived 
capacity to fulfil such duties. However, as mentioned above, it is important to 
resist the self-interested rationalities that tend to dominate attitudinal research, 
and beyond this, explanations of attitudinal variation are more thoroughly 
considered in chapters five, six and seven.  
Vizard (2010) argues that the 2005 Citizenship Survey offers ‘an overall 
picture of public support for…rights that the public are willing to endorse at a 
“higher” or “abstract” level’ (Vizard, 2010: 11).  Significantly, the general public 
are much more likely to subscribe to an idea or principle, than to endorse 
substantive measures relating to social citizenship (Bartels, 2005). In addition 
the general public struggle to identify the relationship between socio-economic 
outcomes and public policies (Hedges, 2005; Horton and Gregory, 2009). 
Because the questions concerning rights and responsibilities work at a level 
of abstraction, it is likely that any support witnessed for particular rights and 
duties is higher than it might otherwise be (Feldman, 2003: 491). 
Nevertheless, the survey questions on rights and responsibilities 
demonstrate, in broad brushstrokes, the ways in which the general public seek 
to define the constitutive features of social citizenship. Mouffe (2005: 60) 
suggests that ‘the way we define citizenship is intimately linked to the kind of 
society and political community we want’. In this regard, support for the 
aforementioned rights and responsibilities in the 2005 Citizenship Survey 
represents a political commitment or orientation towards the ideals of 
citizenship.  
Beyond questions concerning the rights and responsibilities of social 
citizenship, respondents to the 2005 Citizenship Survey were also asked 
about their impressions and experiences of their local area, neighbourhood 
and community (see Appendix A.2). These questions covered a broad range 
of areas such as whether a respondent felt that they were able to make a 
change in their local area to whether they felt their neighbours could be trusted 
or would participate to help solve a community problem. The differences 
between Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens are 
briefly referred to in chapter five. Unfortunately, due to limitations on space it 
has not been possible to go into greater depth to elaborate on the secondary 
quantitative analysis undertaken on these components of the 2005 Citizenship 
Survey.  
Similarly, the survey also measures dimensions of formal and informal civic 
engagement and participation in public and private social networks (see 
Appendix A.3). Formalised civic engagement includes activities such as 
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involvement in local decision-making, engagement in community 
consultations, contacting an elected representative and formal volunteering 
(Kitchen, 2006). Informal dimensions of civic engagement entail providing 
‘help’, ‘support’ and ‘informal voluntary help’ to relatives, household members 
and others. These forms of ‘help’ and ‘support’ include activities such as doing 
shopping or chores for someone, providing childcare or providing 
transportation assistance. These sorts of measures were able to capture the 
support given and received, as well as the social networks of Residual 
Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens. Again, due to limitations on 
space it has not been possible to discuss these dimensions in any great depth. 
However, these are referred to in chapter seven. 
The secondary quantitative data analysis undertaken for this study moved 
from bivariate to multivariate analysis to establish whether any statistically 
significant relationships exist between lived experiences of inequality and 
conceptions of social citizenship. The first stage of analysis entailed a 
summary of the observed differences between the attitudes and experiences 
of the two sample groups. The second stage of analysis explored the extent 
to which distinct lived experiences of inequality were able to predict the 
attitudes of respondents. By undertaking a series of binary logistic 
regressions, it was possible to predict the probability of a citizen’s orientation 
towards the constitutive aspects of social citizenship. Once established, a 
number of multiple linear regression models were run to establish whether and 
how lived experiences of inequality affect attitudes towards citizenship. The 
selection criteria used to operationalize the lived experiences of inequality 
were also examined separately to establish their relative and compound effect 
on attitudes, behaviours and experiences.  
Whilst there have been numerous studies undertaken to utilize the rich data 
available in the Citizenship Survey (e.g. Kitchen, 2006; Vizard, 2010), these 
studies tend to focus on area-level or socio-economic characteristics. It is 
therefore believed that a mixed methods approach offers a unique and timely 
contribution to this field of study; providing analysis at an individual level rather 
than generalizing neighbourhood or area effects which can often prove 
problematic (Lupton, 2003).  
The primary objective of this phase of research was to provide an empirical 
background and understanding of whether there are significant differences in 
conceptions of social citizenship according to lived experiences of inequality. 
To enrich any causal inferences made and to fully explore the underlying 
relationships between lived experience, attitude formation and citizenship 
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structures, it was necessary to move towards a more generative view of 
causation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). A generative view of causation that 
argues: 
events cannot be seen as being discrete and isolatable; they are part 
of a network or system of events. To isolate them artificially is to 
produce connections that may bear little relationship to how things 
actually behave. In addition, they argue that establishing connections 
or relationships is only the starting point. It is necessary to discover the 
underlying structures and mechanisms that are responsible for 
producing such connections (Blaikie, 2003: 17). 
With this in mind, the limitations of the quantitative dataset have to be 
acknowledged. Whilst the findings of the secondary quantitative data analysis 
provided an important empirical background, they could not fully explain how 
and why potential differences were observed. Adopting a critical realist 
approach, the second stage of the research process was particularly crucial 
to move towards a deeper level of social explanation that captured the 
relational and phenomenological significance of inequality, as well as the 
drivers shaping conceptions of social citizenship.  
4.5 Qualitative Interviews 
The second phase of the research process involved a series of in-depth, 
structured ‘scenario-driven’ qualitative interviews with Residual Contingent 
Citizens and Validated Active Citizens. Participants were only eligible for 
inclusion in the study if they satisfied all three of the selection criteria outlined 
above. Participants were sampled from in and around the Leeds city area and 
were interviewed between February 2013 and January 2014. As a post-
industrial city, the demographic, economic and household profile of Leeds is 
broadly similar to that of England and Wales (ONS, 2014). Drawing on data 
from the 2011 Census, Appendix B.1 demonstrates some of the dimensions 
and degrees of similarity observable. Across many dimensions, the 
characteristics of Leeds city region are typical of the national profile. This 
includes dimensions such as the gender split, the proportion of the population 
that identifies as a Black or Minority Ethnic group and those classified as 
economically ‘active’ and ‘inactive’. The proportion defined as having ‘never 
worked’ and as ‘long-term unemployed are similar to the national profile, as 
are the proportion of households that experience dimensions of deprivation 
(see Appendix B.1). According to the latest data available from the Index of 
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Multiple Deprivation 2010, when compared with 56 other English cities, Leeds 
is currently middling and is ranked the 23rd most deprived (Bee, 2015: 6).  
In light of the broadly similar demographic profile and institutional environment 
within which qualitative interviews were undertaken, it was possible to draw 
inferences at a number of different levels about the demographic profile and 
lived environment of research participants. All fieldwork was undertaken in 
one geographical location to ensure that participants were (at least in theory) 
exposed to the same administrative, institutional, and public service settings. 
It was later felt this was particularly important given the localised experiences 
and comparisons of public services and institutions articulated by research 
participants. 
Invariably, there are characteristics of Leeds that are somewhat idiosyncratic 
to its geography, production base and population. For example, by virtue of 
the relatively high full-time student population in the city there is a slightly 
higher proportion of young people and people renting in Leeds compared to 
the rest of England and Wales (see Appendix B.1). Leeds also exhibits a 
relatively high level of internal inequality relative to other cities (Bee, 2015: 7). 
This made it particularly important to isolate fieldwork to one geographical 
area. When comparing the attitudes, behaviours and experiences of the two 
sample groups, it was felt it would be easier to account for differences in one 
area rather than across multiple areas.   
A total of 28 interviews were undertaken. This phase of the research explored 
the underlying dynamics that underpin lived experiences of inequality and 
attitudinal divergence towards social citizenship, welfare and inequality. 
Specifically, these scenario-driven interviews offered insight into how poverty 
and affluence generate unique experiences and patterns of knowledge about 
the structural determinants of socio-economic outcome and action. From this 
it was possible to consider how and why people engage with or deviate from 
the dominant ideals and praxis of social citizenship. 
4.5.1 Research Design 
In his seminal text, Allport (1935: 810) defines an attitude as ‘a mental and 
neural state of readiness, organised through experience, exerting a directive 
and dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and 
situations with which it is related’. This study prescribed to such a definition 
and sought to identify how lived experiences of inequality intervene on an 
individual’s orientation and disposition towards the ideals and praxes of social 
citizenship. As a consequence, during the interview, questions regarding 
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attitudes towards the rights, responsibilities and ideals of citizenship were 
interleaved with questions about a respondent’s individual circumstance, 
experience and behaviour in relation to welfare, work and inequality. This 
made it possible to stimulate and structure discussion of social citizenship 
around a participant’s own knowledge of and involvement with citizenship 
structures. Such an approach was particularly important given the abstract 
and figurative nature of social citizenship.   
As acknowledged in previous studies (e.g. Dwyer, 2002; Lister et al., 2003), it 
can be difficult to explore notions of social citizenship amongst the general 
public. Miller (2000) argues that ‘citizenship – except in the formal passport-
holding sense – is not a widely understood idea in Britain. People do not have 
a clear idea of what it means to be a citizen’ (Miller, 2000: 26). However, this 
thesis brings to bear evidence that the concept and practice of social 
citizenship is more ‘contested’ rather than ‘poorly understood’. Chapters five, 
six and seven demonstrate that the principles rather than the nomenclature of 
social citizenship figure more vividly in the ‘moral repertoires’ of citizens 
(Dean, 2004).  
An abductive research strategy (Blaikie, 2007; Blaikie, 2010) was therefore 
used to understand tacit attitudes, behaviours and experiences in relation to 
social citizenship and then develop social scientific explanations on this basis. 
Blaikie (1993: 176) argues that it is possible ‘produce social scientific accounts 
of social life by drawing on the concepts and meanings used by social actors 
and the activities in which they engage’.  
Lister at al. (2003) suggest that the values and ideas that shape conceptions 
of social citizenship, particularly rights and responsibilities are embedded within 
‘real world’ values and are not recognized as something immediately relevant to 
participants. Grounding interviews in the lived experiences and intuitions of 
participants made it possible to explore conceptions of social citizenship in a way 
that was meaningful to them. This required some capacity to identify the 
relational and institutional significance of participant’s ‘lay accounts’. However, 
it was also borne in mind that  
we should not invent the viewpoint of the actor, and should only 
attribute to actors ideas about the world they actually hold if we want to 
understand their actions, reasons and ideas (Becker, 1996: 60).  
This strategy informed the design of the interview schedule and analysis of 
qualitative data. 
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Along similar lines, care was also taken not to superimpose the findings of the 
secondary quantitative data analysis onto the qualitative data collected. Whilst 
the first phase of the research helped ‘to inform and complement the analysis 
of freshly collected data’ (Hakim, 1982: 2), assumptions were not made about 
the attitudes, experiences or behaviours of participants in the second phase 
of the research process. Beyond the selection criteria, no homogeny was 
assumed between respondents to the Citizenship Survey and those 
participating in qualitative interviews.  
4.5.2 Interview Schedule and Vignettes 
The interview schedule facilitated a structured, scenario-driven ‘conversation’ 
between the researcher and participant (see Appendix B.2). The interviews 
covered a range of topics that both directly and indirectly relate to social 
citizenship, in particular, rights and responsibilities. The first part of the 
interview asked participants about their social networks and engagement with 
public affairs, institutions and their local community more generally. This 
section of the interview sought to explore the behaviours of participants. 
Participants were then asked about their lived experiences, material 
circumstance and the repercussions of this. Participants were particularly 
encouraged to elaborate on how and why they felt the way they did about their 
employment status, income and local area. Following this, a range of vignettes 
were presented to and discussed with participants. These are discussed in 
detail shortly. The final section of the interview schedule covered a broad 
range of topics to explore attitudes towards welfare, inequality, social policy 
and citizenship. The interview schedule was designed and refined based on 
cognitive testing and two pilot interviews with individuals satisfying the three 
selection criteria. Each interview lasted between 50 minutes and 1 hour 45 
minutes and the same interview schedule (with a few additions) was used for 
individuals identified as Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated Active 
Citizens.  
During the interview, the researcher read out four vignettes. As discussed in 
greater detail in chapter six, these vignettes drew upon caricatures of 
individuals that are commonly (mis-) represented in public discourse and by 
the media: ‘the deserving workless poor’, ‘the undeserving workless poor’, ‘the 
deserving working poor’ and ‘the undeserving working rich’ (see Appendix 
B.2). The scenarios touched upon welfare provision, individual behaviour and 
activity that could be deemed as virtuous or transgressive to dominant 
conceptions of social citizenship. Participants were then asked a range of 
questions based on these scenarios. The vignettes served as a heuristic to 
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explore participant’s intuitions and attitudes related to social citizenship. They 
were a means by which to ground abstract principles associated with social 
citizenship in situations that participants found believable (Rahman, 1996). 
Rather than just looking at how people’s attitudes towards social citizenship 
were shaped by lived experiences of inequality, it was possible to understand 
the processes by which people arrive at a particular conception of social 
citizenship and the significance of that conception. In this instance, vignettes 
proved to be: 
a useful tool to illuminate and tap into these complex processes by 
isolating certain aspects of a given social issue or problem. When 
integrated within a multi-method approach our understanding of these 
processes and the relationship between belief and action can be 
enhanced (Renold, 2002: 4). 
For each vignette, respondents were asked the following question: “How 
responsible is X for her/his situation?” There may be some concern about 
whether respondents either understood this question or interpreted it correctly 
given its potentially ambiguous nature. However, ‘short-staged written 
vignettes’ are often used to identify and establish the significance of 
differences in the interpretation of open-ended or ambiguous questions 
(Soydan, 1995; Sheppard and Ryan, 2003). In fact, it has been suggested by 
some that truly open-ended questions and reactions offer a more accurate 
picture of real-life attitudes and behaviours (Kalafat and Gagliano, 1996). The 
ambiguity of the vignettes made it possible to elicit normative intuitions around 
social citizenship, identify how participants ‘fill in the gaps’ and explore how 
lived experiences of inequality intervene on attitude formation: 
The notable grey areas that vignettes produce, through the selective 
representations of various elements of reality, can be harnessed and 
used to help uncover and clarify the concepts at work and under study 
(Hughes and Huby, 2004: 45). 
Having said that, vignettes should not be too ambiguous. Previous studies 
have shown that respondents may feel unable to answer questions without 
sufficient information (Wilson and While, 1998). With this in mind, the 
researcher struck a balance between complexity and ambiguity to elicit 
meaningful responses from participants. This approach made it possible to 
explore supplementary areas or points that participants felt were particularly 
relevant to a vignette or topic under consideration. 
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4.5.3 Recruitment and Sample 
The researcher initially planned to recruit participants by leafleting local areas 
and liaising with a gatekeeper to assist with recruitment. Unfortunately, this 
was not possible and the researcher focused almost entirely on leafleting 
residential areas across the Leeds City region. Using the three compound 
selection criteria, a clear distinction was drawn between Residual Contingent 
Citizens and Validated Active Citizens during the recruitment of participants. 
The researcher visited the most and least deprived Lower Super Output Areas 
(LSOAs) across Leeds and delivered leaflets to households encouraging 
residents to take part in the research. All areas targeted were in the top and 
bottom 30 per cent of the Indices of Multiple Deprivation according to the latest 
administrative data available at the time of qualitative fieldwork (DCLG, 2011). 
One version of the leaflet was delivered to households in the least deprived 
areas and another version was delivered to households in the most deprived 
areas. The leaflets were slightly different to target prospective participants 
based on their income and employment status (see Appendix B.3).  
These leaflets provided preliminary information on the study as well as a 
contact email address and mobile phone number. The leaflets mentioned that 
a £10 high street shopping voucher was available to all participants as a ‘thank 
you’ for their time. It was hoped that this would encourage individuals to 
participate and make contact either via email or telephone. Mindful of the 
ESRC’s Framework for Research Ethics, the researcher ensured that all 
‘research participants….participated in a voluntary way, free from any 
coercion’ (ESRC, 2010). If contacted, the researcher spent a short amount of 
time explaining the purpose of the study to potential participants and asking if 
they would like to partake at a time and location that best suited them. A great 
deal of flexibility was firstly required to generate interest in the study by 
delivering leaflets and, secondly to secure interviews at times and locations 
that accommodated the (often complex) needs of participants.  
Throughout the research process, the researcher abided by Leeds 
University's ethical and health and safety guidelines. The good practice 
guidelines outlined in the Statement of Ethical Practice of the British 
Sociological Association were also followed. An information sheet and 
consent form were provided to all participants to ensure they understood their 
participation in the research (see Appendix B.4). Participants were able to opt 
out at any stage of the qualitative fieldwork. All information used in the final 
research outputs of this thesis is and will be suitably edited to safeguard the 
confidentiality and anonymity of participants.  
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In total, 28 interviews were conducted: 15 interviews with participants 
satisfying the selection criteria for Residual Contingent Citizens and 13 
interviews with participants satisfying the selection criteria for Validated Active 
Citizens. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these two groups exhibited unique 
characteristics (see Table 1). The demographic profile and circumstance of 
participants classified as Residual Contingent Citizens all contribute towards 
their lived experience of inequality. For participants in this sample group, the 
period of time they had been unemployed ranged between 2 weeks and 19 
years. They all lived within the top 18 per cent of the most deprived areas of 
England, just under 75 per cent lived in the top 10 per cent and more than half 
lived in the top 1% (DCLG, 2011). All had an income that was well below the 
equivalised income poverty line and an equivalised income that was in the 
bottom fifth of the income distribution. They were aged between 24 and 66 
years old. Just below half had dependent children. Two thirds were women. 
Just below half identified as an ethnic minority. One participant in this sample 
group identified as physically impaired (wheel-chair bound) and 4 others 
indicated that they were suffering from a mental health issue. These correlates 
of disadvantage proved crucial to the biographies of these participants and 
their orientation towards the key features and institutions of social citizenship.  
Table 1: Demographic profile of qualitative research participants 
 Residual Contingent Citizens Validated Active Citizens 
Employment 
Status 
All unemployed: for between 2 
weeks and 19 years 
All in full-time employment 
IMD status 
 
• All in top 18% of IMD 
• Almost 75% in top 10% 
of IMD 
• Over 50% in top 1% of 
IMD 
• All in bottom 27% of IMD 
• Over 50% in bottom 14% 
of IMD 
• Over 33% in bottom 5% of 
IMD 
Income All below poverty line and in 
bottom fifth of income 
distribution 
All well above the national mean 
and in top fifth the income 
distribution 
Age Between 24 and 66 years old Between 31 and 62 years old 
BME Almost 50% BME 1 BME 
Dependents Almost 50% had dependents Almost a quarter had dependents 
Gender Two thirds were female More than 60% were male 
Disabilities 1 participant wheel-chair bound  
4 suffering from mental health 
issues 
N/A 
Participants classified as Validated Active Citizens all lived in the bottom 27 
per cent of the IMD (i.e. the most affluent areas in England), over half lived in 
the bottom 14 per cent of IMD and just over a third lived in the bottom 5 per 
cent of IMD. All were either engaged in full-time employment or were self-
employed. All had an equivalised net household income that was well above 
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the mean and within the top 20 per cent of the income distribution. They were 
aged between 31 and 62 years old. Over 60 per cent were male. Three 
participants had dependent children. One participant identified as an ethnic 
minority. Evidentially, the demographic profile and circumstances of these 
participants radically differed from those classified as Residual Contingent 
Citizens. This created a sufficiently large psychological and material gap 
between the two sample groups when it came to exploring how lived 
experiences of inequality affect citizen identity and orientation.  
4.5.4 Analysis of Qualitative Data 
With the permission of participants, all interviews were digitally recorded and 
transcribed. Due to the structured nature of the interview schedule, the 
questions asked by the interviewer were only briefly noted during transcription. 
However, the responses of research participants were transcribed verbatim. 
By undertaking transcription throughout the period of fieldwork, it was possible 
to reflect upon the interview process and the data collected. The researcher 
made fieldwork notes before and after each interview to include relevant 
information and reflections during data processing and analysis. The effective 
storage and synthesis of this data proved instrumental to the thematic analysis 
subsequently undertaken; particularly the capacity to move from descriptive 
to analytic consideration of the data.  
There were two key stages to the qualitative data analysis. The first stage of 
analysis entailed a broad and thorough consideration of all the qualitative data 
as a whole. Bearing in mind the overall research questions of the thesis, key 
themes and codes emerged from the data. Subsequent to this, the second 
stage involved a deeper consideration and comparison of the attitudes, 
experiences and behaviours of the two sample groups.  
As stated at the outset of this chapter, the research questions underpinning 
this thesis are principally concerned with comparing and contrasting lived 
experiences of deprivation and affluence and exploring what impact this has 
on conceptions of social citizenship. To do so, the verbatim responses from 
each transcript were input into an excel spread sheet and organised according 
to specific questions and areas of discussion in each interview. The relatively 
structured interview schedule was designed in such a way as to ensure the 
interviews and responses of ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ research participants were 
broadly replicable and comparable.  This made it possible to explore how each 
respondent across a range of demographic characteristics responded to 
specific research questions. From this, patterns emerged about the 
differences between but also within the two sample groups. Adopting a critical 
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realist approach, this research process sought to understand ‘people’s 
perspective in the context of the conditions and the circumstances of their 
lives’ (Ormston, 2013: 22). Such a strategy was intended to capture the 
complexity of people’s responses but also to identify the themes, differences 
and similarities that became observable from research participants 
(Huberman and Miles, 2002).  
Whilst all questions asked were comparable in terms of their thematic content, 
many of the questions were left open and purposefully ambiguous to capture 
the concepts and categories advanced and articulated by respondents. This 
meant codes and frames of references emerged from the data and their 
significance could be explored with reference to the core research questions. 
Drawing on phenomenological analytical techniques (cf. Smith, 2004a) it was 
possible to explore how research participants interpreted abstract concepts 
such as responsibility, justice and welfare on their own terms and how their 
diverse vantage points and experiences lead to differing ways and strategies 
of understanding the social world. This essentially provided the analytical 
framework and resources necessary to move from lay accounts to social 
scientific categories and explanations (Blaikie, 2010).  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the methodological approach taken to meet the key 
research objectives and questions of this thesis. The multi-stage mixed 
methods research process involved secondary quantitative data analysis and 
a series of in-depth, structured, scenario-driven interviews with Residual 
Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens. A particular challenge of 
the research was to make these two categories empirically tractable and 
conceptually cogent based on the data available to the researcher and 
feasible within the confines of the research project. The research methods 
were employed to incorporate the lived experiences and accounts of citizens 
into explanations of how and why individuals engage with or deviate from the 
dominant ideals and praxis of social citizenship. Recognising the often 
ephemeral and contradictory nature of public attitudes, the research process 
sought to identify and then explain the causes of attitudinal divergence. This 
research and methodological approach makes a unique empirical contribution 
to citizenship studies and critical social policy in this regard. Rather than 
assessing the efficacy of welfare regimes on their own terms (i.e. via different 
structural welfare arrangements), the lived experience of citizens can help 
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uncover the extent to which the dominant praxis of social citizenship operates 
effectively to tackle or at least temper deprivation and inequality.  
Qualitative and quantitative methods ‘are fundamentally complements, not 
substitutes – and certainly not rivals. They mutually inform each other’ (Robb, 
2002: xii-xiii). A mixed methods approach can strengthen the credibility and 
external validity of lived experiences in this regard. In spite of significant 
differences within and across social groups, this methodology made it possible 
to consistently measure and explore inequality across a range of contexts. 
This is precisely because the socio-structural dynamics that give rise to 
inequality are manifest in the experiences, behaviours and attitudes of 
citizens.  
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Chapter 5: Negotiating validation and contingency in social 




This chapter explores whether and why attitudes differ between those 
notionally defined as Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated Active 
Citizens. As outlined in greater detail in chapter four, three selection criteria 
were used to operationalize these categories: income, area deprivation and 
employment status. Drawing on secondary quantitative data analysis and 
qualitative data from in-depth interviews, the hypothesis that lived experiences 
of inequality affect conceptions of social citizenship is tested here. In doing so, 
the chapter explores the material and symbolic significance of deprivation and 
its implications for citizen identity and orientation. 
Some have suggested that there is little that distinguishes the attitudes of 
‘poor citizens’ from the rest of society (Vincent, 1991). According to this line 
of argument, those in a position of material deprivation exhibit the same 
interpretive practices and attitudinal discourses as other citizens. Beyond their 
inability to fulfil their aspirations as a result of poverty, a number of studies 
conclude that ‘the poor’ exhibit broadly similar attitudes to the rest of the 
population when it comes to work, family, welfare services and social 
citizenship (e.g. Heath, 1992; Gallie, 1994; Marshall et al., 1996). These 
studies rebut the ‘immoral underclass’ hypothesis (Murray, 1994) and the 
narrative of ‘irresponsibility’ that pervades dominant political and policy 
discourse (Hancock and Mooney, 2013). They nonetheless tend to neglect 
the ‘divergent discourses and practices of poor and better-off citizens’ (Jordan 
and Redley, 1994: 156). Whilst these studies recognise the presence and 
effects of inequality, they tend to overlook how domains of social, economic 
and political life are differently constituted, experienced and negotiated within 
and between social groups of a given polity. Inevitably, those facing validation 
and contingency are ‘influenced by the particular opportunities and constraints 
that confront them’ (Jordan, 1996: 111). With this in mind, this chapter 
examines how the attitudes of Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated 
Active Citizens are influenced by their respective lived experiences of 
inequality.  
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The chapter starts by outlining levels of support for the rights and 
responsibilities of social citizenship. The next section explores the factors 
contributing towards attitudinal divergence. Specifically, section 5.3 examines 
how, in isolation and together, income, area deprivation and economic status 
affect lived experiences and attitudes related to social citizenship. To explain 
the statistical differences observed, findings from the qualitative in-depth 
interviews are then considered to understand how income, employment status 
and local area affect lived experiences. To conclude, the chapter reflects on 
how lived experiences affect citizen identity and attitudes towards the 
figurative and applied potential of social citizenship.  
5.2 Support for Social Citizenship: Rights and 
Responsibilities 
In her own analysis of the 2005 Citizenship Survey, Vizard (2010) concludes 
that there is broad support for social rights. Despite evidence that support for 
welfare and redistribution is in decline (Park et al., 2007; Dorey, 2010; Park et 
al., 2013), the general public do seem to intrinsically value social rights (see 
Table 2). Rather than a paradigmatic shift in public attitudes towards social 
citizenship, there appears to be a degree of resistance to neo-liberal reforms 
in this regard (Dean and Melrose, 1999; Dwyer, 2000; Humpage, 2008b; 
Rowlingson et al., 2010b). Of course, this is not to suggest that there is not 
complexity and caveats to this support (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). Whilst there is 
a high level of endorsement across different social rights, there is variation in 
the extent of support. For example, 96 per cent of people support the right to 
be treated fairly and equally whilst only 77 per cent support the right to have 
a job.  
Table 2: Support for social rights by lived experience of inequality 
 
To have 
access to free 
education for 
children 
To be looked 
after by the State 













All 91% 85% 96% 93% 77% 
‘Deprived’ 84% 80% 90% 91% 75% 
‘Affluent’ 96% 86% 99% 93% 70% 
There are many mediating factors that could influence the level and nature of 
support for social rights. Variation might be explained by the differing content 
of social rights. Rights such as free healthcare are generally understood as 
universal entitlements not predicated on individual behaviour or performance 
(Dwyer, 2000: 130). The indiscriminate provision of healthcare and education 
has historically been seen as less problematic than the indiscriminate 
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provision of social security (Lipsey, 1979). Rights such as being looked after 
by the State are much more ambiguous; with principles of fairness and desert 
featuring more significantly in the interpretation of these social goods (Taylor-
Gooby, 1996; Dwyer, 2000: 143-161; Wendt et al., 2011).  
Perceptions of those receiving social rights can also greatly affect support. For 
example, people tend to distinguish between deserving and undeserving 
citizens with greatest moral warrant granted in the following order: elderly 
people, sick and disabled, the unemployed and finally immigrants (Van 
Oorschot, 2006). Van Oorschot (2000) also illustrates how people are more 
likely to support state assistance if the recipient of support is: similar to them, 
not personally responsible for their own disadvantage, docile and grateful for 
help, in sufficient need, and earning assistance through reciprocation. Whilst, 
there is to some extent resilient support for social rights and welfare more 
generally, the general public are increasingly pre-occupied with the 
deservingness of citizens (Jeene et al., 2013). A universal entitlement within 
such a framework becomes invariably contested. 
Depending on the content of a right, its fulfilment will be contingent on state 
actors, non-state actors, or both. How the public believes these should be 
fulfilled and what role ‘responsibility’ has is less clear (Johnson and Gearty, 
2007; Whiteley, 2008). Who delivers such universal entitlements and whether 
the general public see this as feasible affects attitudes and levels of support 
for certain rights. For example, it could be argued that the right to have a job 
is more associated with questions of market capability rather than state 
responsibility. In the UK, the general public and political elite remain reluctant 
to recognise employers as corporate citizens (Hill, 2011) and tend to see the 
state as an employer of last resort (Hills and Lelkes, 1999). This means that 
for some, the right to a job is neither viewed as a universal entitlement nor a 
responsibility of the State.   
Variation can also be explained by the policy landscape and informational role 
of the welfare state (Gingrich, 2014). Guaranteeing a (potentially costly) 
universal entitlement may provoke questions about individual and state 
financial capabilities. Covariance between the level of government spending 
and support for attendant policies suggests that increased welfare spending 
results in a ‘thermostatic effect’ on public attitudes:  
‘a responsive public behaves much like a thermostat. That is, the public 
adjusts its preferences for ‘more’ or ‘less’ policy in response to what 
policy makers do. When policy increases (decreases), the preference 
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for more policy decreases (increases)’ (Soroka and Wlezien, 2005: 
667).  
Perceptions of public social spending and welfare activity are often distorted 
by interchangeable and coarse definitions of welfare (Bamfield and Horton, 
2009; Baumberg et al., 2012; Osborne, 2012). This may greatly affect public 
beliefs about the effectiveness of welfare institutions and thus what the 
economic capabilities are for guaranteeing certain rights. It is likely that these 
factors compete, compound and complement one another to condition support 
for social citizenship rights. Beyond this speculative introduction, these factors 
are considered in much greater detail in chapters six, seven and eight. 
Overall, there are very high levels of support for social rights across the board 
with less than one per cent of all respondents feeling that people are not 
entitled to any social rights. Such high levels of support point to the importance 
and value of these rights for citizens as a pillar of social citizenship. Rather 
than detract from the salience of particularism in welfare discourse, this 
suggests that public attitudes are perhaps tempered by a concern for welfare 
more fundamentally. This may help explain the resilience of attitudes that 
support social rights also, but it tells us little of how responsibilities feature in 
conceptions of social citizenship.  
As with rights, overall support for responsibilities is high (see Table 3). The 
most supported is the responsibility to raise children properly (97 per cent). It 
goes without saying that these responsibilities are normatively laden, with 
ideas such as ‘behaving responsibly’ inevitably construed differently by 
respondents. Nevertheless, they offer an indication of the level of support for 
universal social responsibilities.  
Table 3: Support for social responsibilities by lived experience of inequality 
 













All 95% 97% 89% 95% 91% 
‘Deprived’ 93% 94% 78% 89% 90% 
‘Affluent’ 97% 98% 94% 98% 92% 
The least (but still very strongly) supported responsibilities were the duty to 
help others (91 per cent) and to work to provide for oneself (89 per cent). A 
universal obligation to help others is perhaps unsurprisingly contested 
because it extends beyond individual obligation to issues of collective 
responsibility and mutuality for fellow citizens. The ambiguous meaning and 
content of this as a duty may lead to greater ambivalence amongst the general 
public.  
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The obligation to work to provide for oneself centres on ideals of economic 
self-sufficiency and financial autonomy. The fiscal and non-fiscal 
interdependencies of respondents may well compromise support for this 
universal obligation (Berlin, 1958: 4). Given the work-centric approach that 
dominates the institutional and discursive features of welfare (Prideaux, 2010; 
Patrick, 2012), it is striking to note that this is the least supported responsibility. 
Similarly to support for the rights of social citizenship, it is likely that individual, 
institutional and structural factors intervene on support for responsibilities.  
In summary, it would appear that there are high levels of support for the rights 
and responsibilities of social citizenship at a level of abstraction. The finer 
details of entitlement and obligation are likely to intercede on attitude 
formation (Bartels, 2005). In conjunction, the institutional and material 
environment within which knowledge and value systems are cultivated is also 
known to affect attitudes towards social citizenship (e.g. Marx, 2014). With this 
in mind, the following section explores what bearing lived experiences of 
deprivation and relative affluence have on conceptions of social citizenship.  
5.3 Quantifying the effect of inequality on conceptions of 
social citizenship  
Overall, support for rights and responsibilities differs between Residual 
Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens (see Tables 2 and 3). With 
one exception, those experiencing deprivation are less likely to support social 
rights. The only instance in which this is not the case is the right to have a job, 
where 75 per cent of people in the ‘deprived’ sample support this compared 
to only 70 per cent of people in the ‘affluent’ sample. Given that all 
respondents in the deprived sample are not engaged in paid employment, this 
is perhaps unsurprising, and may well suggest that people’s support is to 
some extent self-referential. However, if support were by and large rational 
and rooted in class interest (Dean and Melrose, 1999: 98), we would also 
anticipate a higher level of support for social rights amongst those 
experiencing deprivation.  
Lived experiences of deprivation also seem to affect the extent to which 
people subscribe to citizenship responsibilities. The most considerable 
difference is the responsibility to work to provide for oneself, with 78 per cent 
of Residual Contingent Citizens and 94 per cent of Validated Active Citizens 
supporting this respectively. Murray (1984) and Mead (1986) would argue that 
a lower level of support for responsibilities such as this points to the permissive 
nature of welfare. However, lower levels of support for responsibilities 
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amongst the deprived sample are coupled by lower levels of support for social 
rights (except the right to have a job). It is therefore reasonable to challenge 
the claim that, given the chance, individuals would shirk their responsibilities 
whilst exploiting the social entitlements of an overgenerous welfare system. 
Before going any further, it is worth reiterating that, in the majority of cases, 
support for citizenship rights and responsibilities still remains relatively high 
amongst Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens with only 
minor differences observed in certain cases. Nevertheless, understanding the 
causes of attitudinal difference is crucial to explaining conflicting accounts of 
social citizenship and the rights and responsibilities it accrues. Perhaps a 
more cogent explanation of attitudinal divergence is the discord between the 
promises and outcomes of social citizenship: 
as people’s rights to benefits as citizens of the welfare state have been 
eroded or become increasingly conditional…, could it be that their 
sense of obligation to the welfare state has also been eroded? (Dean 
and Melrose, 1996: 4).  
Given the material position of those experiencing deprivation, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that they are less likely to feel they actually have social rights 
(see Table 4). Comparing the two groups, the most significant differences are 
the right to have a job and the right to have access to free education for 
children. Importantly, social rights such as free education for children are not 
categorically stratified according to employment status, income or area 
deprivation. All children are legally entitled to free education in the UK and yet 
only 81 per cent of respondents actually felt they had this right. Whilst all may 
recognise that there is a legal right to free education, there may well be (and 
indeed are) marked discrepancies in the quality and geographical and 
financial accessibility of this education (Thrupp and Lupton, 2011). This 
perhaps explains why only 72 per cent of ‘deprived’ respondents felt they 
actually had the right to free education compared to 89 per cent of ‘affluent’ 
respondents. With this in mind, it seems citizens not only reflect on the actual 
securement of social citizenship rights in assessing its value, but also the 
nature and quality of these rights according to their own lived experiences of 
it. 
Table 4: Social rights respondents feel they actually have 
 
To have 
access to free 
education for 
children 
To be looked 
after by the State 













‘Deprived’ 72% 61% 63% 83% 39% 
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‘Affluent’ 89% 63% 74% 81% 59% 
The extent of support for rights and responsibilities seems to be moderately 
affected by whether citizens feel they actually have social rights. There is a 
medium positive correlation between whether a respondent feels they have a 
particular right and whether they think everyone living in the UK should have 
that right, r = .324, n = 7,772, p < .001. Before computing these Pearson 
correlation coefficients, it was necessary to create an index to capture the 
extent of support for rights, for responsibilities and the extent to which 
respondents felt they had social rights. This was measured by constructing an 
index that assigns a score from 0-5 to each respondent for the respective 
dimensions covered in Tables 2, 3 and 4. Looking at the correlation between 
people’s support for responsibilities and the rights they feel they actually have, 
a moderate positive relationship is also observed, r = .254, n = 7,721, p < .001. 
In many respects, the feeling that one lacks social rights and the lived 
experience of deprivation, are conceptually and empirically inseparable:  
The main advantage that accrues from citizenship status is, in effect, a 
guarantee that no citizen will be allowed to fall into poverty and 
destitution; their status as a citizen (regardless of class position) gives 
them access to limited social support (Dwyer, 2010: 83). 
In this instance, deprivation represents the failed promises of social 
citizenship: an absence or lack of effectual social rights. As outlined in chapter 
four, three selection criteria have been used as a proxy: an indicator of the 
extent to which individuals experience contingency or validation in their 
economic and socio-political life. In doing so, it is possible to explore how 
those failed by the prevailing notion of ‘ideal citizenship’ (Marshall, 1950) 
support social citizenship as an institution and means of social organisation. 
If the lived experience of deprivation is a proxy, the extent to which citizens 
feel they actually have social rights is arguably a direct measure of this 
phenomenon.  
As shown in Tables 2 and 3, the majority of respondents support social 
entitlements and responsibilities. In addition, Table 4 demonstrates that a 
significant proportion of respondents feel they have social rights. However, 
there are some noteworthy statistically significant differences in the 
experiences and attitudes of Residual Contingent Citizens and Validated 
Active Citizens. In order to understand the extent to which lived experiences 
of inequality affect conceptions of citizenship and how this occurs, it is 
necessary to identify the factors of significance affecting attitudes towards 
social citizenship. By undertaking a series of binary logistic regressions, it is 
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possible to predict the probability of a respondent’s attitudes and how this is 
affected by lived experiences of deprivation, other socio-economic conditions, 
social identity characteristics and subjective impressions (see Appendix C.1 
for details). Logistic regression analysis was undertaken to predict the 
probability of a respondent’s attitude towards the following: 
• the right to be looked after by the State; 
• the right to have a job; 
• the responsibility to work to provide for yourself; 
• the responsibility to help others; 
• feel they actually have the right to be looked after by the State; and 
• feel they actually have the right to be treated fairly and equally. 
These particular dimensions were selected because they represent some of 
the more contested features of social citizenship. With two exceptions, a test 
of the full model versus a model with the intercept only is statistically 
significant. A test of the model coefficients shows that the overall lived 
experience of deprivation cannot help improve prediction of a respondent’s 
support for the responsibility to help others; 𝛸! (1, N = 1,462) = 1.464, p = 
.226; or whether a respondent feels they actually have the right to be looked 
after by the State; 𝛸! (1, N = 1,458) = 1.987, p = .159.  The success of all the 
other regression models in predicting cases was nonetheless quite high.  
Table 5 summarises the results of the regressions undertaken to explore the 
effect of lived experiences of deprivation on the attitudes and experiences of 
respondents (see Appendix C.1 for details). Overall, the lived experience of 
deprivation was the most effective predictor of support for rights, 
responsibilities and whether individuals feel they have specific socio-
economic rights.  
Table 5: Effect of deprivation on attitudes and experiences related to social 
citizenship 
 
B Wald (𝚾𝟐) P 
Odds Ratio: 
Exp(B) 
The right to be looked after 
by the State -.669 22.137 <.001 .512 
The right to have a job .433 10.987 .001 1.541 
The responsibility to work to 
provide for yourself -1.496 70.011 <.001 .224 
The responsibility to help 
others -.228 1.464 .226 .796 
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Feel they actually have the 
right to be looked after by the 
State 
-.161 1.987 .159 .851 
Feel they actually have the 
right to be treated fairly and 
equally 
-.722 37.429 <.001 .486 
As illustrated above, lived experiences of deprivation were found to affect 
attitudes and experiences in a number of statistically significant ways. Lived 
experiences of deprivation: 
- almost halve the odds (Exp(B) = .512) of an individual supporting the 
right to be looked after by the State; 
- increase the odds of supporting the right to have a job by (Exp(B) =) 
1.541;  
- reduce the odds of supporting the responsibility to work to provide for 
oneself by (Exp(B) =) .224; and 
- more than halve the odds (Exp(B) = .486) of an individual feeling as if 
they have the right to be treated fairly and equally. 
Running multiple linear regression models, it is possible to infer that the lived 
experience of deprivation reduces support for rights as well as responsibilities 
(see Table 6). For Residual Contingent Citizens, the regression models 
predict that respondents will score .729 less on their support for rights and 
score .971 less on their support for responsibilities. Accounting for interaction 
effects, again the extent to which an individual feels they have social rights 
also greatly affects support for rights and responsibilities. With each right that 
an individual feels they have the regression models predict that respondents 
will score .179 more on their support for social rights and .188 on their support 
for responsibilities.  
Table 6: Effect of deprivation and actually having rights on support for rights 
and responsibilities 
 Index of Rights Index of Responsibilities 
 B t Sig. 𝐑𝟐 B t Sig. 𝐑𝟐 
Constant 3.800 44.002 P<.001  4.485 59.346 P<.001  
Overall 
deprivation -.729 -5.607 P<.001 .015 -.971 -8.539 P<.001 .054 
Feel have 
Rights .177 7.964 P<.001 .134 .084 4.327 P<.001 .118 
Feel have 
rights* .179 5.004 P<.001 .149 .188 6.001 P<.001 .140 
*accounting for interaction effects 
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For a multiple regression model with all three covariates summarised in Table 
6, it is possible to predict 15 per cent of the variance in support for rights, and 
14 per cent of the variance in support for responsibilities. The most significant 
and successful predictor of support for the rights and responsibilities of social 
citizenship is whether a respondent feels they have social rights. This confirms 
the hypothesis that if a social good is not experienced as a social right it is 
less likely to be interpreted as such. In addition, individuals are less likely to 
support some of the social responsibilities that citizenship demands if they 
lack a ‘sufficiently generous share of the social product’ (White, 2003: 17) 
From the above analysis, it is clear that there is broad support for social 
citizenship rights and responsibilities amongst both ‘poor’ and ‘better-off’ 
citizens. Nevertheless, there are notable attitudinal differences between the 
two groups. Those in a position of material deprivation tend to express lower 
levels of support for rights and responsibilities and are less likely to feel they 
actually have social rights. Better off citizens tend to have higher levels of 
support for rights and responsibilities and are more likely to feel they have 
social rights. From the findings, it is reasonable to conclude that lived 
experiences of inequality do affect conceptions of social citizenship.  
Those experiencing deprivation and contingency in their day-to-day life are, 
to some extent, alienated from the common experiences that underpin and 
reinforce sentiments of collective belonging and mutuality. In response, those 
experiencing deprivation appear to have developed distinctive frames of 
reference in subscribing to certain citizenship ideals and practices. Jordan 
(1996: 111) argues that these differences ‘should be understood within a 
dynamic of inclusion and exclusion’. In this spirit, the remainder of the chapter 
draws on qualitative interviews undertaken with Residual Contingent Citizens 
and Validated Active Citizens to examine how people reconcile the promises 
of social citizenship with their own lived experiences of it. By exploring how 
people navigate and give meaning to a social, political and economic system 
that structures their marginality, it is possible to see how the substantive and 
figurative significance of social citizenship is undermined for those 
experiencing deprivation.  
5.4 Poverty and Plenty 
Recent qualitative research suggests that people stuck in the ‘low-pay, no-pay 
cycle’ tend to distance themselves from both the material and increasingly 
moral category of poverty (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). Despite facing 
everyday hardship, some studies have found that those living in poverty resist 
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the claim that they are excluded from mainstream society because of their 
financial situation (Flaherty, 2008). Shildrick and MacDonald (2013) suggest 
that this ostensible contradiction can be explained by the increasing 
propensity to individualise the causes of poverty in public and welfare 
discourse (Tagler and Cozzarelli, 2013). Identifying as ‘poor’ within such a 
climate is tantamount to conceding ‘moral and personal failure’ (Shildrick and 
MacDonald, 2013: 293). 
Whilst qualitative fieldwork undertaken for this thesis did not directly ask 
whether participants identified as ‘poor’, participants were asked about the 
extent to which they thought they had enough money to have a good quality 
of life. Perhaps unsurprisingly, all those below the poverty line did not feel that 
they had enough money to have a good quality of life. All respondents 
recognised that they were on a low income relative to other people living in 
the UK. It was left open for respondents to decide what they deemed to be a 
good quality of life, but it was clear that their conceptions of this were rather 
modest (Backett-Milburn et al., 2003). The majority of respondents felt they 
lacked the necessary resources to secure a sufficient standard of living to 
meet the immediate needs of themselves and their family: 
Enough money?  To have enough money to just live a basic life and 
still be happy… No, not right now. It depends what you want though 
and what your dreams are… I don’t want to go higher, I want a 
manageable life. To survive at this stage I’m at in life. (Jackie, Female, 
RCC2) 
I don’t think I’ve got enough money. By the time I’ve put my gas and 
electric on, got me shopping and then there’s me television licence, me 
water - I’m left with like £20 for the fortnight once I’ve got all me 
shopping and that. So it’s just not enough. (Ben, Male, RCC) 
Respondents attributed this hardship to a range of barriers, changes and life 
circumstances. Disability-related costs and expenditure, the rising cost of 
living and fuel and the inability to secure well-paid, meaningful or secure 
employment were all cited as factors limiting their ability to safeguard their 
basic well-being (Athwal et al., 2011). Some respondents also attributed 
 
2 As detailed in chapter four, all qualitative participants were recruited on the basis 
that they satisfied the selection criteria for either Residual Contingent Citizens 
(RCC) or Validated Active Citizens (VAC). “RCC” and “VAC” is used here to 
indicate which sample group participants belonged to. This method off notation is 
used throughout the thesis when citing participants. 
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responsibility to public services and institutions. Some felt their income was or 
recently had been actively restricted by administrative and bureaucratic 
structures but also by the discretionary actions taken by public servants: 
It's hard. You know, I've heard a lot of people complaining, what with 
the poor tax coming in. All these bedrooms, you know. (Jade, Female, 
RCC) 
You've gone down to sign on, and sometimes, depending on who you 
get, they can be hard on you. You might end up in an argument with 
them, and then they can just suspend your money like that, for how 
many bloody months. So I depend on my family and friends, for food 
and stuff like that. (Liam, Male, RCC) 
Interviews were conducted at a time of particular stress and uncertainty for 
many respondents. Many had recently been affected by reforms to public 
service provisions and social transfers. Others were concerned about current 
and forthcoming changes to social security entitlements, council tax 
exemptions, housing benefit and payment methods. Chapter seven explores 
how respondents engaged with public service and welfare institutions under 
these circumstances. 
All these respondents were in receipt of social security, which was their main 
source of income. A significant body of research confirms the ‘degrading, 
devaluing, dehumanising and belittling’ experience of those receiving low-
income social security public assistance (McIntyre et al., 2003: 304-5; 
Wacquant, 2009). This feeling and experience was clearly articulated by low-
income participants. Overwhelmingly people’s response was one of resilience 
and resourcefulness with many describing attempts to accommodate and 
cope with increased financial hardship and material deprivation (Middleton et 
al., 1994; Dean and Shah, 2002; Batty and Cole, 2010). Respondents drew 
upon a range of coping strategies (Anderson et al., 2010; Flint, 2010) that 
included borrowing money, food and clothes from friends, family and 
neighbours, getting into debt, reducing fuel and food consumption, walking 
considerable distances to save on public transport costs and selling 
possessions: 
It comes sometimes, where I might have to borrow something off a 
friend, off my mum, you know, till when I get paid. And then, when I do 
get paid, I'm handing it back out to my mum. Then I'm left with nothing 
again… (Beth, Female, RCC) 
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I shop everywhere, I shop at Morrisons, Sainsbury’s, Asda, so if they’ve 
got an offer on I will buy a load of it. So it saves me money. But erm, 
I’m very careful with money… I don’t have lights on at night (Tom, Male, 
RCC) 
These coping strategies helped overcome exigent barriers to meeting human 
need. However, this came at a significant physical and psychological cost to 
both family members and those trying to keep their ‘heads above the water’ 
(Orr et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2010; Ridge, 2011). Coping strategies were 
felt to be damaging to the sense of self-worth of some respondents. Other 
respondents described feelings of alienation, degradation and depression 
(Hooper, 2007): 
You see people that are smarter dressed and all that and they budge 
past you and that. It’s just the way they look at you and like “ah look at 
him you can tell”… because it’s hard to afford nice clothes and that. 
You’ve just got the clothes that you’ve got. (Ben, Male, RCC) 
I needed a shed for my mobility scooter... and, I had to fundraise to get 
that money and I felt like quite soul destroyed, I just like… I want a 
shed… I felt like I was begging. Yes, if you’re not earning your own 
money, you have to do that. (Lucy, Female, RCC) 
Respondents gave the impression and very often gave expression to the idea 
that they were ‘surviving’ rather than ‘living’: ‘you have to make sacrifices in 
order to be able to survive’. Respondents were engaged in a great deal of 
hard ‘work’ in an attempt to secure or at least come close to meeting their 
basic needs (Patrick, 2014). Research suggests that the concerns arising 
require a great deal of ‘cognitive bandwidth’ leaving less mental resources 
available for other tasks (Mani et al., 2013). Consumption patterns and 
activities largely deemed to be normal or customary by the general public 
(Mack et al., 2013) were felt to be a ‘luxury’ or ‘indulgent’ by many 
respondents. In this sense, respondents were primarily concerned with their 
‘hedonic’ rather than their ‘eudaimonic’ needs and future aspirations (Dean, 
2010).  
Without legal recourse from destitution, many were left without the necessary 
tools and resources to exercise their citizenship responsibilities and claim their 
citizenship rights. For these individuals, even a ‘modicum of welfare and 
security’ (Marshall, 1950) guaranteed to people by virtue of their citizenship 
status, appears to more of an ‘ideal citizenship’ (Marshall, 1950) rather than a 
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reality.  Lister (2003) suggests poverty undermines the treatment of citizens 
as of ‘equal worth’ (Lister, 2003: 121). A sizeable portion of research notes 
the sense of exclusion, isolation and alienation felt by those on a low income 
(cf. Jo, 2013; Walker, 2014).  In this light, the presence of poverty within any 
polity corrupts the symbolic and material significance of social citizenship.  
These lived experiences contrast strongly with those of better-off citizens. All 
those in a better pecuniary position felt that they had enough money to have 
a good quality of life. Some respondents noted that they gave relatively little 
thought to money and focused their attention on other matters:  
Well we’re very comfortable because we… I think I mentioned to you 
in my email… my husband sold his business in 2005 so we invested a 
lot of that money into property and we live from property rentals. 
(Emma, Female, VAC) 
I don’t really think about money at the moment. I think about my brother 
and mother. (Richard, Male, VAC) 
The one exception to this was a respondent who had chosen to take a drop in 
income. Whilst he did not feel he now had enough money to have a good 
quality of life, this was an active decision to make a career change. His income 
nonetheless exceeded the national average quite considerably. 
More than half of affluent respondents felt that their income was somewhere 
around the middle of the income distribution with the rest feeling like it was 
high relative to others. Many affluent respondents emphasised their financial 
autonomy and were keen to stress that their income and capital were a 
product of their own effort and decision-making. One respondent 
spontaneously affirmed that she did not receive any assistance from the 
government: 
We're not rich or anything… We're in the middle. We have a good life. 
We don't live off the government, either… (Sophie, Female, VAC) 
Despite having an income that was well above the national average, a third of 
affluent respondents felt that they would like a higher income than they 
currently have access to: 
I’m sure, like anybody, I’d like to have a bit more. But I’m reasonably 
happy with money. I’ve got my mortgage paid off and I’ve got no loans 
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so there’s no debts or anything. There’s no pressure on me workwise 
but it would be nice to have more. (William, Male, VAC) 
The desire for a greater income can perhaps best be explained by the ‘status 
anxiety’ experienced by most people irrespective of their social or economic 
position (de Botton, 2004). People tend to compare their situation, 
consumption patterns and lifestyle against that of their peers. This may come 
some way to explain why those on a very high income tend to; underestimate 
their income and wealth relative to the national average; significantly 
overestimate what they believe to be average occupational wages; and place 
the national poverty threshold very close to the average national income 
(Toynbee and Walker, 2009: 22-26). As the top one per cent pull away from 
the rest of the income distribution, the poor and the ‘moderately wealthy’ are 
likely to feel more alienated from the conspicuous consumption of the wealthy 
elite. 
Going into further detail, a number of affluent respondents revealed anxieties 
about their financial position. In spite of significant capital accumulated and a 
relatively secure financial position one respondent intimated that her family 
were ‘struggling’: 
 
At the moment I would say we get by, but I only get by because I’ve got 
a husband who works flat out as well. And because I’ve actually 
managed to accrue that capital in my house and everything and I’ve 
paid my mortgage off. (Rachel, Female, VAC) 
Only two respondents explicitly identified as ‘rich’. These two respondents 
were particularly keen to emphasise their wealth relative to others. They 
expressed gratitude for their own life circumstances and opportunities and 
were concerned that other generations and social classes were not being 
afforded the same.  
5.5 Work and Worklessness 
Much of the existing literature suggests those that are unemployed and living 
below the poverty line exhibit a clear desire to be engaged in paid employment 
(Kempson, 1996; Shildrick et al., 2010; MacDonald et al., 2014a). All those 
unemployed respondents interviewed for this thesis expressed a similar desire 
to be in paid work. However, to suggest that this is indicative of their ‘work 
ethic’, neglects the significant amount of voluntary, care and/or domestic 
- 106 - 
labour already undertaken by these individuals (as detailed in chapter seven). 
To suggest that their desire to engage in paid work is indicative of their ‘work 
ethic’ is to subscribe to a rather narrow conception of what constitutes ‘work’. 
Respondents gave a number of reasons for wanting to engage in paid work, 
relating to improved mental health, greater freedom, independence, choice 
and financial security, a greater sense of purpose, and avoiding substance 
abuse: 
It’s not just for the money, although the money would be nice. But just 
to get out of the house instead of… having a purpose… because when 
I’m in the house that’s when I tend to fall back into drinking and into 
drugs. If I’m out a lot more it’s better. (Ben, Male, RCC) 
I think basically, you just feel better about earning your own pennies, 
then you don’t have to justify how you spend your money. When you’re 
getting something from the State, you have to justify everything… And 
I find that incredibly intrusive, I find that hard and frustrating, because 
really and truly I would like to pay for my own care. (Lucy, Female, 
RCC) 
Yeah. I think it’s more mentally for me as well because being in the 
house and stuff all the time… I’m just constantly on a downer all the 
time.  (Brooke, Female, RCC) 
Unemployed respondents with caring responsibilities (almost two thirds) were 
keen to engage in paid work that could accommodate the needs of their 
children, family and friends (Preston, 2006; Finn and Gloster, 2010). Part-time 
work was often viewed as the most desirable option for these individuals. 
Many were also keen to engage in paid work that was meaningful to them or 
was aligned to their own interests and ambitions. Many said they were willing 
to do a job that was not necessarily what they wanted to do permanently but 
that they wanted this to eventually lead to meaningful work that they would 
enjoy (Crisp et al., 2009). In this sense, respondents’ desire to engage in paid 
work was not ‘blind’. Rather than an indiscriminate desire to undertake any 
form of work, respondents were keen to find gainful employment that 
enhanced their own sense of self and worth. This related to types of activities 
that respondents were willing to engage in but also the financial remuneration 
that was deemed to be acceptable. Whilst respondents were aware of the 
integrative potential of employment (Murphy and Athanasou, 1999; Lindsay, 
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2010), they were also concerned about many of the challenges and 
compromises that came with it: 
Yeah, I’d love to work. As long as it’s around the hours of my kids. 
(Beth, Female, RCC) 
I've said to myself, if I have to go back into doing that - not that I really 
want to, but I would, I suppose, go back into looking after the elderly. 
I've said to my advisor, maybe, from there, I could work my way up, 
and get into working with children. (Jade, Female, RCC) 
Some felt that public services did not give them the appropriate support they 
needed to transition into paid employment. A number of respondents found 
that their financial situation (as well as life circumstances) made it difficult to 
fulfil behavioural requirements prescribed by welfare institutions such as 
Jobcentre Plus. Some found it difficult to search for work in an efficient or 
meaningful way because this incurred financial and time costs. Three 
respondents felt that they were just going through the motions and were not 
making genuine progress in moving closer towards paid employment. Many 
respondents felt as if they were under a significant amount of pressure to 
conform to the expectations of public institutions and servants they came into 
contact with. A few respondents had been subject to benefit sanctions.  
Others felt as though they were being repeatedly sanctioned in spite of efforts 
to fulfil work-related obligations. These respondents felt that they were 
regularly questioned, watched and inspected by welfare institutions with some 
feeling that their treatment and material condition actually constituted a form 
of punishment. All this points to the increasingly governmental approach to 
social policy and particularly social security provision (Marston and McDonald, 
2006; Schram et al., 2010). Respondents pointed to many structural and 
discretionary acts of control that were dictating their behaviours, consumption 
patterns and lifestyle choices. When discussing the concept of work, the 
lexicon of many respondents shifted to expose the internalised logic of welfare 
reforms and workfare (Dwyer and Ellison, 2009). Many respondents used 
terms such as ‘actively seeking employment’ and ‘active job search’ redolent 
of the governmentality unemployment benefit claimants were subject to: 
Well, they want to know if you've been looking for jobs out there, and 
stuff like that, and they want proof. Well, I'll tell them straight-up that 
I've been looking on my sister's laptop. I go on there - because I haven't 
got one, I got to go my sister's. (Selina, Female, RCC) 
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You could apply for ten jobs… and they’re like “Is that all you’ve 
done?”… like they talk down to you kind of thing. Like you’ve never 
done enough you always go away thinking oh I could have done more 
and when you’re getting your benefit it’s like it’s coming out of their 
personal pocket… (Ashley, Female, RCC) 
The length of time respondents had been unemployed varied significantly: 
from 2 weeks to 19 years. Long-term unemployed respondents were more 
likely to express anxiety and concern about their job prospects and 
opportunities to find gainful employment. These respondents had applied for 
a considerable array and number of jobs but felt that competition was now too 
high and they were ‘on the bottom of the pile’. One respondent noted 
difficulties that her ‘well-qualified’ daughter was having in finding a job: ‘if she’s 
got no chance then what sort of chance have I got’. After making many 
unsuccessful job applications some respondents lacked confidence and did 
not feel that they would ever find a job again:  
You know I been out of it so long and then I get back into it. When you 
kind of get into a set routine and expecting nothing every day. You don’t 
want to better yourself. (Amber, Female, RCC) 
Jobs are very limited, competition is so stiff. (Liam, Male, RCC) 
Some respondents struggled to see the financial benefits of engaging in the 
paid labour market (MacDonald et al., 2005). For those falling in and out of 
low-paid employment, concerns were expressed about the lack of security that 
came with transitioning into paid work (Jordan et al., 1992: 122-133; Shildrick 
et al., 2012). Two respondents also noted how difficult it was to transition out 
of poverty and alluded to questions concerning the perverse incentives of 
taking up paid work, high marginal deduction rates and the poverty trap 
experienced by many (Ray et al., 2010): 
They’ve got to realize it costs so much traveling.  It eats up half of your 
wages, so the bit of ease of going back to work and having a little bit of 
income support paid for my bus fares to go back to work without directly 
taking out my wages.  Because right now we’re working for gas, 
electric, and bus fares…  We’re not working for ourselves. I’m just going 
round in circles - how are we going to enjoy this life? (Jackie, Female, 
RCC) 
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Where unemployed respondents had previously been in paid work, they did 
not necessarily experience the fiscal and non-fiscal integrative potential of 
employment. The experience of low-paid low-skilled work undermines the 
theoretical notion and practical desire to ‘Make Work Pay’ (McQuaid et al., 
2010). By virtue of their household income and nature of employment, 
Validated Active Citizens could see the multiple values of work. The vast 
majority of these respondents were engaged in work that they found 
worthwhile, stimulating and enjoyable. In addition, they were able to pursue 
their own desired ends as a result of this employment. As previously 
mentioned, the financial and non-financial benefits of employment featured in 
the collective imagination of unemployed respondents seeking work. 
However, their actual experiences suggested that these benefits were far from 
tenable given their qualifications and life circumstances (Saunders et al., 
2006).  
Within the current citizenship framework, unemployment and ‘poor work’ 
(Shildrick and MacDonald, 2007) have a number of detrimental effects on 
citizen status and identity. As discussed, unemployed benefit claimants face 
multiple barriers that prevent them from obtaining gainful employment 
(Fletcher et al., 2008). Many struggle to engage with and subscribe to the 
dominant ideals surrounding citizenship duties and work (Lister, 2002a: 107). 
As a result, unemployed citizens are less likely to feel they have the right to a 
job and are less likely to support the responsibility to work to provide for 
themselves (see Tables 3 and 4). This may come some way to explain the 
result of one study that found unemployed, socially excluded people ‘did not 
feel they had a responsibility to work, nor did they see any value in work other 
than as a source of income’ (Page, 2000: 26). With a limited ability to identify 
with and perform the role of ‘citizen worker’ many are denied full citizen status 
through institutional and discursive means.  
All unemployed respondents interviewed felt judged for not being employed 
or being on unemployment benefit: 
Yeah, I feel degraded because I feel worthless. If you say to people ‘I’m 
unemployed’, they look down their nose at you. It’s hard. What do you 
say, what do you do? I mean I’ve tried. I’ve applied for so many jobs 
and I think age has got a lot to do with it. (Tom, Male, RCC) 
People looking down their nose at me and just thinking I’m sponging 
off the government or… stuff like that. So yeah… But like I say it’s not 
through a choice of my own I do want to go back to work but at the 
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minute obviously we’re still in recession supposedly and everybody is 
losing their jobs and it’s just hard trying to find work. (Brook, Female, 
RCC) 
Without capacity or willingness to fulfil prescribed forms of behaviour, 
unemployed individuals are alienated from the validating dogma of ‘active 
citizenship’. For these individuals, work is very often experienced as a 
responsibility which they are less able to fulfil and an unrealised right to which 
they aspire. For Validated Active Citizens, work is experienced and venerated 
as a reward of effective citizen engagement and performance. The categorical 
and material cleavages that arise as a result undermine common citizen status 
and identity. 
5.6 Area Deprivation and Affluence 
As detailed in chapter four, respondents interviewed for this study were 
recruited from some of the richest and poorest areas of Britain. There are 
considerable differences in the characteristics of these areas related to 
housing quality, population density, ethnic diversity, employment opportunities 
and so on (Hooper, 2007; DCLG, 2011). The 2005 Citizenship Survey (see 
Table 7) suggests that those living in deprived areas are much less likely to 
feel that they belong to their immediate neighbourhood. They are less likely to 
feel that their neighbours can be trusted, are willing to help them and would 
pull together to help solve community or local problems. These differences 
were discernible in the experiences of participants in the qualitative phase of 
this study.  
Table 7: Experiences and impressions of local area and neighbourhood 
  ‘Deprived’ ‘Affluent’ All 
Strongly feel that they belong to their 
immediate neighbourhood 69% 73% 72% 
Agree that people in their neighbourhood 
pull together to improve the neighbourhood 53% 79% 70% 
Agree that many people in their 
neighbourhood can be trusted 17% 66% 50% 
Agree it is likely that people in their 
neighbourhood would participate if they 
were asked by a local organisation to help 
solve a community problem 
64% 87% 80% 
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Agree that people in their neighbourhood 
are willing to help their neighbours 72% 95% 87% 
Feel that they can influence decisions 
affecting their local area 31% 45% 40% 
About half of the respondents living in deprived areas felt that they were part 
of a community where they lived. These respondents felt that they got on with 
their neighbours and that they could get help and support from local friends if 
needed. A number of respondents also felt that their familial roots and history 
anchored them to their local area. The other half of respondents living in 
deprived areas did not feel as though they were part of a community for a 
number of reasons. Some cited feelings of isolation from people they knew 
and people they could relate with. A significant number of those living in 
deprived areas (even those who felt part of their community) felt unsafe in 
their local area. Violent crime, drug abuse, vandalism and robbery were felt to 
be a persistent problem that prevented many from feeling positive attachment 
to their local area and neighbours:  
The area where I live, I don’t think it is a good area… I don’t belong to 
that place… we are different from the others, neighbours and the other 
people who live around. (Julia, Female, RCC) 
I don’t feel safe around here at all. I don’t feel as if I’m part of the 
community at all and just the area is going downhill which you probably 
heard from the news anyway because of the stabbing which I think it 
were last week or the week before just up the road… (Brooke, Female, 
RCC) 
Over two thirds of respondents living in deprived areas did not feel as if they 
could make a change in their local area. For some, meeting their own 
immediate needs was a greater priority that took up the majority of their time 
and effort:  
You know, getting through every day is enough for me at the moment 
do you know what I mean. At the moment in my life I don’t feel like I 
have much left to give. (Ashley, Female, RCC) 
Oh!  Me? Not now at the moment because we are really focusing on 
living. So not now.  Maybe three years ago if my son was better. Julia, 
Female, RCC) 
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Some who were keen to engage with and make changes to their local area 
either lacked knowledge of who to contact or how to go about this. Others that 
had tried to engage with local authorities, housing associations and services 
were faced with significant challenges and did not feel as if they had the power 
to get local issues resolved: 
No. Because it doesn’t matter what you do. You try and make a change 
and it’s like. It’s like you walk round and you’re constantly avoiding dog 
muck on the floor and stuff. I’ve been in touch with the Council and stuff 
over it and they haven’t done anything. I’ve been in touch with other 
people and like school and everything. Erm, problems with school and 
it’s just…trying to get something done about it. Nobody listens to you. 
(Brooke, Female, RCC) 
This contrasts quite markedly with the experiences of respondents living in 
affluent areas. More than two thirds of respondents living in affluent areas felt 
that they could make a change in their local area. Those that were less inclined 
to agree still felt that they could make some changes but that this would not 
be easy. Many were actively involved in community groups and organisations 
that, in some measure, enhanced the built environment, facilities and activities 
available in their local area. Interaction with the local authority and service 
groups paid dividends on a number of occasions and many were able to 
readily cite examples of where they had been concerned about something and 
were able to affect change. There was a feeling from many of these 
respondents that public services were responsive to their needs and 
concerns:   
Down there at the playground - there was a problem there for a while. 
Particularly now that it is the summer and the clocks change, so 
children will start having GCSE exam leave, and all that kind of thing. 
Sometimes there are teenagers that hang around there, and they'll be 
drinking, and just doing normal teenage stuff. But then, there has been 
a problem with smashed glass, down there, and I did contact the 
Council saying, "Look, this is a playground. There's bottles smashed 
here from teenagers." I’ve seen them cleaning it up, and stuff being 
repaired and replaced, and stuff. I also know that somebody must have 
contacted the police, because the police do a second round there, on 
the summer evenings. (Rachel, Female, VAC) 
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Some felt that public services and community groups were less responsive to 
their needs. Having made little progress with the council on particular issues, 
a number of respondents had decided to join or establish community ventures 
that they felt would remedy the problem. This ranged from ‘guerrilla planting’ 
(gardening on land that an individual or group has no legal right to use in that 
capacity) and litter picks to fundraising activities and local petitioning.  
As illustrated in Table 7, individuals living in affluent areas are much more 
likely to feel they can influence and affect change in their local area. In addition 
to this, these individuals are more likely to trust their neighbours and feel that 
people in their local area are willing to pull together and help one another to 
solve community problems. Some respondents were aware of the unique 
characteristics and experiences related to their local area. One affluent 
respondent noted that her immediate neighbourhood was ‘a bit of a bubble’ in 
the sense that it was much wealthier and ‘nicer’ than other neighbourhoods 
surrounding it. One respondent living in a deprived area noted that she felt a 
sense of alienation when visiting wealthier areas that differed so starkly from 
her own:  
Yeah…I guess…I feel part of my community. But in the bigger scheme 
of things I don’t feel comfortable in other areas. Do you know what I 
mean, there’s a lot of people like me where I live so I kind of feel like I 
fit in there. But when I go up to my dad’s area where it’s all posh I don’t 
feel like I fit in at all… (Ashley, Female, RCC) 
Runciman (1966) claims that people tend to compare their situation with a 
reference group similar to themselves rather than the whole of society. This 
tendency means some are less aware of the extent of income inequality and 
poverty and where they lie on the income distribution. When individuals 
become aware of this, a ‘revolution of rising expectations’ (Runciman, 1966) 
may occur where there is increased support for redistribution. In this instance, 
we can see that the lived experience of area deprivation has not led to such a 
‘revolution’ but Residual Contingent Citizens are very much aware of their 
structural disadvantage. This is reflected in their surrounding and built 
environment and they negotiate the challenges that this brings in ways that 
prove either constructive or manageable to their day-to-day lives. Recent 
studies have shown that there are significant neighbourhood effects that ‘may 
influence people’s views about inequality and redistribution, namely attitude 
transmission and knowledge accumulation’ (Bailey et al., 2013; Kearns, 2014: 
459). Macdonald et al., (2005: 885) demonstrate ‘the continuing sociological 
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relevance of class and place in understanding lived experience’. They suggest 
that young people growing up in poor neighbourhoods derive some sense of 
attachment and inclusion via their families, class background, local economy 
and lived environment. ‘Networks of inclusion’ though are created against, 
rather than within, a common citizenship praxis. Chapter seven explores the 
extent to which this was the case for participants interviewed in this study.  
5.7 The material and symbolic significance of inequality 
Having encouraged respondents to reflect upon their lived experiences, 
respondents were then asked whether they felt they had social rights as 
someone living in the UK. Only two respondents experiencing material 
deprivation felt that they did. However, both of these respondents qualified 
their answers stating that these rights were either ineffectual at times or 
undermined by conditionality, political rhetoric and stigma associated with 
dependence on public services and transfers. Along with many others living 
below the poverty line, one of these respondents felt that service provision 
and support did not work in their interests or address their concerns:  
The way they speak to you makes you feel you are not entitled to it. So 
just kind of going back to the benefit and the welfare system; I think it’s 
unfortunate we’ve got a system that undermines these people… I do 
feel I have social rights, but you have to fight for them. (Selina, Female, 
RCC) 
Obviously I’ve got rights, but…I don’t think many people take much 
notice of anything I have to say really so… erm… I suppose it would 
depend on what issue I was making. I feel like yeah I got rights and 
people listen and people are there to help if I choose to use their 
services but erm…when I’ve come for help in the past it has never really 
got me anywhere so I just tend to not bother… (Liam, Male, RCC) 
The vast majority of respondents living in material deprivation did not feel that 
they had social rights at all. These respondents also expressed similar 
concerns about the efficacy of social rights and the procedural effects of 
welfare reform. For these respondents, this was felt to be one of the key 
reasons that undermined their claim to a meaningful universal entitlement. 
Others felt that some claims for assistance were met with punitive treatment 
or indiscriminate decision-making on benefit receipt. Many drew connections 
between a lack of social rights and a lack of basic material resources to meet 
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their basic requirements. Some also recognised that this damaged their 
capacity to meet ‘thicker’ eudaimonic needs (Dean, 2010) intrinsic to human 
flourishing and self-determination:  
No, I don’t.  For my present situation as a carer, no, I’ve got no welfare 
rights.  It’s all been taken away.  How has it affected me?  It’s just 
slowed down progress, kept me from growing, expanding…  It just 
stops me from being who I want to be.  I love to help me kids and I love 
to travel, but I’m not able to do that because I’m stuck in this stupid 
welfare.  Some people are lucky and some people are not.  Some 
people can go to get loads of money from the welfare system where I 
go and I get penalized for working for three months.  It doesn’t make 
sense. (Jackie, Female, RCC) 
Like I say, we don’t have no rights, full stop. (Brooke, Female, RCC) 
The vast majority of better-off respondents felt that they had social rights. 
Affluent respondents interpreted the substance and purpose of these rights in 
very different ways to respondents experiencing deprivation. Two 
respondents were ambivalent and one respondent did not feel as though they 
had social rights. Those that were ambivalent felt that social rights in the UK 
were being eroded. One person felt like they had social rights but that other 
citizens did not due to welfare reforms. A number of others responded as if 
social rights were reserved for a particular portion of society. These people 
felt that their relatively affluent position precluded them from an entitlement to 
social rights. They saw social rights as reserved for a small portion of the 
population but that they were entitled to these if they had a need to draw upon 
or claim them. However, as illustrated in chapter three, those in the middle 
and at the top end of the income distribution receive a non-trivial amount of 
social security payments (see Figure 4). A number of other respondents 
engaged in highly remunerated work, felt that their entitlement to social rights 
was derived through their employment status and earnings record. This points 
to the social divisions of welfare that continues to characterise social politics 
(Titmuss, 1958). For these individuals, social rights were conceived of as 
something to be earned, traded and bargained for. These ‘exchange-
orientated relationship strategies’ are typical of upper-class individuals (Kraus 
et al., 2012: 562): 
Yes I feel that I’ve got social rights probably…well… on the basis that 
I’m contributing financially to society then I should have whatever social 
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rights, whatever that means, so to live within the law in this country and 
enjoy the things you know that society offers as and when we wish to 
dip into it. Having contributed you know both of us throughout our lives 
as being higher rate taxpayers then yes all those things [education, 
NHS, social security] we do feel totally entitled to use them. (Emma, 
Female, VAC) 
I don’t suppose I have rights under the current circumstances I am in 
but do I… I suppose I do take them for granted so yes I do think there 
are rights that I have. Erm, but that’s because I put something in. With 
rights you’ve got obligations to put something back again. If you can 
afford it you should pay the tax to try and help those who can’t afford it. 
(Owen, Male, VAC) 
For this last respondent, social rights were to be conferred to those on a low 
income and ‘earned’ for those on a reasonable income. Not only were the 
rights of social citizenship deemed to be different, but also the responsibilities 
in a way that recognised the material differences and thus capacities of the 
two groups to contribute in the same way.  
As is apparent, whether people feel they have social rights does not always 
match up with their legal entitlement. Nevertheless, people’s experience of 
public services and provisions appears to substantially affect whether they 
feel they have social rights. In terms of their capacity to affect change in their 
local area, the previous section pointed to noteworthy differences in the 
experiences of poor and affluent citizens. These differences carried through 
to other domains of interaction between citizens, public institutions and service 
providers. Affluent respondents generally had more positive and constructive 
experiences: these individuals felt more confident approaching service 
providers because problems were resolved or concerns were addressed or at 
least responded to. In contrast, respondents experiencing deprivation 
generally had more negative experiences with service providers who were 
often perceived to be ineffective and/or unresponsive.  
After seeking help from local authorities and service providers, some 
respondents felt ‘ignored’, ‘judged’ and ‘patronised’. One respondent 
complained about, what she felt was, particularly poor treatment from the 
police. There had been an attempted burglary at the respondent’s house 
whilst her family and children were there. In spite of a violent altercation with 
the burglars, she said police spent less than five minutes in the house and 
then left without recording the incident. This contrasts strongly with the 
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experience of one affluent respondent. A burglar was seen outside her house, 
the police were called and a helicopter search was subsequently undertaken 
to search for the prospective burglar in the fields behind the respondent’s 
house. Faced with similar circumstances, these two respondents reported 
radically different responses from emergency services. Those experiencing 
deprivation reported numerous difficulties in securing what many would 
conceive as basic services and facilities to ensure a safe living environment 
for their family (Mack et al., 2013). Such deficiencies included: no locks on 
children’s bedroom windows, no sink in a bathroom for 10 years, and a lack 
of appropriate advice from health visitors.  
For those respondents experiencing deprivation, their lives were often 
characterised by precarity, upheaval and vulnerability (Hooper, 2007). It would 
appear that such an experience makes it difficult for these individuals to 
reconcile their own material condition with the apparent benefits and 
substance of social citizenship (Cole, 2011). The broken promises of 
citizenship are materially and symbolically alienating and many struggle to 
identify with social citizenship as a meaningful status given their own 
experience of it. When asked, only a third of these respondents felt as if they 
were social citizens. These respondents recognised the exclusionary potential 
and reality of citizenship but nonetheless felt that they were able to challenge 
this in their interactions with public institutions. The other two thirds of 
respondents did not feel as if they were social citizens. Some felt unable or 
unwilling to conform to prescribed forms of responsible citizenship centring on 
paid employment. Strikingly, a number of respondents said they would feel 
more like a social citizen if they were employed. They felt that this would 
enable them to participate in domains of life that they were currently excluded 
from. Others felt that they lacked core life opportunities and social rights 
accessible to others. Some felt that they lacked political power and input into 
public institutions and policies. The demands of being poor and on welfare 
were also cited as factors jeopardising citizen status. For those living in a 
condition of deprivation, their life circumstances, interaction with public 
services and employment status appear to undermine feelings of common 
belonging and purpose:  
I know that if I had a job I’d feel more like a social citizen than I do now 
at the moment being unemployed. I would feel as though I fitted into 
society more. Yeah if that happened… I would feel more like a social 
citizen. [Researcher: Why?] I dunno, just probably the way I’ve been 
brought up and that. I’ve always like… had it bad… well not bad, but I 
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haven’t had a lot of stuff other people have had. Maybe if I did I could 
be classed more as a social citizen but if I was in full-time employment 
and actively paying my taxes and this, that and the other, I think I would 
be classed more as a social citizen. (Ben, Male, RCC) 
You feel not listened to… like you don’t care… you just go through a 
day to day, hand to mouth kind of life. (Ashley, Female, RCC) 
If I was working, I would probably think more about voting and what 
have you… about my rights and fitting into society more because you 
do feel more of a different person when you’re working. Like I worked 
in a call centre a while ago and actually getting in a suit and getting up 
and when you’re walking around the town you do feel as though you fit 
in more. (Liam, Male, RCC) 
I mean, obviously I have the right to vote, so I have some choices. But 
I think, like I have said before, I think that my choices are limited, and I 
think that’s partly down to the government and partly down to my 
health, that I don’t engage as much.  You’re a burden on the state and 
society and I actually, I feel like I do contribute through my voluntary 
work, through educating people about the importance of health. So, I 
do feel like I have a role in society, but no, I think it’s not like a bankable 
or a… it doesn’t have a value on it, so…I feel that people, have 
assumed, and it is coming from the government, that somebody with a 
disability is a lower class. (Lucy, Female, RCC) 
The condition of deprivation is meaningful and potent in isolation. However, 
the relativity of deprivation is perhaps most meaningful for understanding the 
sense-making of citizenship orientation. People seem to evaluate the worth of 
their resources, orientate their experiences and authenticate their position in 
relation to and against others. The material resources at one’s disposal are 
socially constituted (Dittmar and Pepper, 1994). Deprivation and affluence 
then are not only a material deficit or accretion; they are an expression of 
one’s citizenship status and position (Beresford et al., 1999; Palmer et al., 
2008). In this sense, the material and symbolic repercussions of deprivation 
that are negotiated in day-to-day life, compromise a common citizen identity. 
Other studies have found similar psychosocial effects with individuals feeling 
like ‘second class citizens’ or ‘excluded from citizenship’ (Dean and Melrose, 
1996; Dwyer, 1998; Lister et al., 2003; Humpage, 2008a; Scanlon and Adlam, 
2013; Roseneil, 2014). 
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Whilst heavily critiqued, the idea that engagement in the paid labour market is 
in some way constitutive of social citizenship status and identity is 
uncontroversial. Hegemonic conceptions of social citizenship have almost 
always been predicated on citizen participation in the form of paid labour 
(Lewis and Fink, 2004). However, it is striking to see this idea expressed so 
patently by those marginalised by citizenship ideals and institutions. Just as 
the processes entangled in cultural citizenship are subject-making, it appears 
the nexus between work and citizenship is part of the ‘dual process of self-
making and being-made’ (Ong, 1999: 738). Within the current praxis of 
citizenship, belonging and common identity rest substantially on one’s 
capacity and willingness to undertake paid work. That people feel alienated 
from society because of this, demonstrates the extent of exclusion currently 
at play in citizenship practices: 
Citizenship, like freedom, tends to be regarded as an absolute 
condition, but the history of poor citizens in Britain demonstrates the 
fundamental relativity of the term. Despite and in some respect 
because of the welfare state, many degrees of citizenship have 
survived or developed. Wealthier householders are more effective 
citizens than those with less certain sources of income, and indeed are 
frequently able to make better use of the common services of the 
welfare system (Vincent, 1991: 181). 
From this chapter, it is clear that the topographies of social citizenship 
resulting in a stratification of resources and status feed into the lived 
experiences of different social groups. This ‘contingent’ and ‘validated’ 
citizenship gives rise to differing ‘ways of construing the self, perceiving the 
world, and relating to others’ (Kraus et al., 2012: 561). Deprivation affects 
conceptions of social citizenship in ways that reflect its exclusionary capacity. 
If citizenship is to mean anything in an everyday sense it should mean 
the ability of individuals to occupy public spaces in a manner that does 
not compromise their self-identity, let alone obstruct, threaten or even 
harm them more materially (Painter and Philo, 1995: 115). 
Due to their lived experiences, Residual Contingent Citizens are less likely to 
feel that they have social rights and that they can perform prescribed 
citizenship responsibilities. As a result, they are less likely to feel like social 
citizens or identify with and subscribe to dominant citizenship structures and 
ideals. By contrast, support for formalised social citizenship is higher amongst 
Validated Active Citizens because their rights and responsibilities are 
conceived on a basis conducive to their lived experience and capacities: 
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I feel quite a social citizen, in terms of – I work hard, I pay my taxes, I 
give things back to the community, I'm responsible for my own children, 
I make sure they don't break the law, I don't break the law.  (Michael, 
Male, VAC) 
I would feel that I’m certainly a law-abiding citizen who contributes 
heftily financially to the system obviously as I did explain I’m not 
involved in the local society so I’m not contributing in that way but 
certainly in terms of compliance yes I’m a very social citizen. (Emma, 
Female, VAC) 
One affluent respondent captured the stark difference of experience and 
feeling between Validated Active Citizens and Residual Contingent Citizens:  
I think I have a stake in society. (Catherine, Female, VAC) 
A number of studies have explored how structured inequalities shape the 
divergent experiences and attitudes of citizens. However, as discussed in 
chapter four, studies that have incorporated lived experiences into an 
explanation of attitudinal difference, tend to conflate material position with 
material interest (Evans, 1993; Brooks et al., 2006; Brooks and Svallfors, 
2010; Evans and de Graaf, 2013). These studies fail to account for the 
complex ways in which citizens may mediate their own experiences and 
interactions with citizenship structures. Social citizenship structures and 
welfare policies ‘help make citizens’ (Campbell, 2003). Material and status 
inequalities arising as a result are likely to inform the relational orientations 
and attitudes of individuals within a collective (Mettler and Soss, 2004: 61). 
5.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that, overall, there are high levels of support for social 
citizenship rights and responsibilities. Having said that, Residual Contingent 
Citizens have different experiences and thus attitudes to Validated Active 
Citizens. Secondary analysis found that there were a range of factors that 
affected individual conceptions of social citizenship but these effects were 
often not consistent or one-directional. Overall, the lived experience of 
deprivation proved to be the most significant determinant of people’s attitudes. 
Qualitative data points to a disjuncture between the dominant ideals of social 
citizenship and its material and psychosocial effects.  
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Throughout this write-up of findings there has been some discussion of the 
extent to which people’s support for rights or responsibilities is self-referential. 
In the case of those experiencing deprivation it is apparent that people’s 
understanding of these facets of social citizenship is not self-interested but is 
certainly referential. Conceptions of social citizenship, rights and 
responsibilities are grounded in the lived experiences of everyday life. It would 
seem individuals orientate their own interpretation of social citizenship around 
what it has as an institution and practice been able to offer them. Espousal of 
fairness, equality and desert has less meaning to those in a condition of 
deprivation because these principles are not built on anything substantive. 
Quite literally, a lack of social goods, makes discussion of their fair or just 
distribution less meaningful. If social citizenship has failed to deliver a 
‘sufficiently generous share of the social product’ (White, 2003: 17), then there 
is a somewhat perverse incentive for them to subscribe to the assumptions 
upon which it is built. Effectively ‘a sense of citizenship… is a key motivation 
for the practice of citizenship’ (Conover, 1995: 135) and with the status of 
citizenship undermined by deprivation, support for it becomes compromised. 
Social citizenship structures that, notionally, guarantee a meaningful level of 
welfare and security, have failed to do so for Residual Contingent Citizens. As 
previously stated, their lived experiences of public institutions and policies 
suggest that it is less feasible to secure certain social goods than might 
otherwise be assumed. The intensification and extension of conditionality 
(Dwyer and Wright, 2014) has re-formulated the terms and conditions of 
entitlement. For those experiencing poverty and social exclusion then, claims 
to social rights are not so much seen in isolation but in a dialectical relationship 
with citizenship responsibilities and ideals that have come to structure their 
marginality. The lived experience of these groups is a constant reminder of 
the ‘social structural limits’ that infringe upon their agency and capacity to 
embrace prescribed forms of citizenship behaviour and benefit. In this sense, 
‘certain phases of social structure generate the circumstances in which 
infringement of social codes constitutes a ‘normal’ [in the sense of a culturally, 
if not approved] response’ (Merton, 1938: 672). Whilst, Validated Active 
Citizens are able to employ reasonable means to perform and realise 
prescribed citizenship ends, Residual Contingent Citizens are more likely to 
deviate in a way that reflects their relative exclusion from the ideals and 
practices of social citizenship.  
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Chapter 6: Agency vs. structure: how lived experiences 
shape the sociological imagination of the rich and poor  
 
6.1 Introduction 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, there are high levels of support for social 
citizenship rights and responsibilities at a level of abstraction. The general 
public tend to oppose absolute poverty and excessive inequality and support 
redistribution and poverty alleviation as a matter of principle (Coughlin, 1980; 
Kumlin, 2007). Generalised support for welfare state activity can therefore be 
seen as an expression of collective values, norms and orientations (Feldman, 
2003). However, attitudinal divergence tends to occur when the specificities 
of institutional and individual action feature in moral reasoning (Hedges, 
2005). Attitude formation within and between social and economic groups has 
been explained by a range of factors but this chapter explores the hypothesis 
that lived experiences amount to knowledge accumulation and thus attitude 
(trans-) formation in relation to social citizenship. Analysis thus far suggests 
that attitudes are shaped by how aligned one’s own experiences are with the 
dominant ideals and praxis of social citizenship. This chapter develops such 
an idea to consider how lived experiences affect knowledge accumulation 
about the structural determinants of action, agency and socio-economic 
outcome.  
This is done by comparing the attitudes of those notionally termed here as 
Residual Contingent Citizens  (unemployed individuals living below the 
poverty in deprived areas) and Validated Active Citizens (wealthy individuals 
engaged in full-time work and living in affluent areas). It is believed these 
material and relational conditions shape what individuals see as a legitimate 
responsibility, the capacity and resilience of individual agency and the role of 
structural barriers and enablers. This affects attitudes towards poverty and 
deprivation and in turn these attitudes affect what the general public believe 
should specifically and in principle be done to address such phenomena 
(Groskind, 1991; Roff et al., 2002; Lepianka et al., 2009; Mullen and Skitka, 
2009; Jeene et al., 2013; Tagler and Cozzarelli, 2013).  
To explore this, vignettes were used in qualitative fieldwork to discuss 
operational notions of justice, responsibility and fairness. As discussed in 
section 4.5.2, respondents were presented with four vignettes or ‘case studies’ 
(see Appendix B.2). Built into each of the vignettes, were a number of 
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structural constraints or enablers that informed the opportunities, outcomes 
and treatment of individuals. Each vignette culminated in a ‘problem’ or 
‘challenge’ and respondents were then asked how responsible they felt each 
of these individuals were for their situation. Crucially, every vignette 
demonstrated some interplay between the structural and agentive 
determinants of socio-economic outcome. Capturing the duality of structure 
inherent to all social processes (Giddens, 2013),  respondents were left to 
interpret notions of responsibility as they saw fit. This proved useful in 
exploring conceptions of responsibility drawn upon by respondents and 
whether they attributed desert, blame or effective behaviour to the individuals 
described in the vignettes. As such, these vignettes were used as a heuristic 
to explore tacit and explicit attitudes fundamental to conceptions of social 
citizenship. 
The chapter begins by outlining the existing literature and evidence on the 
relationship between knowledge accumulation and attitude (trans-) formation. 
This section considers the lessons and limitations of existing research and the 
apparent contradiction between high levels of support for social citizenship 
rights and lower levels of support for social security spending on particular 
groups. The chapter then considers each of the vignettes in turn to explore 
how ‘responsible’ individuals are seen in terms of their behaviour and/or the 
situation that they find themselves in. Some of the vignettes talk about 
particular policy instruments, forms of work, taxation, and educational or life 
opportunities. Finally, the chapter draws some conclusions from this analysis 
and discusses some implications.  
6.2 Knowledge accumulation and attitude (trans-) formation 
The empirical literature has illustrated that the general public are highly 
misinformed about poverty, inequality, benefit fraud, welfare spending, and 
public services reform (Sefton and Stewart, 2009; Baumberg et al., 2012; Park 
et al., 2012). Kuklinski et al. (2000) find that misinformation plays a significant 
role in determining policy preferences and attitudes. When participants are 
presented with the correct information, a dramatic shift occurs in their attitudes 
(see also Bamfield and Horton, 2009). Perhaps then, negative attitudes 
towards welfare activity and recipients are contingent on sufficient knowledge 
and accurate information. Whilst the presentation of correct information may 
not amount to a wholesale shift in attitudes or opinion (Kuklinski et al., 2000), 
it may help facilitate informed debate and consideration pertaining to social 
citizenship and social policy. 
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Studies have shown that support for welfare spending and activity is informed 
by whether the general public view poverty and inequality as primarily caused 
by individual or structural factors (Linos and West, 2003; Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2005). For example, Sefton (2005) finds that those attentive to 
structural causes of disadvantage are much more likely to support 
redistributive policies. Similarly, those more inclined to recognise the structural 
determinants of poverty and affluence are more inclined to support 
progressive and inclusive welfare policies (Bullock et al., 2003). Attitudes 
related to poverty and deprivation then, have a significant effect on the political 
legitimacy and nature of social citizenship practices (Applebaum, 2001).  
A great deal of the existing research that explores attitudes towards the 
causes of poverty rests on a rather crude distinction between structural, 
individual and fatalistic (such as luck) explanations of poverty. In reality, these 
determinants of poverty are not easily or entirely separable. Studies that draw 
an exclusive distinction between structural and individual explanations can 
generate simplistic interpretations of knowledge accumulation and attitudinal 
(trans-) formation that fail to capture the ‘compound nature of public 
perceptions and the existence of composite explanations’ (Lepianka et al., 
2009: 422). For example, Henry et al. (2004) find that explanations of poverty 
vary according to the demographic characteristics of the poor in question – 
respondents will ascribe different causes of poverty according to the age, 
gender, race and residential status of those that are destitute (see also Wilson, 
1996). Such varied ascriptions reflect the multi-dimensional nature and 
causes that feature in people’s reasoning. However, it may well also reflect a 
bias in the attitudes and stereotypes that people often attach to the 
phenomenon of poverty and deprivation.  
Material and socio-cultural position have a profound effect on the attributes 
and characteristics ascribed to different social groups. Empirical research 
suggests that wealthier individuals tend to be  
seen as intelligent, responsible hard-working, successful, skilful, 
physically attractive and resourceful. In contrast, poor people are 
viewed as lazy, unmotivated, lacking in abilities and skills, 
irresponsible, unattractive and lacking proper money management 
(Dittmar, 1992: 162). 
A number of other studies have also found the same: that the poor tend to be 
described as ‘stupid’, ‘dirty’ and ‘lazy’ and middle-income groups tend to be 
described as ‘hardworking’, ‘attractive’ and ‘intelligent’ (Cozzarelli et al., 2001; 
Woods et al., 2005). This patterned attribution reveals a generalised collective 
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consciousness about the relationship between structure and agency. Whilst, 
the general public tend to recognise that poverty and inequality are caused by 
a range of factors, they are also more likely to cite individual, rather than 
structural bases of socio-economic outcome in liberal welfare regimes 
(Jordan, 1996; McNamee, 2009; Kallio and Niemelä, 2013; Tagler and 
Cozzarelli, 2013). Shirazi and Biel (2005) emphasise the importance of 
country or culture specific studies in this area owing to the differing 
philosophical foundations at play. The Victorian legacy of the Poor Law period 
may serve as such an example of individualised attributions in the UK context. 
However, with some consistency it is possible to establish that the tendency 
to ascribe negative characteristics and behaviours to poor people and positive 
characteristics and behaviours to rich people is a reflection of people’s 
intuitions about whether people are poor or rich as a result of their own being 
and doing.  
A number of studies proffer insight into how socio-demographic factors affect 
attitudes towards the determinants of poverty and action. Some have 
suggested that factors such as age, education and gender do not unilaterally 
affect attributions of poverty (for example Van Oorschot and Halman, 2000; 
Cozzarelli et al., 2001; Sun, 2001; Swank, 2005). However, a significant body 
of research has found that socio-economic characteristics substantially affect 
attitudes towards the causes of poverty. Empirical research has found that 
those occupying a higher social or economic status tend to individualise 
poverty, whilst those with a lower social status are more likely to draw upon 
systemic explanations (Hunt, 1996; Reutter et al., 2005; Shirazi and Biel, 
2005; Reutter et al., 2006b).  
For example, a study undertaken with middle class respondents and welfare 
recipients found that welfare recipients were much more likely to stress the 
structural determinants of poverty (Bullock, 1999). In addition, household 
income significantly affects attitudes towards poverty: ‘support for the external 
causes of poverty is greatest among people who have difficulty getting by on 
their family income’ (Niemelä, 2008: 26). Ostensibly contradictory findings 
suggest that those on the lower end of the income distribution and in receipt 
of social security are more likely to attribute negative characteristics and 
qualities to those they identify as poor (Golding and Middleton, 1982). 
However, this ‘othering’ appears to be endemic amongst certain groups most 
vulnerable to market and status inequalities (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). 
Research suggests that an infringement upon individual identity or collective 
belonging induces anxiety about acceptance which can lead to a tendency to 
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over-conform or commit to groups ideals, norms and objectives (Sleebos et 
al., 2006). 
Another apparent contradiction lies in the attitudes of those occupying a higher 
economic or social position. As illustrated in chapter five, these individuals are 
more likely to support social citizenship rights and yet they are also more likely 
to individualise poverty and be less supportive of redistribution. This apparent 
contradiction is summed up nicely by Coughlin (1980) who suggests that there 
is 
widespread public acceptance of the general principles of the 'social 
rights' of citizenship, entailing positive government efforts to promote 
individual security and social equity, with simultaneous allegiance to 
individual freedom, the 'free market,' and individual responsibility for 
success or failure in a competitive economic order (Coughlin, 1980: 
155). 
Whilst some may support social citizenship rights as a matter of principle, their 
experiences and thus knowledge will shape the extent to which they support 
specific welfare policies. Attitudinal differences between social and economic 
groups have been explained according to a number of factors. Perhaps the 
most pervasive explanation of all is that of self-interest (cf. Sears and Funk, 
1990). Crucially, this paradigm of attitudinal research fails to account for how 
one’s socio-cultural or material position is, to a great extent, an expression of 
systemic features. If attitudinal differences are stratified according to the 
material resources at one’s disposal, this cannot be seen in isolation from the 
factors that give rise to material inequality. Explanations that rely on rational 
economic actor theory abstract individuals’ preferences and behaviours from 
the structural determinants of resource allocation and lived experience. 
Importantly, it has long been suggested that that an individual’s capital 
represents, in great part, the extent of control they have over their socio-
economic situation (Furby, 1978). How one conceives of the relationship 
between structure and agency will invariably be mediated by their relation to 
and experience of structural features of a given polity. Attitudes, then, are 
constructed in relation to structuration processes and features. With this in 
mind, awareness of, or exposure to, the structural determinants of socio-
economic outcome and action should significantly affect attitudes towards the 
nature of poverty, as well as its causes and remedies.  
A study undertaken with students in Croatia, Ljubotina and Ljubotina (2007) 
found that respondents tended to recognise the structural causes of poverty 
first, followed by micro-environmental factors (such as intergenerational 
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poverty), individual factors, and finally fatalistic factors. Compared to 
agriculture and economics students, social work students were much less 
likely to individualise the causes of poverty (Ljubotina and Ljubotina, 2007). 
Similarly, Guimond and Palmer (1996) found that, over the course of their 
higher degrees, social science students are more likely to recognise the 
systemic features of poverty, and commerce students are more likely to 
emphasise the individual causes of poverty. In part, this indicates a process 
of political socialisation but it also reflects the different knowledge 
accumulated about the causes of inequality and disadvantage.  
Bullock’s (2004) study noted differences between the attitudes of social 
workers and welfare recipients but also noted that these groups shared similar 
views about the causes of poverty. Bullock (2004) recognises the different 
socio-cultural and economic positions that these two groups occupy, but also 
suggests that they ‘share a working and/or lived knowledge of poverty’ that 
goes some way towards explaining similarity in their attitudes. More education 
and knowledge about poverty appears to increase the likelihood of making 
structural attributions:  
respondents who had worked with low-income people and, particularly, 
those who had a close friend or family member living in poverty or had 
learned about poverty in courses and workshops were more likely to 
hold this perception (Reutter et al., 2006b: 14).  
Wilson (1996) suggests that the nature and extent of exposure to poverty 
affects whether respondents are more likely to attribute poverty to structural 
or individual factors. Those that have ‘been panhandled’ or informally discuss 
poverty are more likely to individualise poverty, whereas those who have 
friends who are poor or have exposure to expertise on the phenomenon of 
poverty are more likely to attribute poverty to structural factors. Wilson (1996) 
categorises being ‘panhandled’ as direct exposure to poverty but this is 
arguably a rather fleeting and superficial interaction that does not capture the 
processes resulting in destitution.  
Overall then, the empirical literature suggests that genuine and prolonged 
exposure to or experience of poverty increases structural attributions: ‘the raw 
stuff processed by sociological imagination is human experience‘ (Bauman, 
2005: 123). Increased support for progressive and inclusive social policies is 
not necessarily rooted in economic or class self-interest (Sears and Funk, 
1990). It may well be a reflection of the knowledge accumulated through one’s 
lived experiences. The following four sections will explore whether individuals 
occupying different material and symbolic positions differ in their attitudes 
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towards responsibility, justice and fairness. The existing empirical literature is 
dominated by quantitative studies that often rely on crude distinctions between 
structural, individual and fatalistic explanations of poverty. By employing 
qualitative vignettes, it is possible to a) avoid false dichotomies between 
structural and individual determinants of socio-economic outcome and action, 
b) tap into lay accounts of justice and fairness and c) explore the extent to 
which knowledge generated through lived experiences affects attitude (trans-
) formation. To do this, qualitative respondents in positions of deprivation and 
relative affluence were presented with four vignettes. Each of these will be 
discussed in turn to consider whether attitudinal differences exist, how these 
can be explained and what implications this has for inclusive social citizenship 
practices.  
6.3 The ‘deserving workless poor’: Becky 
All respondents participating in qualitative fieldwork were presented with the 
following scenario: 
Becky lives alone with her two children. At 18, Becky got good grades 
and wanted to go to University but was worried about the cost and debt 
that she might face. Instead, Becky got a secretarial job in a small 
company hoping to work her way up. After one year, Becky was made 
redundant and fell pregnant shortly after. Since then, Becky has been 
unable to find a job. Becky split up from her boyfriend five years ago 
and has relied on benefits and occasional help from her parents ever 
since. She lives in social housing and has done for four years. Becky 
would like to work but has been unable to find a job that is flexible 
enough for her to gain career prospects and also care for her children. 
Becky volunteers three times a week whilst her children are at school. 
The Job Centre has told Becky that she needs to get a job as some of 
her entitlement to Income Support will soon finish.  
More than two thirds of deprived respondents felt that Becky’s situation was 
primarily caused by fatalistic or structural factors beyond her control. The vast 
majority of these respondents cited structural determinants of her situation: 
It’s obviously not her fault that she’s fallen pregnant and stuff. It’s not 
her fault she’s been made redundant either so she’s not responsible. 
(Brooke, Female, RCC) 
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Whilst many felt that life events absolved her of responsibility for her situation, 
two thirds of respondents still felt that she was assuming responsibility and 
responding in a constructive and positive manner: 
She’s still out there helping people with voluntary work that is still in the 
community. She’s not sat about drinking and watching Jeremy Kyle all 
day! (Ben, Male, RCC) 
Only two deprived respondents cited individual reasons for Becky’s situation 
and only one respondent felt that it was entirely her fault. Other explanations 
were the ‘permissive’ nature of welfare and a lack of appropriate information 
provided about the costs associated with higher education. Interestingly, both 
of these reasons came from respondents who were born in transitioning 
welfare regimes with much lower levels of social protection but had 
subsequently moved to the UK. Their reference point was therefore a much 
more residual conception of welfare. 
For respondents in a position of relative affluence, there was greater 
ambivalence surrounding Becky. Just below a third of respondents thought 
that Becky was not responsible for her situation and cited exogenous factors 
contributing towards her behaviour and circumstance. By contrast, just below 
two thirds of respondents thought Becky was at least partially responsible for 
her situation with many citing her ‘poor choices’ such as deciding to have more 
than one child and not going to university. One respondent could not come to 
a conclusion without further information due to the efforts Becky had made to 
improve her situation. Interestingly, affluent respondents were more likely to 
moralise or caricature her biography. Despite evidence presented to the 
contrary, some affluent respondents suggested Becky had multiple children 
from different fathers, had chosen to fall pregnant and that she was a teenage 
mother: 
Well… you see there are several strands to this story aren’t there. Have 
I got this right? That she’s now 18? [clarification provided] Oh, I see, 
okay. But you also, erm, used a phrase which is used quite a bit “she 
fell pregnant”. Hmmm, and you’ve got to be very careful here because 
this happens… You know, pregnancy is not something that is pushed 
on you. It happens because you do something. It just seems to me that 
she’s got parents, erm, she has allowed herself to become pregnant. 
And if you look at it from… you would say well hold on a minute she’s 
living a life of… she’s not working full-time. Although she’s got two 
children, that’s you know that’s down to her. And yet she’s expecting 
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society to subsidise what some would call her fecklessness. However, 
it’s a common story. The answer is surely that her parents, given that 
she is only 23 and plenty of people are living, are still living at home at 
23 because they can’t afford anything else. It seems to me she needs 
to go back and live with them. And, if you like, it brings in this whole 
question of the family and the responsibility they need to take rather 
than expecting the State to step in all the time... I think, just to develop 
this theme. I mean I’m quite a liberal broad-minded person you know. 
There’s no… I’m not one of these moralistic types at all. But, erm, I 
think you see on television a lot now young girls who are interviewed 
and they have like four children to three separate fathers. And they say 
that they see no link between benefits from somebody else and money 
being given to them to subsidise what is a pretty rackety lifestyle and I 
think we need to get back to a little bit of personal responsibility. (Peter, 
Male, VAC) 
Some affluent respondents went as far as to ‘search’ for bad decisions in 
Becky’s biography to help explain her situation. A minority of affluent 
respondents were much less willing to mischaracterise Becky’s situation and 
decisions: 
Well, I don’t know what her childcare costs are. I don’t know whether 
her parents live locally. Or whether the boyfriend is contributing 
anything towards the child. So you know, without getting that 
information I wouldn’t jump to any great conclusions to be quite frank.  
(Joe, Male, VAC) 
When asked if Becky should be ‘forced to work rather than volunteer’, all 
respondents in the deprived category did not agree that this should happen. 
Over half of deprived respondents believed that Becky’s child-rearing and 
volunteering activities were of societal benefit and she should therefore be 
precluded from work compulsion. Others were keen to emphasise the 
prohibitive costs associated with working parenthood and the potential utility 
of volunteering for Becky’s eventual transition into employment. Relatively 
affluent respondents were similarly reluctant to enforce work obligations. Only 
one respondent believed this should happen. Around a quarter of affluent 
respondents felt that Becky should be encouraged to work rather than 
volunteer. These individuals cited paternalistic reasons for such an approach 
and one believed the luxury of ‘volunteering’ should be open to all, not just 
those that did not work. Many of those reluctant to enforce work obligations 
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cited Becky’s virtuous efforts and behaviours as a reason to continue financial 
support. This appears to support the empirical literature that says support for 
welfare is mediated by whether recipients of welfare are seen as deserving 
(Sefton, 2009). Interestingly, a number of affluent respondents drew a direct 
link between their own social citizenship responsibilities and Becky’s social 
citizenship rights:  
I think she's doing well, and I think it's the job of the state, or us 
taxpayers, provided she is looking for a suitable job. I'm quite happy 
that the state continues to support her, or that me as a taxpayer, 
continues to support her. (Mark, Male, VAC) 
Whilst this sort of justification evokes some notion of collective identity 
between unconnected citizens, it also constructs a division between 
contributors to and recipients of welfare: A distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
fails to acknowledge that the majority of people receiving public assistance 
are also contributors (financial or otherwise) to the common project of social 
citizenship. This sort of framing is potentially problematic for cultivating a 
sense of cooperative solidarity, especially if this is based upon some principle 
of conformity or desert. For respondents that did suggest Becky was 
responsible for the situation that she found herself in, the vast majority did not 
believe that she should (permanently) suffer the consequences of her actions:  
Well she is responsible but I don’t think you can hold that sort of thing 
against people. People can always do something about their situation 
if they’ve got the mind to do it. Erm. But you know, there are always 
elements of bad luck in people’s lives and good luck so you know it’s… 
she is responsible. But in some ways it’s irrelevant. It’s what she does 
in the future not what has happened in the past. (Rachel, Female, VAC) 
Becky was a caricature presented to explore people’s intuitions about those 
notionally conceived as unemployed and ‘deserving’ of public assistance. Her 
situation was largely determined by factors beyond her control and her 
response to life circumstances was portrayed as virtuous. It appears that 
Becky’s ‘culpability’ was tempered by her actions and overall the majority of 
respondents did not see her as responsible for her situation. However, a 
substantial minority of affluent respondents were more likely to see Becky as 
responsible and to moralise her behaviour and decisions. The extent to which 
respondents saw Becky as responsible for her situation seemed to affect 
whether and what public assistance respondents thought her and her children 
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should be entitled to. Those experiencing deprivation were more likely to 
recognise the concessionary factors that precluded Becky from engaging in 
full-time work and commended her non-fiscal contribution to society. The 
following section will explore how the actions and decisions of individuals 
conceived as less ‘deserving’ or ‘virtuous’ are understood and what effect this 
has on support for public assistance.  
6.4 The ‘undeserving workless poor’: Aimee 
In the mainstream media, benefit recipients are regularly characterised as 
‘work-shy’, ‘deceitful’ and ‘lazy’ (Likki and Staerklé, 2015). As a result, there 
has been increasing concern about the deservingness of welfare recipients 
(Park et al., 2012). Aimee was presented to respondents as an exemplar of 
this stereotype that tends to dominate public and political discourse 
(Baumberg et al., 2012):  
Aimee and her partner claim Incapacity Benefit. Aimee has claimed 
benefits on and off for 15 years. Aimee began claiming benefits when 
she had a bad back, and although she can now go dancing, these days, 
she has got used to being on benefits and is stuck in a bit of a rut. She 
was unable to cope with her children because of her drinking and her 
two children are now in care. Aimee’s entitlement to Incapacity Benefit 
has recently stopped and she now must look for work in order to claim 
another benefit (JSA).  
Just under a third of respondents experiencing deprivation felt that Aimee 
should still receive some form of public assistance from the government. A 
number of justifications were given for this. Many suggested that Aimee’s 
substance abuse, loss of children and long-term unemployment could be 
symptomatic of broader problems and challenges. They felt that alongside 
financial assistance, Aimee may benefit from the opportunity to attend lifelong 
learning courses, seek medical help with her alcohol dependency and receive 
support in raising and caring for her children. For these respondents, a 
withdrawal of entitlement was not seen as a solution. Some believed that 
Aimee should be encouraged, but also assisted to find gainful employment. 
Particularly for those that were long-term unemployed, Aimee’s story seemed 
to resonate in terms of ‘being stuck in a rut’: 
It like kinda creeps up on you. I don't think you ever set out in life and 
think I want to claim benefits for the rest of my life you know just sponge 
off society. You don’t intend to get that way but over years it really does 
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drag you down, you lose a lot of motivation you know and you just get 
into this rut of picking up that giro every two weeks you know. You 
don't... you’re responsible for putting yourself there but I think we need 
more help to get out of the rut before it happens. They should crack 
onto this quicker rather than leaving you on benefits for 5 or 6 years 
and then blame you for sitting there and getting like free money every 
fortnight. But it’s no picnic you know – it’s not as easy as people think 
– just sitting there looking for a hand-out every two weeks – It’s very 
hard to make that spin out. It’s not fun. (Ashley, Female, RCC) 
This respondent felt that public agencies should do more to assist people back 
into work rather than punishing them for not finding work. Prompted by 
Aimee’s story, a number of other respondents also discussed instances of, 
what they felt was, particularly unconstructive treatment from public agencies 
and officials. Some reflected on their own treatment whilst others talked about 
friends, family or neighbours. One respondent described how his daughter-in-
law, who faces multiple mobility issues, was compelled to travel substantial 
distances for an interview, only to find that the job was unsuitable. A great 
number of respondents experiencing deprivation suggested that there was a 
lack of consistency in the judgments and support provided by agencies such 
as JobCentre Plus. These respondents cited instances of benefit fraud that 
they were aware of, whilst talking about the hardship they or others had faced 
as a result of harsh treatment: 
I know people driving round in £20,000 cars and there’s nothing wrong 
with them. Do you know what I mean, and then I know people who are 
sick and can’t get on it so I think how they hand it out needs to be 
looked into further. (Liam, Male, RCC) 
These respondents expressed frustration at those they believed were claiming 
benefits fraudulently. They felt the relatively comfortable lifestyle of fraudulent 
claimants contrasted quite starkly from their own lived experiences and 
therefore believed administrative systems needed to be refined in order to 
ensure money was going where it was most needed. Many discussed how 
hard they found it to get by on the social security payments they received. For 
many, this appears to affect their attitudes towards Aimee and other people in 
a similar situation. One respondent had been employed for thirty years before 
being made redundant and was struggling to find employment despite 
significant efforts. This respondent felt that his attitudes towards benefits had 
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changed drastically since struggling to meet his basic needs on the social 
security payments he received: 
Since I been on benefits I sit back and wonder how people manage. I 
mean like me, I watch what I spend. Every penny. I see people going 
to [sic] pub and I couldn’t do it. I can’t afford to do it – I watch my money. 
So they must be getting something that I’m not. It’s like all these people 
coming to this country... They come here to get a home, get paid, they 
get help with everything. They get money. And then they send money 
back home. It makes me angry because they’ve got rights here. Not 
me though.  (Tom, Male, RCC) 
Whilst this respondent struggled on his own social security payment, he felt 
that there should be more rigorous checks for those that are potentially making 
fraudulent claims. This typifies the ‘politics of resentment’ that Hoggett et al. 
(2013) argue is driving social divisions and anti-welfare populism in the UK. 
Notably, this respondent also expressed frustration that his relative on 
incapacity benefit was subject to intrusive and, in his mind, unnecessary 
checks when it should have been quite clear that they were unable to work. 
These sorts of contradictory sentiments embody the ambivalence expressed 
by a number of respondents. Half of respondents experiencing deprivation 
thought Aimee should no longer be entitled to any benefits from the 
government. As a matter of principle, these respondents did not feel it was fair 
for Aimee to receive assistance. Whilst many recognised that Aimee’s bad 
back was not her fault, her response to life circumstance made her 
responsible for her situation now. Overall, the majority of respondents 
experiencing deprivation felt that Aimee’s situation was primarily explained by 
individual factors. However, over a third of respondents experiencing 
deprivation still cited structural determinants of her situation. 
Similarly, the majority of affluent respondents felt that Aimee’s situation was 
explained by her own actions and decisions and a third felt that systemic 
explanations were more relevant. Half of affluent respondents felt that Aimee 
should no longer receive public assistance from the government. Many of 
these respondents felt that Aimee had defaulted on her responsibilities and 
had therefore forfeited her ‘entitlement’ to social security. Beyond notions of 
welfare contractualism that seem to pervade this principle, affluent 
respondents also gave expression to paternalistic notions of noblesse oblige 
(Dean, 2007). Many felt that Aimee was not as ‘deserving’ of social security 
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as others, and that the contributions of ‘decent working people’ would be 
better spent on those less able to affect their own situation: 
I think for a person like her I think that she needs to do something in 
return for her benefits so she needs to demonstrate that she’s trying to 
improve herself rather than just living her life her own way off other 
people and that actually is the scenario that you know I find really 
abhorrent and we all know people like that and it’s very irritating. 
[Interview: Why is it irritating?] Well because other people like myself 
and lots and lots of other, as I call them, decent working people have 
paid into this system for a long, long time taking very little out for their 
own benefit and that’s fine feeling that you’re paying major taxes if 
those taxes are going to help people who are justifiably needy. But if 
those people are actually working the system so that they are using the 
benefits to fund the lifestyle that they have chosen rather than a lifestyle 
that actually has been imposed upon them by disability or an accident 
or other misfortune then I think that those people aren’t deserving of 
those benefits. (Emma, Female, VAC) 
This encapsulates the ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction that affluent respondents 
seem keen to make between those that receive and those that contribute to 
public assistance. Equally, it draws a distinction between those apparently in 
command of their own environment and those ‘justifiably needy’ and 
vulnerable to structural factors of socio-economic outcome. Both distinctions 
are, of course, a false dichotomy (Williams, 1998) but seem to pervade 
affluent conceptions of social citizenship. Other respondents that believed 
Aimee’s benefits should be stopped were sceptical about her initial claim to 
incapacity benefit and felt that social security provision was too permissive in 
‘giving people an excuse’ to not work:  
Whether she should have ever been on benefits is another matter but 
she certainly shouldn’t now. She’s perfectly capable of working. For 
instance, I’ll give you a personal example. I’m profoundly deaf in my left 
ear – I can’t hear a thing and it doesn’t affect me at all because in a 
situation like this I can hear everything. But if I’m in a crowded room 
which is very noisy and people are on my left I’ve got to turn round that 
way. I could say well you know it’s a disability really. But I just ignore it. 
I think sometimes you’ve just got to be robust about these things. (Joe, 
Male, VAC) 
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Those that believed Aimee should still be entitled to benefits attached a 
number of conditions to its receipt. Two affluent respondents said that ‘if it 
wasn’t for the drinking’, they would be more inclined to withdraw Aimee’s 
entitlement to social security altogether. However, they believed that Aimee 
should still receive benefits but also more non-financial support that could 
include counselling to ensure Aimee recovers from her alcohol dependency. 
Other affluent respondents supporting continued payments felt that greater 
welfare-to-work conditions should be placed on Aimee to ensure that she 
actively looks for work. One respondent suggested that financial assistance 
could be explicitly time-limited to ‘motivate’ Aimee into employment. 
Having discussed the above issues, respondents were subsequently 
presented with additional information about Aimee and asked whether this 
changed how they felt about her: 
Aimee spent the majority of her childhood in care and went to four 
different secondary schools. She was heavily bullied and therefore 
attended school very little. Aimee left education at 16 with few 
qualifications and little idea of what she might like to do in the future. 
She wanted to become a social worker, but did not get onto the course. 
Aimee then went onto work as a cleaner. 
Despite presenting this additional information, almost two thirds of 
respondents said this did not change how they felt about Aimee - a similar 
proportion of deprived and affluent respondents expressed this sentiment. 
One might reasonably conclude from this that additional knowledge about the 
structural factors affecting individual outcome and agency do not seem to 
affect attitudes. It might be assumed that the attribution of responsibility is 
somewhat canalised – buffered against accumulated knowledge. Importantly 
though, respondents remained unchanged in their attitudes for different 
reasons. The majority of deprived respondents that were unchanged in their 
opinion already had an idea of what Aimee’s biography might look like. Whilst 
some felt that this exonerated Aimee of her responsibility, this information did 
not change their attitudes as it was already present in their mind. Others still 
felt she had an opportunity to assume responsibility now and this did not 
excuse her fraudulently claiming benefits: 
I kind of expected it. I’m sitting thinking about this fictitious person but 
that's kind of where I think she would be coming from anyway you 
know. I think like she’s been in care so she’s used to all this benefits 
stuff – you don't have much guidance in how you…I think she’s still 
responsible for her own situation, I think we’re all responsible. I don't 
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think it has helped her but I think she’s responsible for herself still. 
(Ashley, Female, RCC) 
Affluent respondents remained unchanged in their attitudes for a number of 
different reasons. For some, this additional information reinforced what they 
had previously felt about Aimee – that she needed non-financial assistance 
and support, rather than social security payments:  
I still think that she needs the same type of help as before, which is 
non–monetary, because she's going to spend it on the wrong things.  I 
don't trust her with that… I still definitely wouldn't give her any more 
money now, because she's not going to change her behaviours. She's 
got no motivation to change. (William, Male, VAC) 
A number of affluent respondents were public services workers and drew upon 
their own interaction with others facing structural constraints to arbitrate 
between Aimee’s biography and her agentive responsibility. In certain 
instances, these respondents remained unchanged in their opinion because 
these circumstances are what they ‘would have imagined’ for Aimee. Two 
affluent respondents whose opinion remained unchanged, cited their own 
‘rags to riches’ stories to invoke the idea that, despite her ‘background of 
disadvantage’, Aimee should have ‘broken the cycle’ and ‘bettered her life’. 
Affluent respondents were more likely to express sympathy for Aimee’s ‘tough 
start in life’ but found her behaviour ‘inexcusable’ and ‘simply unfair’: 
Whilst I would sympathise with her upbringing, what she is actually 
doing is giving the same sort of upbringing to her children that have 
gone into care. So, at this stage I would be more worried about them 
and making sure that the cycle didn’t repeat itself than about enabling 
her to continue living on benefits and what she needs is some sort of 
focus in life rather than going out dancing, you know and drinking and 
all this other sort. She does need a job and if cleaning is the only thing 
that she can do then you know she needs to get those values back. 
(Emma, Female, VAC) 
I’ve had first-hand experience of children who have been in care and it 
can be incredibly troubling and disturbing and so there’s an awful lot of 
emotional issues there. In terms of the other part of your scenario no it 
doesn’t change anything because I left school when I was sixteen. I 
had very few qualifications and I happen to now own a cleaning 
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company so [laughter]. So in terms of sort of the second section, my 
response would be ‘and what’s wrong with that’? (Richard, Male, VAC) 
The latter respondent draws on his interaction with children in care to 
recognise the challenging circumstances that Aimee has faced. However, he 
equates his own socio-economic trajectory without recognising how ‘agency 
is overlaid onto structural inequality’ (Orton, 2009) and how that could impinge 
upon the actions of someone like Aimee. Orton (2009) demonstrates that, due 
to different starting points in the broader socio-economic structure, two 
individuals (such as the respondent and Aimee) are likely to experience very 
different outcomes even if they were to exercise agency in similar ways. The 
reality is that ‘agency cannot be divorced from people’s severely 
disadvantaged structural position’ (Orton, 2009: 496) and affluent 
respondents interviewed were slightly more inclined to neglect this factor in 
explaining individual agency and believe that ‘people can always do 
something about their situation if they’ve got the mind to do it’.  
Despite broad recognition across the two sample groups that ‘unhappy 
beginnings usually don't help you to have happy endings’ (Holly, Female, 
VAC), the majority of respondents felt that Aimee was responsible for her 
situation and tended to cite individual reasons for her life circumstances. 
There were, however, notable differences between the two sample groups. 
Both deprived and affluent respondents drew upon various notions of 
‘fairness’ when discussing Aimee but were concerned at the injustice faced by 
different groups. Deprived respondents tended to express concern that social 
security payments were not going to those who most needed them. Affluent 
respondents were concerned about those ‘doing the right thing’ - they felt 
taxpayers were fulfilling their obligations only to subsidise the poor lifestyle 
choices and behaviours of characters such as Aimee. Those exposed to the 
structural determinants of outcome and agency were more inclined to 
recognise the mitigating circumstances that may explain Aimee’s actions. 
However, those with direct lived experience of structural constraints were 
more likely to recognise that Aimee’s circumstances and actions were 
symptomatic of broader problems and challenges. For example, deprived 
respondents were more inclined to prescribe support and training to enable 
Aimee to find fulfilling employment, whilst affluent respondents tended to 
suggest Aimee should find any form of work irrespective of its financial 
remuneration or self-realising potential. Finally, deprived respondents were 
more inclined to recognise how Aimee’s life circumstance explained (but did 
not excuse) her individual actions, whilst affluent respondents were more likely 
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to emphasise the resilience of individual agency in the face of structural 
constraints.  
6.5 The ‘deserving working poor’: James 
According to government rhetoric (if not policy), James epitomises the 
‘hardworking decent people’ that current political discourse characterises as 
‘deserving’ of public assistance (Ridge, 2013). James is still in receipt of public 
assistance despite engaging in (more than) full-time employment:  
James left school with one O-level and has always felt that he is better 
at practical ‘hands-on jobs’ than being in an ‘office job’. At 46, James 
lives with his wife and 4 children. He works for a large supermarket and 
does a lot of shift work, working nights and evenings. He works very 
hard and has recently taken on an extra part-time cleaning job. As a 
result, he is not always able to help his children with school work. 
James’s family receive Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credits which 
help a lot but they are often short at the end of the month. The rising 
cost of food and energy means James is in debt as he cannot always 
afford to pay the bills. He wants more hours at work to pay this off but 
cannot get any more at the moment. James’s wife does not work as 
she feels the cost of childcare would be too much to make it worthwhile.  
The vast majority of respondents experiencing deprivation felt that James was 
acting responsibly and ‘trying to do the best he can’. Over two thirds of 
respondents felt that James’s situation was not his fault. Many of these 
individuals recognised wider structural challenges facing James’s family such 
as the rising cost of food and energy and a low minimum wage. Some of these 
individuals attributed responsibility for James’s situation to the government, 
whilst others blamed employers for not providing what is often termed a ‘living 
wage’. Many empathised with James’s situation and felt that they had 
experienced similar financial challenges themselves:  
There is something wrong if the minimum wage is not enough to have 
the minimum cost of the house.  Like, pay the rent and pay the bills and 
food… bring food home.  If the minimum wage is not enough to do that, 
the Government is wrong.  Something’s wrong.  The prices going up 
and electricity going up, the food going up so is not his fault. (Julia, 
Female, RCC) 
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With rising cost of food and everything else it’s a struggle. I know that 
myself. Struggling day in, day out, basically. In this day and age, like I 
say, it’s trying to get the work and get the extra hours and everything 
else which is hard… (Brooke, Female, RCC) 
These respondents discussed falling behind with bills and how easily this can 
happen as a result of unexpected costs associated with children’s schooling, 
broken household goods and rising energy bills. A number of these 
respondents also suggested that it would be a ‘false economy’ for James’s 
wife to seek paid employment due to the significant costs associated with 
travel and childcare. All respondents experiencing deprivation felt that James 
and his family should receive tax credits from the government. Respondents 
justified this by emphasising the significant efforts James was making to 
support his family.  
In stark contrast to those discussed above, affluent respondents were much 
more likely to blame James for his situation. Two thirds of these respondents 
thought James was at least partially responsible for his financial difficulties. 
Whilst almost all respondents recognised that James was working hard to 
provide for his family, some questioned his lifestyle choices. These individuals 
suggested that James should not have had so many children given the sort of 
low-wage work that he had chosen to go into:  
The fact that he’s short of money… yeah… four children. Yeah I mean 
he is responsible because I don’t have children. And you could say well, 
why should people with one child just pay him. No I think… I would say 
he’s got to cut his coat according to his cloth. (Joe, Male, VAC) 
Other affluent respondents struggled to understand why James might not able 
to afford his household costs. Some were keen to clarify the sort of spending 
and consumption habits of James and his family. These individuals 
questioned whether James was making sound financial decisions, for 
example, whether he was smoking or spending money on ‘unnecessary’ 
household goods. Whilst many attributed responsibility to James as a result 
of this, some were still keen to emphasise that his family were ‘worthy’ and 
‘deserving’ recipients of public assistance: 
He's working hard, from the story that we've heard so far. Are you going 
to add on a bit to this story, as well? Because he's – you'd like to know, 
what does his house look like, when you go into it? What is he 
spending? Has he got all of the Sky channels, going on in there? Has 
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he got a huge TV in there? Or is he just living within his means, in terms 
of he's working really hard, and he's just got the six Free View channels, 
or whatever it is. Do you know what I mean? Why is he working two 
part–time jobs, and why are things still not meeting? [Interviewer: 
Because he’s on minimum wage] Yeah. This is what I said to you on 
the phone – I'm not sure that I'll know enough about how much that 
means, in practical terms. (Sophie, Female, VAC) 
Does James smoke? I think if James smokes then this is where it 
becomes an issue… there’s so much money that goes on tobacco and 
alcohol that I think people assume that they should be able to get that 
first and then all the money for their food and their children if you see 
what I mean. They don’t mentally categorise it that way round but erm, 
it’s when you see people on the television how much they get a week 
and that they can’t go to the supermarket and buy the food they need. 
You sometimes question it… I think somebody has got to investigate 
really what the cost of living should actually be if you see what I mean. 
And people like that shouldn’t expect to have all the extras they should 
only expect… they should only be able to get the essentials. The risk 
is of course that if you actually reduce the amount of money they’ve 
got. Will they actually give up the tobacco and the alcohol or is it the 
children that will start to be neglected because it’s the children that are 
lower down the list. (Rachel, Female, VAC) 
Limited exposure to, and awareness of, financial management in a low-
income household appeared to affect the judgments of more affluent 
respondents with many moralising the presumed behaviours and decisions of 
characters such as James. When asked about whether James’s family should 
receive tax credits from the government, affluent respondents were more 
ambivalent. Just over half believed James’s family should receive assistance, 
with the rest of the respondents more inclined to suggest alternative revenue 
streams. Despite a statement that James’s wife did not work because she 
thought the costs of childcare would be too prohibitive, a number of 
respondents insisted that she should still find paid employment. This affected 
some respondent’s judgment so that they were more inclined to blame James 
for his financial difficulties.  One respondent suggested that the children, if old 
enough, should find employment to support the household. For those affluent 
respondents that were employers, concerns were raised about how raising 
the minimum wage would have a negative impact on employers and the 
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overall number of staff employed. However, a sizeable proportion of affluent 
respondents disagreed with the principle of tax credits more generally:  
As a taxpayer, I resent the fact that companies and shareholders – 
despite having a few shares myself – and particularly well–paid chief 
executives, directors, are being subsidized by taxpayers, because 
they're not paying their workers enough to live on. (Mark, Male, VAC) 
Once again, many affluent respondents seemed to root their judgments of 
fairness and justice in their identity as taxpayers, that is, as contributors to the 
collective financial project of social citizenship. In this instance, their attitudes 
were bound up with their identity as active citizens and this appears to have a 
significant bearing on how these individuals interpret the responsibilities and 
deservingness of other citizens in receiving public assistance. Overall, 
respondents experiencing deprivation were more aware of the exigent 
financial pressures and challenges that a family such as James’s might face. 
By comparison, more affluent respondents tended to under-appreciate how 
and why low-waged families might find themselves in debt or hardship. Whilst 
mindful of macroeconomic and policy governance structures that affect socio-
economic outcomes, affluent respondents tended to moralise the presumed 
behaviours and decisions of James and suggested alternative means by 
which he could avoid resorting to social security. 
6.6 The ‘undeserving working rich’: Robert 
The final vignette describes the life opportunities and actions of Robert. Robert 
was presented to respondents to explore whether people were more or less 
likely to recognise the conditions that had increased his agency and affected 
his socio-economic trajectory:  
Robert is very clever and did very well at school. He received a great 
deal of support and help from his parents with school work. Robert went 
to University and received financial support from his parents when 
moving for his first job. Since starting his first job, Robert has always 
worked hard, often staying late in the office and taking work home at 
the weekends. He earns a lot from his job and has private health 
insurance. He has decided to buy a second property and rent this out 
to tenants. He is concerned about how much tax he will have to pay 
when he eventually sells this second property. He is worried that he 
could be made to pay for the hard work he has put into building a good 
life for himself. 
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In general, respondents felt that a confluence of factors had shaped Robert’s 
situation. Respondents were mindful of the financial assistance and non-
financial support that Robert received from his parents, but also emphasised 
the efforts he had put into his own education and career. Only two respondents 
experiencing deprivation felt that Robert was entirely responsible for his 
situation with the majority more inclined to recognise the opportunities 
afforded to Robert. These respondents suggested that such opportunities had 
not only had a significant impact on his material position, but also his 
opportunity to exercise agency in determining his income and work-life 
balance. Whilst they recognised that Robert may have made the most of his 
opportunities, they still felt he was given many opportunities that others were 
not and as result he was seen as less responsible:  
Obviously he was privileged, many people don’t get help like that. And 
his parents were supporting him. It’s always an advantage when you 
come from a very good social setting or a privileged social environment. 
To some extent he is responsible. When you went into the classroom, 
he’s the one that paid attention, he’s the one that read the book, do you 
understand what I’m saying? So in that way, he is the architect of his 
own success. But obviously it’s different when you come from a 
privileged social setting. But in the sense that he’s the one that read 
books, he’s the one that remained focused because it’s not everyone 
who has that background who makes it in life. Some people fail in life 
and fall off the rails but obviously if we take someone who comes from 
a poor background and then manages to achieve, let’s say, what 
Robert has achieved even though they came from a poor background 
we would obviously say they are more an architect of their own success 
than say Robert. Obviously they deserve more credit than Robert. 
(Liam, Male, RCC) 
Reflecting on the disparity in opportunities available to different people, a 
number of respondents drew on fatalistic explanations of Robert’s situation 
suggesting he was lucky to ‘be born clever’ and ‘have parents like that’. Some 
went further to suggest life outcomes and opportunities were, in some 
respects, preordained. These respondents felt that one’s ability to take control 
over their life circumstances, opportunities and material environment was 
already determined by birth – affected by factors that extended well beyond 
their agentive responsibility: 
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Yeah, I think it’s luck. It’s just a struggle and it’s chance.  It’s a chance… 
[Interviewer: Do you think it’s fair then?] No, because that’s what’s 
planned out for him and everybody’s got their own destination. 
[Interviewer: Do you think it’s possible to change that destination?] Not 
really. (Jackie, Female, RCC) 
A small minority of affluent respondents were conscious of the inequality of 
opportunity presented across the vignettes, and therefore felt that Robert was 
less responsible for his situation. However, on the whole, affluent respondents 
were much more inclined to ascribe personal responsibility to Robert for his 
‘good grades’ and ‘professional achievements’. Whilst some acknowledged 
fatalistic and structural factors affecting Robert’s opportunities and agency, 
over two thirds emphasised his entitlement to and ownership of his success:   
Oh he seems to be very responsible. You know he seems to have his 
head screwed on the right way. You know for his own personal 
situation. (Owen, Male, VAC) 
Well he’s created his situation yes. He’s done well for himself so yes 
he’s responsible for achieving that success. (Joe, Male, VAC) 
From this, it is clear that the two sample groups differed dramatically in their 
intuitions about the role of structure in affecting Robert’s life opportunities, 
actions and subsequent socio-economic position. Whilst no respondents 
blamed Robert for the inequality of opportunity from which he had benefited, 
some expressed concern that he was somewhat ‘undeserving’ of the capital 
he had accumulated as a result. Respondents were asked whether it was fair 
that Robert earned more than James. Respondents were told that both 
individuals worked hard and for the same number of hours per week. 
Respondents experiencing deprivation were more likely to interpret the 
question as a suggestion that the gap between their incomes was too great or 
that James was not paid enough. Half of respondents experiencing 
deprivation felt it was fair whilst the other half did not. For those who thought 
it was fair, a number said that Robert’s qualifications justified him earning a 
higher wage. Others also said that Robert had ‘a more up the chain job’ where 
his skills were more socially and therefore economically valued. For the half 
of respondents that did not think it was fair, they recognised that Robert’s 
profession may be more socially valued but did not think this meant James 
should receive such a low wage. These respondents felt uneasy about 
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justifying unequal pay as a result of qualifications or intelligence and felt effort 
would be a more just determinant of one’s remuneration: 
He’s more hardworking aint he James but that’s just how it seems to 
go innit? Yeah, James should really probably get more than Robert but 
it’s not how it goes is it. Robert’s paid more in definitely and because 
Robert’s done that - he’s a more valuable member of society in 
everyone’s eyes but to me I personally think James works hard and 
puts in a lot of hours and keeps Britain ticking over probably in more 
ways than Robert does, so I think James should get a little bit more 
help. (Ashley, Female, RCC) 
All but one affluent respondent felt that it was fair that Robert earned more 
than James. Interestingly, affluent respondents were much more likely to 
interpret the question as a suggestion that Robert and James should receive 
the same pay for the work that they do. These respondents were strongly 
opposed to such an idea and felt that there were many problems associated 
with such a ‘socialist idea’ or ‘communist situation’. Despite not having 
information about his profession, a substantial number of respondents 
believed that Robert’s employment contributed more to society and involved 
more ‘sophisticated knowledge, understanding or work’. Perhaps, by virtue of 
his qualifications and remuneration, this was a reasonable assumption to 
make. However, respondents experiencing deprivation were not as likely to 
express such an opinion. Affluent respondents tended to say Robert’s work 
was, categorically valuable, whereas deprived respondents tended to suggest 
that it was socially and economically valued. This subtle distinction in 
understanding ‘value’, points to a differential appreciation of the structural 
determinants of one’s socio-economic position and consequent actions.  
Yes I think it’s fair. I don’t think we can live in a society where everyone 
gets paid the same. Erm. Sometimes it’s down to people’s… erm… 
ambitions and drive but there’s also the issue of people’s abilities… So 
you could say that well… erm… James is less capable so why should 
he be penalised for that? But I think we can’t go back… we can’t have 
a communist state where everyone gets paid the same. (Rachel, 
Female, VAC) 
Yes I do because, I don’t know what Robert’s job is, but he is probably 
contributing more to the company or the department that he works 
through from an intellectual sense and people like that are needed 
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because if… not everybody can be Queen Bee but you do need it for 
the hive to run properly… (Emma, Female, VAC) 
Many affluent respondents oscillated between recognising Robert’s good 
fortune and emphasising his hard work to justify the capital he had 
accumulated. Intelligence was recognised by some as a legitimate 
determinant of pay differentials. Some felt that any system that tried to 
countervail this was running against the ‘natural order’ and when discussing 
intellectual abilities and differences in pay, there was some resignation to a 
process that resembled natural selection:  
Yes because it’s a cruel world and some people are either more 
intelligent than others or have more physical ability or just get on more. 
It’s just a fact of life. It’s the human existence isn’t it.  (Peter, Male, VAC) 
In this instance, it appears affluent citizens were less able to recognise the 
somewhat arbitrary distribution of natural abilities and talents and less willing 
to approve of mechanisms which attempted to counteract this. Interestingly, 
these individuals were less inclined to see closing the gap between rich and 
poor as desirable or feasible and more inclined to accept the current state of 
play.  
6.7 Discussion  
From the evidence, there is a propensity for the left wing to emphasise the 
structural determinants of poverty and right-wing people to stress individual 
behaviours and decision-making as a determining factor of inequality 
(Williams, 1984; Cozzarelli et al., 2001; Hopkins, 2009a). This appears to 
significantly affect attitudes towards welfare, rights and responsibilities and 
the political and policy preferences that fall out as a result. The existing 
literature has tended to suggest that this can largely be explained by material 
and class interests. However, the majority of this literature fails to account for 
the phenomenological significance of material position. That is, how one’s 
position is perceived or understood by oneself and others, and what 
individuals believe to be the determinants of their own situation and behaviour 
as a result. Material position and interest cannot be fully understood in 
isolation from lived experiences. The above analysis suggests that lived 
experiences substantially affect knowledge accumulation, which in turn, 
informs attitude formation and potentially the construction of material interests.  
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Any sociological account that entirely attributes or discounts agentive 
responsibility to an individual creates a false binary distinction that fails to 
capture the relationship between agency and structure (cf. Sewell, 1992).  
Whilst it is important to avoid causal determinism, there is an overwhelming 
body of evidence that behaviours, decisions and socio-economic trajectories 
are significantly informed by structural or fatalistic factors. The efficacy of 
human action will vary for different groups and in this study respondents 
experiencing deprivation were much more likely to recognise the structural 
determinants of their situation and others. This goes some way to explain why 
people in poverty find it hard to imagine becoming rich and equally rich people 
find it hard to imagine being poor (Shapiro, 2002). One respondent noted his 
own lack of awareness prior to experiencing financial hardship: 
I didn’t think of what could happen. I never thought I’d ever be made 
redundant. I never thought I’d be in a situation like this.  (Tom, Male, 
RCC) 
At the end of the day, it is not something that I made happen, it is 
actually just something that happened. And I think that’s the message 
that’s lost a lot of the time. (Liam, Male, RCC) 
Some have suggested that people facing deprivation develop negative self-
narratives (Creegan et al., 2009). However, Batty and Flint (2010) find that 
those drawing on structural explanations of their disadvantage are better able 
to mitigate the damaging effects of poverty on self-esteem. Reviewing the 
evidence, Haidt (2012) concludes that ‘people who are able to construct a 
good narrative, particularly one that connects early setbacks and suffering to 
later triumph, are happier and more productive than those who lack such a 
‘redemption’ narrative’ (Haidt, 2012: 371). Those living in hardship are more 
inclined to feel powerless, trapped and lacking options or means to affect 
change in their lives (Beresford et al., 1999; Lister, 2004; Hooper, 2007). The 
barriers and constraints they face mean they have greater exposure to and 
knowledge of the systemic features shaping decision-making, agentive 
capabilities as well the causes of poverty. As a result of their lived 
experiences, affluent respondents were much less aware of how institutional, 
cultural, or economic factors may shape the agency and outcomes of 
individuals. Even when presented with such information, affluent respondents 
were inclined to view agency as resistant to or superseding structure. This 
finding supports much of the existing evidence that socio-economic status 
affects how individuals conceive of and exercise choice (Stephens et al., 
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2011; Piff, 2014). For example, Kraus and Keltner (2013) found that wealthier 
people were much more likely to say their affluence, achievements and 
position were a product of their own doing. They were also more inclined to 
believe that societies functioned in a just manner and that people got what 
they deserved.  
Importantly though, just as people’s life experiences and circumstances are 
changeable, it appears that attitudes are malleable in conjunction. Through 
analysis of panel data, Owens and Pedulla (2014) find that when people lose 
their job or suffer a loss of income, their support for redistributive policies 
increase. The authors argue that this supports the idea that there are material 
underpinnings to political and policy preferences. However, the authors also 
concede that loss of income or employment may be explained by people 
becoming ‘more empathic toward other individuals who are also down on their 
luck  or facing structural barriers to economic security’ (Owens and Pedulla, 
2014: 1105). One affluent respondent noted how his own life experiences had 
informed his attitudes towards responsibility: 
The possible assumption, is that somebody with a fairly reasonable 
employment history, hasn't been involved in that situation. I have been 
made redundant three times. I have, in periods of redundancy, stocked 
shelves in Sainsbury's, worked as a market trader type, and where I 
mentioned that – When I started my own business, the exchange rate 
went against me, so I got a job working for an events company, doing 
stewarding, and so on. Of course, not only was I there, working for the 
minimum wage, but most of my fellow employees were people who 
were – that was their sole source of income, on the minimum wage. If 
the company didn't have a lot of events to do, some weeks they were 
on the dole, and some weeks, they were out. So I've got a fairly good 
understanding, both from personal experience, and, as I say, from 
talking to other people in those situations, of what are the chances of 
this world – what the situation is. (Mark, Male, VAC) 
Those affluent respondents that had had sustained interaction with or 
experience of structural constraints were much more likely to recognise the 
factors that might mitigate an individual’s responsibility for their situation or 
action. Knowledge accumulation then, appears to mediate awareness of and 
appreciation of the relationship between structure and agency.  
As a result of their lived experiences, deprived respondents demonstrated a 
stronger capacity to make use of their ‘sociological imagination’ to understand 
- 149 - 
individual action, decision-making and the socio-economic order. Their 
material and symbolic marginalisation meant they held a more ‘vivid 
awareness of the relationship between experience and the wider society’ 
(Mills, 1959: 3). In contrast, affluent respondents, who experienced financial 
and figurative validation were less cognisant of the systemic features shaping 
socio-economic and political life. Mills argues that the ‘narrow’ daily milieu the 
general public operates within alienates them  
not only from the product and the tools of their labour, but from any 
understanding of the structure and the processes of production…men 
[and women] cannot see the top, and cannot state the issues that will 
in fact determine the whole structure in which they live and their place 
within it (Mills, 1999 [1956]: 322).  
Mills claims that all those outside the military, economic and political oligarchy 
are similarly affected and that this ‘narrow’ daily milieu obscures individuals 
from the socio-structural dynamics that shape behaviour and circumstance 
(Mills, 1999 [1956]). However, the qualitative findings considered thus far 
suggest that those most perniciously affected by social structures, with an 
infringed capacity to affect its systems as a result, are better able to identify 
the interplay between agency and structure. Put another way, those with lived 
experiences of poverty and inequality seem better able to factor in ‘the whole 
structure in which they live and their place within it’ in their moral reasoning. 
The lived realities of deprivation compel individuals to reflect upon their socio-
economic position within the context of their ‘daily routines and look at them 
anew’ (Mills, 1959). 
Summarising the findings from a battery of psychological experiments, Kraus 
et al. (2012) find that knowledge and attitudinal differences relating to 
structure, agency and identity are stratified according to socio-economic 
position:  
Differences in resources and rank that define lower- and upper-class 
contexts give rise to contextualist and solipsistic social cognitive 
patterns… The rich do indeed differ from the poor. With respect to the 
self, lower-class individuals show elevated sensitivities to threat and 
conceptualize the self in a communal fashion, whereas upper-class 
individuals experience an elevated sense of control and experience the 
self in personally agentic ways. With respect to perceiving the world, 
lower-class individuals are more empathic, explain events in terms of 
broad contextual forces, and conceive of social categories as cultural 
constructions, whereas upper-class individuals invoke dispositional 
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explanations to make sense of the world and essentialise social 
categories (Kraus et al., 2012: 562).  
As illustrated above, this influences how individuals view the role and nature 
of responsibility in social citizenship ideals and practices. If people see and 
experience life as more determined by their own individual efforts they are 
more likely to value liberty over equality and their political and policy 
preferences will fall in line accordingly (Smith and Stone, 1989; Likki and 
Staerklé, 2015). They will support a socio-economic and political system that 
reflects the way they believe the world works but also one from which they 
feel they have gained most. 
It would seem, then, that attitudinal differences relating to welfare, citizenship 
and social policy are shaped by material position but it is not entirely clear that 
this represents material interest. The knowledge accumulated through lived 
experiences instantiates the worldview of the general public, which may in turn 
shape material interests. It is important though to see attitude formation 
around welfare and citizenship as a process that extends beyond rational 
economic calculation or value systems, there are multiple cognitive processes 
preceding this that help explain and understand attitudinal difference. 
Alongside this study, there is a growing body of evidence that knowledge 
accumulation affects attitudes towards poverty and inequality (Iyengar, 1990; 
Kearns, 2014).  
In light of increasing poverty and income inequality, these research findings 
are particularly pertinent. Socio-spatial inequality and residential segregation 
are increasingly prevalent across liberal welfare regimes, including the UK 
(Fry and Taylor, 2012; Bailey et al., 2013; Reardon and Bischoff, 2013). In 
addition, there has been a substantial decline in relative intergenerational 
income mobility over the last three decades (cf. Hills et al., 2010). As Reardon 
and Bischoff (2013) highlight, increasing economic and geographical 
segregation between rich and poor communities leads to marked disparities 
in exposure to certain social risks, environments and institutions. Essentially, 
‘the more extreme the income inequality, the greater the psychic distance 
between the have-nots and the haves’ (Shapiro, 2002: 120). This results in an 
‘empathy gap’ whereby wealthier individuals are increasingly divorced from 
the precarities of daily life and their ability to understand and identify with the 
circumstances, experiences and behaviours of others becomes limited 
(Mitchell, 2010).  
As a result, the disintegration of social relations between different socio-
demographic groups could be ‘leading to a lack of understanding of, and 
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concern for, inequality’ (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007: 35). Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2009: 57) claim that ‘we are less likely to empathise with those not 
seen as equals; material differences serve to divide us socially’. Research 
suggests that the extent of interaction in mixed social environments and the 
socio-cultural distance between groups greatly affects attitude formation and 
support for redistributive policies (Fong et al., 2006; Christ et al., 2014). In 
addition though it also informs pro-social behaviour and inclinations. For 
example, lower and middle-income groups are known to give a greater 
proportion of their income to pro-social behaviour and charitable activities 
compared to upper income groups (Daniels, 2015). In addition, wealthier 
donors tend to give to colleges and cultural institutions whereas lower income 
groups tend to donate to food banks and social services (Daniels, 2015). 
Against the backdrop of rising structural inequality, median voters are less 
exposed to the structural determinants of socio-economic outcome and action. 
Without greater knowledge of and exposure to these processes, individuals 
are more inclined to adopt individualistic rather than structural explanations of 
poverty, which in turn, reduces support for redistributive policies. This appears 
to have occurred in the UK where there has been an ostensible hardening of 
attitudes towards welfare and an increasing distinction between deserving and 
undeserving welfare recipients (Park et al., 2012). 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has found that deprivation and affluence generate unique forms 
of knowledge about the structural determinants of socio-economic outcome 
and action. As a result of their lived experiences, deprived respondents were 
much more likely to recognise exogenous factors impinging on individual 
agency. Owing to their experiences and material position, affluent 
respondents exhibited less awareness of the systemic features of deprivation 
but particularly struggled to grasp the ‘exercise of agency within structural 
inequality’ (Orton, 2009). The vignettes presented to participants offered the 
opportunity to explore lay accounts of justice, fairness and responsibility that 
were grounded in specific examples. These enabled respondents to more fully 
consider the interplay between structure and agency. In spite of this, affluent 
respondents were still more inclined to emphasise the resilience of agentive 
capacities and individualise poverty. This significantly affected attributions of 
personal responsibility for hardship or affluence. The following chapter 
explores how this affects conceptions of social citizenship, specifically how 
- 152 - 








- 153 - 
Chapter 7: Heterodox conceptions of social citizenship? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As stated at the outset of this thesis, there is a tendency in the social policy 
literature to overlook the ‘divergent discourses and practices of poor and 
better-off citizens’ (Jordan and Redley, 1994: 156). New-Right thinkers 
contend that low-income welfare recipients exhibit attitudes and behaviours 
that are in many ways distinct from the rest of society (e.g. Murray, 1994). The 
following chapter gives some credence to this idea but challenges the 
manifestation and nature of this difference by exploring the repercussions of 
inclusion and exclusion, validation and contingency. Thus far, this thesis has 
demonstrated that attitudes relating to social citizenship are significantly 
affected by lived experiences. Chapter five confirms that lived experiences of 
deprivation decrease support for social citizenship rights and responsibilities. 
Chapter six illustrates that individuals (symbolically and materially) rewarded 
by the current citizenship praxis are much less likely to recognise the structural 
determinants of circumstance and were, therefore, more likely to individualise 
the responsibilities of citizens. This chapter reflects upon how this affects 
attitudes and behaviours relating to the constitutive features of social 
citizenship. In doing so, the chapter considers the orientations of Residual 
Contingent Citizens and Validated Active Citizens and explores the extent to 
which these two groups deviate or conform to the current ideals of citizenship 
that are expressed through and regulated in interpersonal, communal and 
institutional life.  
A number of studies identify and categorise the ways in which people 
understand the rights and responsibilities of citizenship (e.g. Dwyer, 2000; 
Lister et al., 2003; Dean, 2004). Based on a study of public attitudes towards 
dependency, responsibilities and rights, Dean (2004) identifies fluid moral 
repertoires that are drawn upon or subjugated in public and political discourse. 
Dean (2004) finds that whilst most people appear to recognise collective 
interdependencies in their own and other people’s lives, the majority still draw 
upon an entrepreneurial moral code that emphasises economic independence 
and a contractarian understanding of the relationship between rights and 
responsibilities. Dean (2004) argues that entrenched individualism in the 
public psyche and political landscape inhibits the capacity to endorse inclusive 
and solidaristic conceptions of citizenship. Current and forthcoming welfare 
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reforms are set to sharpen the focus on individualism and further undermine 
the collectivism embodied in common inalienable social rights. What is less 
clear is how individuals that are differentially affected by this development 
resist, endorse or resign to the dominant ideals of citizenship that are currently 
promulgated in the UK.  
In a review of evidence on public attitudes to economic inequality, Orton and 
Rowlingson (2007) conclude that more research needs to focus on the values 
and discourses underpinning attitudes towards inequality, redistribution and 
citizenship. With this in mind, this chapter starts by drawing on different 
attitudinal and discursive categories developed by Dwyer (2000) and Dean 
(2004), to explore how different groups interpret and realise the rights and 
responsibilities of citizenship. The following section considers how individuals 
attempt to either enforce or subvert existing citizenship structures. Finally, the 
chapter concludes by exploring the significance and nature of engagement 
exhibited by those experiencing affluence and deprivation.  
7.2 Attitudes towards the Social Rights of Citizenship 
The social rights of citizenship are an aggregation of services, outcomes and 
opportunities. To ask participants about these in a general capacity would 
have made discussion with and comparison between the two sample groups 
difficult. Respondents were therefore asked a number of questions about the 
specific right to social security. As stated in chapter three, the right to social 
security is particularly useful to consider because it is arguably the most 
important (Torry, 2013), but also the most contested social right (Wendt et al., 
2011). It best demonstrates the relationship between rights and 
responsibilities and therefore the differing conceptions of social citizenship 
exhibited by respondents. These questions were preceded by a discussion of 
the vignettes summarised in chapter six and therefore enabled participants to 
ground their discussion in specific examples and various expressions of 
justice and fairness.  
All questions asked about the social rights of citizenship were normative: 
participants were asked what they thought should be the case. Respondents 
quickly moved from an abstract ethical discussion to consider the benefits and 
drawbacks of existing welfare services and provisions within the UK. From 
this, participants situated their own beliefs alongside or in opposition to current 
social security policy. As a result, there were many caveats and stipulations 
attached to people’s intuitions about what they felt the social rights of 
citizenship should be. As illustrated in much attitudinal research, there tends 
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to be much higher levels of support for the principles of welfare, rather the 
specificities of its implementation and use (Feldman, 2003; Roosma et al., 
2013). Nonetheless, discussion of the right to social security offers an 
opportunity to explore the justifcatory frameworks drawn upon to support or 
temper the rights of welfare citizenship. Overall, respondents drew upon a 
range of ‘principles’ (Dwyer, 2000) and ‘moral repertoires’ (Dean, 2004) to 
consider the terms upon which social rights should (or indeed, should not) be 
granted.  Dwyer (2000) identifies three primary principles of welfare salient in 
public discussions of welfare: ‘universal’, ‘contributory’ and ‘social assistance’. 
These will be considered in light of the findings discussed below. 
Participants were initially asked whether everyone living in the UK should be 
entitled to benefits. Respondents excluded from the symbolic and material 
benefits of the current citizenship paradigm were much more likely to support 
this entitlement. Only one respondent experiencing deprivation did not believe 
this should be an entitlement and this individual was making a direct 
comparison between the meagre levels of welfare provision within her own 
(less economically developed) country of origin and the relatively generous 
forms of provision available in UK. Whilst she recognised her own 
dependence on social security provision, she worried about the moral and 
behavioural repercussions for those that saw social rights as an ‘entitlement’ 
rather than a ‘privilege’.  Whilst the overwhelming majority of respondents 
experiencing deprivation supported benefit provision, respondents differed in 
what they felt the terms of entitlement should be. Around half of those that 
supported ‘universal’ benefit provision drew upon humanist and solidaristic 
principles to explain their support for welfare rights. These individuals 
emphasised the inherent interdependencies and mutual vulnerabilities faced 
in personal and public life:  
I think we should help each other out. There’s always gonna be weak 
links in the chain aint there. And yeah I think we should be there for 
each other more because you never know what is gonna happen. 
(Ashley, Female, RCC) 
This typifies what Dean (2004: 67) has called a ‘reformist’ moral repertoire 
based on substantive social rights and collective ethical responsibilities and 
what Dwyer describes as a ‘universal’ principle of welfare. Irrespective of other 
factors, these individuals recognised that there were common life risks that 
should be buffered against through common associational links and activities. 
Other respondents that were supportive of benefit entitlements qualified their 
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endorsement. For some respondents, it was felt that entitlement should be 
predicated on the legal status of citizenship. Two respondents directly linked 
this to concerns around immigration. These individuals appeared to make 
sense of their own material grievances within the context of, what they saw as 
an unequal and thus unjust, distribution of provisions between (il)legal 
immigrants and themselves: 
Not other communities, because they’re coming from all over the world. 
Obviously, I don’t think you’ll be able to put that down. Well it’s like how 
I’m trying to get rehoused, I’m only general needs but it’s like my friend. 
She’s trying to move over to [x location]. She’s got a son who is 
epileptic. The house is not suitable for where she is. And there’s Asians 
that got the house what she was bidding for over her. They’ve knocked 
walls down and stuff without permission. They said they were homeless 
to get the house but yet there’s brand new cars outside and stuff. So to 
me there’s a lot of fraud going on. Me myself, I’m trying to do everything 
legally and stuff to get moved and I don’t have no rights in moving, I’m 
just general needs and everything else. Like I say, with that, I just don’t 
think we have rights full stop. (Brooke, Female, RCC) 
Whilst ‘othering’ typifies the ‘discursive devices deployed to protect the self 
from social and psychic blame’ (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013: 301), it also 
demonstrates the ways in which individuals attempt to justify or defend their 
own entitlement to ostensibly scarce resources (Cook et al., 2011: 734). Both 
respondents expressing this view had engaged very little in the paid labour 
market and would not be able to coherently defend their entitlement to benefits 
based on a (work-biased) ‘contributory principle’ of welfare citizenship. 
Equally, these individuals felt it difficult to endorse a ‘universalist principle’ 
when they felt that the benefits of welfare citizenship were being unevenly 
distributed. These individuals resorted to ‘othering’ whilst simultaneously 
drawing upon the ‘social assistance principle’ to stress that they were truly 
needy, rather than ‘others’ who were ‘just abusing the system’ (Dwyer, 2000).  
Some respondents had previously engaged in the paid labour market but had 
since become unemployed owing to illness, redundancy or child-care 
commitments. These individuals were more likely to invoke contributory and 
social assistance principles of welfare citizenship (Dwyer, 2000). Whilst these 
respondents were critical of the ‘centrality of paid work’ (Patrick, 2012), they 
also felt that contribution, in its various forms, should inform the basis upon 
which social rights are guaranteed. These individuals felt that non-economic 
- 157 - 
contributions (such as childcare and volunteering) should be recognised in the 
current citizenship paradigm. Where this was not demonstrable, respondents 
felt that questions of need superseded concerns about contribution and should 
therefore inform entitlement to benefit receipt:  
If they need it, then yes. Because the system, if the Welfare State is 
about your work, and part of your earnings go into the State - into this 
pot of money. So, if at some point, you are unable to work, because 
you are ill, had an accident, or you’ve been laid off, well that’s what 
you’ve, it’s like an insurance policy. And what is happening now, it’s like 
you’ve paid for the insurance policy and it’s like the insurance have 
turned around and said, well actually, we’re not going to pay you, or we 
are going to pay you, but we are going to make you feel rubbish about 
it. (Lucy, Female, RCC) 
In stark contrast to those experiencing deprivation, over half of all affluent 
respondents did not believe that everyone living in the UK should be entitled 
to benefits. The majority of these respondents drew upon survivalist or 
entrepreneurial moral repertoires to recommend minimal and targeted welfare 
provision. Other respondents invoked a strong contributory principle of welfare 
citizenship but narrowly focused on financial contribution via paid work as the 
key determinant of entitlement. In this sense, affluent respondents were more 
likely to advance contractarian terms of entitlement that were conducive to 
their own lived experiences and circumstances. By virtue of their employment 
status, these individuals could readily defend a contributory and contractarian 
basis of entitlement:  
Yeah, I think the two things that would – two of the things that would 
dictate it; one would be yes, contribution and then I suppose number 
two would be really what you’re questioning, your citizenship, I think, of 
– are you a citizen?  You know, who are you?  What gives you this 
right?  And I suppose that would be then that citizenship is something 
that can either be earned or be sort of yours by birth. (Michael, Male, 
VAC) 
On a number of occasions, affluent respondents expressed the notion that 
citizenship was something to be earned and this seemed to reflect their own 
success in securing validation in citizenship status and outcomes. Affluent 
respondents that were sceptical of a common entitlement to benefits were also 
concerned about questions of justice – that somebody might accrue resources 
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to which they had no claim. In certain instances, this appeared to countervail 
questions of need. One affluent respondent drew upon humanist principles to 
suggest that entitlement to benefits should be unconditional and universal. 
However, this respondent was something of an exception and self-identified 
as ‘left-leaning’. Other affluent respondents with sustained exposure to or lived 
experiences of deprivation were more inclined to suggest that entitlement to 
benefits should be means-tested. Interestingly, both deprived and affluent 
respondents tended to conceive of benefits as the reserve of the low-income 
unemployed rather than something that the majority of the population receive 
in one form or another (see Figure 4 in chapter three).  
When asked whether everyone living in the UK should be guaranteed a 
minimum level of income, respondents interpreted the question in different 
ways. Respondents experiencing deprivation understood the question as 
concerning whether there should be a minimum income threshold, below 
which nobody should fall. Implicitly (and occasionally explicitly) these 
individuals talked about the presence and moral significance of poverty in their 
discussion. As a result of their own experiences, these respondents were 
much more likely to agree that everyone should receive a minimum income. 
Whilst there were, again, some caveats concerning legal citizenship status, all 
but one respondent supported this. Respondents did not only see this as 
important for meeting basic and immediate human needs. It was also 
considered necessary so that people were able to effectively participate in and 
contribute towards society. Notably, respondents were also much more likely 
to raise issues concerning the minimum wage, working poverty and income 
inequality. It would seem these individuals were much more mindful of the 
broader economic and social processes that structured their exclusion. One 
respondent suggested that a guaranteed minimum income would have 
positive psychosocial effects: 
Yeah, like if you’re working like the minimum wage. If you’re not 
working it would be nice to have a little bit more so you could have just 
a couple of treats that other people do get when they’re working… 
Dunno, I would feel as though it’s more fair. I would feel a lot better in 
my head I think. If everyone was a bit closer to the same it would feel 
more fairer. (Ben, Male, RCC) 
Affluent respondents were much less likely to support the idea of a minimum 
income for everyone living in the UK. Only one respondent did and another 
was ambivalent. For those that did not support the right to a minimum income, 
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some were worried that such a policy would enable, and perhaps excuse, 
‘irresponsible’ behaviour. Interestingly, these respondents tended to 
pathologise poverty, alcohol and drug dependency and focus on low-income 
individuals as the principle recipients of welfare: 
No, I don't. Because I think some people have problems that society 
has created, say – addictions that will not help them spend their money 
wisely, and from that, they shouldn't just be giving carte blanche of: 
"Okay, you've got 15 grand a year, regardless”. (Sophie, Female, VAC) 
For affluent respondents, the overriding concern was that certain people 
receiving a minimum income might not deserve it. These individuals seemed 
less concerned with safeguarding the welfare of those exposed to deprivation 
and more preoccupied with tying individual income to individual effort. Affluent 
respondents were particularly uneasy about guaranteeing a minimum level of 
income and tended to endorse an ‘entrepreneurial’ or ‘survivalist’ moral 
repertoire (Dean, 2004: 67) to justify welfare conditionality: 
No. Why? Because some people don’t put any effort in at all 
themselves. (Rachel, Female, VAC) 
This justificatory framework was typified by respondents stating that a 
minimum level of resources is something to be ‘earned’ rather than 
‘guaranteed’. Whilst there has been a great deal of political and public 
attention directed towards the (un-)deserving ‘poor’, there has been less 
attention directed towards the (un-)deserving ‘rich’ (Rowlingson and Connor, 
2011). This social division of public and state paternalism is reflected in the 
attitudes of affluent respondents and is symptomatic of the current paradigm 
of responsible citizenship that appears to prevail over social rights. 
Respondents were subsequently asked whether there was anything they 
thought the government should do for them as someone living in the UK. 
Despite qualitative fieldwork principally concerning the substance and 
principles of social citizenship, affluent respondents were keen to emphasise 
that the government could do more to protect their civil and political liberties. 
Affluent respondents tended to envisage a more residual level of government 
activity that reflected Nozickian principles of libertarianism (Nozick, 1974). 
These individuals felt that the State was interfering with their basic property 
rights without sufficiently protecting their civil liberties: 
I don’t feel from a financial point of view that I need help in terms of 
benefits or donations. However, I do feel that they [government] have 
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a responsibility to ensure that people like myself and my husband who 
have worked hard throughout our lives and contributed heavily into the 
system… are not penalised for being successful... They don’t need to 
use penal rates for successful people. (Emma, Female, VAC) 
For the above respondent, high financial remuneration was deemed an 
appropriate proxy for identifying ‘successful people’. Embedded within this 
assumption, is that those reliant on ‘benefits or donations’ were in some 
regard ‘unsuccessful’. This is demonstrative of an ‘entrepreneurial’ orientation 
that tends to characterise public and political discourse towards welfare 
citizenship (Dean, 2004: 67). Equally apparent in the above quotations is a 
desire for the government to take on a more neo-conservative role in socio-
economic and civil life. When affluent respondents expressed a desire for the 
government to fulfil social rights, these tended to concern the right to 
healthcare and the right to a pension. These individuals emphasised the 
capacity of the government to operate as a moral authoritarian that might 
encourage desirable forms of behaviour amongst the polity to improve public 
health and the economy. Some respondents stated that the government had 
‘a responsibility to care for its citizens’ but suggested it was more about people 
getting a return on their investment or their ‘contribution to the collective pot’.  
Respondents experiencing deprivation suggested that there were range of 
things that the government had a responsibility to do. This extended well 
beyond civil and political rights and concerned the outcomes and opportunities 
institutionalised through welfare citizenship. A number of unemployed 
respondents wanted the government to do more to provide employment 
assistance to those capable of looking for work. These individuals felt the 
government had a responsibility to provide better, tailored support that 
enabled people to find gainful employment: 
I think the government should. People who have worked for thirty years 
like me… two jobs most of the time. They should help us right? They 
should help us. Give us proper support to go and get a job but they 
won’t. They do nothing. The Work Programme is a waste of time. 
Waste of time and a waste of money. I’ve got certificates. What good 
is food hygiene to me? What good is it? First aid. All right, I’ve learnt 
first aid but what am I actually gonna do with it. (Tom, Male, RCC) 
Others that were unable to enter into or find paid employment felt the 
government had a responsibility to support and protect citizens. These 
respondents drew upon principles of care and respect to inform their support 
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for increased government spending on those facing barriers to paid 
employment. Some of these respondents also felt that the government should 
follow through on promises to appropriately educate and house certain 
groups. Many of these respondents did not see unemployment as a 
permanent feature of their biographies and planned to ‘leave some kind of 
lasting legacy of contribution’. A significant number of deprived respondents 
also expressed an egalitarian or solidaristic conception of social rights that 
they felt should inform welfare citizenship: 
I don’t know. I think it would be lovely if everyone was the same or had 
the same and had the same chances but then everything would be 
equal and it’s never gonna be like that is it. I don’t know... Just my 
opinion yeah, it would be nice if everyone had equal chances – the 
same crack in life. The same things and what have you. (Ashley, 
Female, RCC) 
As illustrated in the above quotation, respondents often simultaneously drew 
upon different (and indeed contradictory) moral repertoires to articulate what 
they felt the social rights of citizenship should be. This respondent suggests 
that there should be equality of opportunity but also that equality of outcome 
is a desirable objective. Such an orientation does not sit comfortably within 
Dean’s (2004) taxonomy of moral repertoires but perhaps reflects more of a 
liberal egalitarian principle of welfare citizenship.  
In many respects, when talking about what the responsibilities of the 
government should be, respondents were identifying a deficit in the current 
institutions and outcomes of social citizenship. Whilst, affluent respondents 
tended to underline an infringement on their civil liberties and property rights, 
respondents experiencing deprivation were more concerned with the 
inadequacy of social rights in meeting human need and enabling effective 
participation in society. In this regard, individuals appear to make sense of and 
advance their own conceptions of welfare citizenship in reference to their lived 
experiences.  
To some extent, lived experiences appear to calcify the attitudes of those 
validated within the current citizenship praxis. Their lived experiences affirm 
the material and symbolic benefits of engaging in the Social Contract as it is 
currently conceived. As a result, affluent respondents are more likely to 
conceive of social citizenship rights in individualistic and contractarian terms. 
Despite high levels of support for social rights (see Table 2 in chapter five), 
these individuals drew upon ‘entrepreneurial’ or ‘survivalist’ moral repertoires 
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(Dean, 2004) to justify the distribution of and conditionality attached to social 
provisions. Concerns about contribution, effort and desert often superseded 
questions of poverty, inequality and participation. Notably, concerns about 
effort and desert appear to apply unevenly as affluent respondents were less 
likely to recognise the lack of correspondence between their own (relatively 
high) receipt of resources and their individual effort. As discussed, in chapter 
six, this appears to be symptomatic of a lack of awareness amongst affluent 
respondents about the structural determinants of socioeconomic outcome and 
agency. The terms upon which the Social Contract is institutionalised in the 
UK appear to be conducive to socio-economic and political life for affluent 
individuals. There was a small degree of divergence in the attitudes of affluent 
respondents. Some expressed concern about the State’s infringement on civil 
liberties. This principally concerned issues relating to property rights and 
perhaps reflects the sharper end of entrepreneurial and survivalist discourse 
expressed by affluent participants. In addition though, it also highlights a 
greater tendency for affluent respondents to articulate a more libertarian 
conception of social citizenship.  
In stark contrast to affluent respondents, those excluded from the figurative 
and applied potential of citizenship tended to diverge greatly in their attitudes 
and intuitions about social rights. Those with lived experiences of deprivation 
were more likely to exhibit solidaristic and universalistic orientations towards 
welfare citizenship that extended well beyond the existing institutional remit of 
social policy in the UK. These individuals tended to conceive of social 
citizenship in collectivist terms that reflected a concern for and appreciation of 
how structural factors impinge on individual agency and significantly shape 
socioeconomic outcomes and opportunities. Many problematized the ethical 
category of poverty to invoke a thicker conception of social rights. Ostensibly, 
this raises a contradiction between the quantitative and qualitative findings of 
this study. Lived experiences of deprivation were found to reduce levels of 
support for social rights (see Table 6 in chapter five). However, it appears that 
respondents experiencing deprivation were more likely to reject the prevailing 
(conditional) conception of social rights and advance an alternative to the 
existing paradigm of social politics. The hegemonic conception of social rights 
centres on a contractarian basis of justice and fairness. Those experiencing 
deprivation struggled to engage with social citizenship on these terms. For 
some, this was because their entitlement to social rights could not be 
defended according to work-biased contributory prescriptions. More broadly 
though, the lived experiences and consequent knowledge accumulated by 
these participants challenged core assumptions inherent within citizenship 
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ideals. The purported performance of state apparatus and ethical coherence 
of distributional justice (in its current form) did not resonate with the outcomes 
and opportunities of Residual Contingent Citizens. As a result, many were 
critical of current social policies and outlined an alternative means by which to 
realise the promises of social citizenship.  
7.3 Attitudes and Behaviours relating to the Responsibilities 
of Social Citizenship 
When discussing social citizenship, there is some evidence to suggest that 
people find it ‘much easier to talk about responsibilities than rights’ (Lister et 
al., 2003: 251). When asked what they think it means to be a responsible 
citizen, respondents articulated a range of attitudes towards the 
responsibilities of social citizenship and these extended well beyond 
institutional and juridical duties. Deprived respondents were more likely to see 
responsibility as something expressed in relation to and with others. Rather 
than focusing on individual responsibilities, these individuals grounded 
conceptions of responsibility in principles of collectivism and solidarity. A 
number of respondents felt that care, respect and dignity should be core 
inalienable features of both private and public life. 
I think it’s about a way of life, rather than money. Being responsible 
towards other human beings, just treat everyone with some respect and 
dignity. (Amber, Female, RCC) 
In order to realise these goals many deprived respondents believed there 
should be common and collective responsibilities expected of all citizens. It 
was felt that these responsibilities should be embedded within institutional 
action and public provision but also through interpersonal and communal 
duties.  
You’re responsible for everybody. Everybody’s safety. (Tom, Male, 
RCC) 
Being honest, love your neighbours as you love yourself. (Beth, 
Female, RCC) 
In many respects, these respondents viewed care ‘as a constitutive 
responsibility and right of social citizenship’ (Kernshaw, 2005: 4).  
Some respondents experiencing deprivation also suggested that work and 
‘respecting the law’ were important responsibilities of citizenship. However, 
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this ‘“hyper-conventional” valuing of work’ was not as prevalent as it has been 
in other qualitative research with economically marginalised groups 
(MacDonald, 2008). Interestingly, deprived respondents tended to talk about 
responsibilities in a way that stressed a duty to others, rather than a duty to 
the State. Care, work and obeying the law were not only seen as significant in 
isolation, they were also seen as having repercussions at an aggregate level. 
In contrast, affluent respondents tended to talk about responsibilities in more 
fragmented terms. An exchange-orientated conception of citizenship 
appeared to pervade much of the discussion regarding responsibilities with 
these individuals. As a result, affluent respondents tended to individualise the 
fulfilment of responsibilities and underplay their actual and potential effects on 
other citizens.  
Affluent respondents tended to see economic self-sufficiency and self-reliance 
as a cornerstone of responsible citizenship. In keeping with other research 
(e.g. Baxter and Kane, 1995), individuals were particularly contradictory about 
their own valorised independence and the legitimate dependency of their 
families. Some felt that responsibility was exemplified by financial contribution 
through the fulfilment of tax liabilities. Affluent individuals were also more 
inclined to stress the importance and value of paid work. A number of 
respondents went further to suggest that hard work was a signifier of 
responsible behaviour. For these individuals it was important to work as hard 
as you can, rather than as much as you need to.  
To work hard, as hard as you can. To pay your taxes. (Sophie, Female, 
VAC) 
By contrast, deprived respondents were more likely to see work and income 
as a means to live ‘a manageable life’. Not only did affluent respondents 
conceive of hard work as an entrepreneurial enterprise, they also saw this as 
a duty of citizenship. That is, to work towards economic and social 
independence:  
Be prepared to look after yourself and your own family. That they get 
on with their neighbours and that they’re independent I suppose. 
(Rachel, Female, VAC) 
Attitudes towards these responsibilities were couched in a contractarian 
framework of justice whereby claims to the benefits of citizenship were 
predicated on certain behaviours: 
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The rights that you have come with responsibilities and you have to 
contribute to be part of it. (Michael, Male, VAC) 
Where possible these people are responsibly planning and carrying out 
their own lives so that, even if something goes awry, they are actually 
planning to look after themselves and planning to get proper work and 
doing something alternative if it does not happen, fine, but just not 
giving up and having a life of existing on benefits without actually 
contributing anything to the system. (Emma, Female, VAC) 
Whilst the majority of affluent respondents expressed such ideals, a small 
number also emphasised the importance of care and respect. These 
individuals were much more likely to cite and recognise structural factors 
shaping the lives and outcomes of individuals. This appeared to affect how 
they viewed the conditional relationship between rights and responsibilities 
but also the content and nature of responsibilities: 
I think we need to look after people who can't look after themselves. 
(Holly, Female, VAC) 
Affluent respondents discussed a range of behaviours relating to responsible 
citizenship. Through the payment of taxation, some affluent respondents felt 
they were fulfilling their social responsibilities. Some discussed more abstract 
values such as ‘living within a society and not neglecting others’ whilst other 
respondents focused on more specific and mundane examples such as 
‘picking up your own litter’. At some point during the interview, almost all 
affluent respondents stressed the importance of obeying the law. This 
procedural behaviour appeared to be seen as an antecedent to forms of 
responsible social citizenship such as ‘taking part in society’. 
When thinking about whether all people living in the UK should have the same 
responsibilities, there was a high degree of ambivalence amongst 
respondents. There was a greater tendency for affluent respondents to 
suggest that the responsibilities of social citizenship should be standardised 
across the population: 
Yeah. I think they should be. I think maybe if you applied, like, a 
minimum set, you know, that – this is the sort of minimum set of social 
responsibilities that everybody should have, knowing that you can take 
on whatever else you want. But I think there should be a sort of baseline 
of what we might accept from each other. (Joe, Male, VAC) 
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However, the majority of respondents across both sample groups felt that the 
responsibilities of social citizenship should be differentially distributed. This 
tempered the contributory and contractarian principle previously advanced by 
some respondents: ‘everybody can’t put the same back in’. Many affluent and 
deprived respondents recognised that there were concessionary factors that 
prevented people from fulfilling certain responsibilities: ‘it depends on the 
individual’.  
… should have the same responsibilities? No. Because you're going to 
have older people, who need care. You're going to have disabled 
people, mental and physical, who need care. You're going to have 
mothers of young children, who are single mothers. (Sophie, Female, 
VAC) 
Young single parents, children, the elderly, and individuals with physical or 
intellectual impairments were all identified as groups that, in certain instances, 
may be exempt from citizen duties. Implicitly, and occasionally explicitly, the 
working age and physical ability of respondents seemed to be a determining 
factor for respondents.  
Well clearly if somebody is disabled or old or young then they’re not 
going to have the same responsibilities. But I think healthy people of 
working age should all have the same responsibilities. (Emma, Female, 
VAC) 
Respondents experiencing deprivation were more inclined to emphasise 
mitigating circumstances and focus on the specificities that might preclude 
someone from engaging in the paid labour market. These respondents were 
also more likely to recognise that (partial) exemption from citizenship 
responsibilities was an inevitable feature of the life course. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given their own life histories and circumstance. By virtue of their 
lived experiences, these individuals were more able to appreciate situations 
and life events that might prevent someone from fulfilling the duties of social 
citizenship. 
A minority of affluent respondents believed that there were certain 
responsibilities of citizenship that should be inalienable. These individuals 
drew a distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ duties. It was felt 
that the ‘non-economic’ duties of civil and political citizenship should always 
be upheld, irrespective of the circumstances of the individual, whereas greater 
contingency should be granted on the ‘economic’ duties of social citizenship. 
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A number of respondents across both sample groups suggested that 
individuals earning a higher wage had a greater responsibility to financially 
contribute to the collective project of welfare.  
The wealthier people should have more responsibility than the less 
well–off, and should contribute more, financially particularly. (Mark, 
Male, VAC) 
Notably, more respondents experiencing deprivation saw this as important 
function of redistribution and poverty alleviation. 
It should be different responsibilities depending on who you are. People 
that are working, with big families, a couple of cars and that – they 
should be doing a little bit more to help people out on their street who 
are poorer. It would be nice for them to help them out a bit. (Ben, Male, 
RCC) 
When asked what forms of behaviour they felt should be recognised as 
responsible, many respondents living in affluence and deprivation stressed 
the importance and value of volunteering and equated it specifically with 
citizenship. For some deprived respondents, volunteering was particularly 
important because it went above and beyond what they saw as the formal 
requirements of citizenship. These individuals saw volunteering as enhancing 
(rather than regulating) the quality of social relations and standards between 
individuals: 
I actually think it [volunteering] is more important than paid work 
because it’s a choice. Because, you could easily not do it. You don’t 
have to do it. And it is, and sometimes some of the volunteer work is 
harder than some paid work, because it is a choice and it is more 
valuable and it is actually supporting society, because they do not have 
to pay for it. Some people who volunteer, get some minimal expenses, 
and some people just don’t get anything at all.  But I think, it is about 
improving people’s quality of life. (Liam, Male, RCC) 
A number of these respondents derived their own sense of self-worth from 
helping and supporting others. In many instances, this was done in a way that 
justified their entitlement to social security and rejected dominant notions of 
responsible citizenship.  
And I feel that they everybody is all for themselves. I mean that has 
come from the government. Yes, for them worthy is about what you do 
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with your money, and your work, it’s not about what kind of person you 
are. (Lucy, Female, RCC) 
These respondents helped friends, family, neighbours in various ways. Some 
offered companionship and support for those isolated from their local 
community. Others raised money for charities by supporting community 
events and activities. A number of respondents provided emergency care, 
food and manual labour to safeguard the welfare of neighbours and the 
elderly. Many did this because they preferred it to ‘being sat around’ but these 
individuals also felt that it demonstrated their contribution to society, outside 
the paid labour market, and consequent claim to the rights of social 
citizenship. Whilst a voluntary ethic appeared to be prevalent amongst those 
experiencing deprivation in qualitative fieldwork, poverty, unemployment and 
area deprivation have previously been identified as factors that tend to reduce 
the degree and frequency of civic engagement and participation (e.g. Mohan 
and Bulloch, 2012). Equally, quantitative findings from the 2005 Citizenship 
Survey suggest that informal kinship and support networks tend to be lower 







Table 8: Comparison of means for different aspects of informal kinship and 
support 
 
‘Deprived’ ‘Affluent’ All 
Number of people a respondent has given help or 
support to in their household in the last month 
1.60* 1.62* 1.61 
Number of people a respondent has received help 
or support from in their household in the last month 
1.41* 1.45* 1.43 
Number of relatives a respondent has had contact 
within the last month 
3.78 4.72 4.40 
Number of relatives a respondent has given help or 
support to in the last 12 months 
2.09 3.33 2.92 
Number of relatives a respondent has received help 
or support from in the last 12 months 
1.98 2.61 2.40 
Number of instances where respondent has given 
informal voluntary help in last 12 months 
1.66 2.22 2.03 
*not a statistically significant difference 
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Ostensibly, these findings challenge the assumption that lower socio-
economic groups are ‘city survivors’, building strong networks of interpersonal 
social capital to cope with precarity (Power, 2007; Young and Wilmott, 2013). 
However, surveys attempting to quantify rates of civic engagement and 
participation tend to capture and favour the activities of middle and upper 
class, older individuals (e.g. Davies, 2014). This obscures the extent of 
participation amongst lower-income groups and communities. Such a 
weakness is apparent in the Citizenship Survey. Behaviours such as ‘looking 
after a property or a pet for someone who is away’ were deemed to be an 
example of help or support and evidently favoured those with a higher level of 
capital and resources at their disposal (see Appendix A.3.2). Kearns and 
Parkinson (2001) suggest that ‘the neighbourhood for poorer people has more 
often served as an arena for ‘bonding’ social capital that enables people to 
‘get by’, rather than as a platform for ‘bridging’ social capital that enables 
people to ‘get on’’ (Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Kearns and Parkinson, 2001: 
2105).  
This was clearly the case in qualitative interviews with deprived respondents 
who saw help and volunteering as a way of managing uncertainty and life 
risks. By comparison, affluent respondents tended to see support and informal 
voluntary help as a way of building upon and improving the social and public 
goods already available within their community. This supports evidence that 
social class positively predicts self-serving orientations and behaviours 
(Dubois et al., 2015). These attitudes tended to arise from a feeling that there 
were limitations upon what the state, civil servants and public institutions could 
achieve. Some affluent respondents talked about how community and 
voluntary work could help improve the local environment through activities 
such as painting railings, planting flowers and tidying pavements. Others 
focused more on broader responsibilities relating to education and healthcare: 
They talk about people who lack education or aspiration but you’ve got 
to be responsible for bringing up your own children. You know, you’re 
taking on a huge responsibility with children and understand first and 
foremost when you understand what responsibilities you have. If you’re 
not responsible. You don’t want to spend more on people, have more 
laws - we’ve got to take responsibility for ourselves. Take more control 
of our own lives. (William, Male, VAC) 
This final quotation demonstrates the distinction in attitudes between deprived 
and affluent respondents. As previously discussed, citizenship ideals currently 
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promulgate a ‘social policy orientation privileging labour force attachment’ 
(Kershaw et al., 2008: 183) in the UK. In many instances, unemployed 
respondents resisted this focus on paid work and emphasised care, respect 
and dignity as organising principles of social and economic life. These 
individuals tended to see responsibilities as a form of collective action and 
cooperation between individuals. They were also more likely to recognise the 
mitigating circumstances that might preclude someone from performing active 
citizenship. In response, they tended to engage in forms of voluntary help and 
support that both recognise and try to address disadvantage and inequality in 
their local area. In summary, lived experiences of deprivation appear to induce 
a ‘wider ‘differentiated’, pluralist, citizenship, which embraces diversity and 
addresses socio-structural divisions’ (Lister, 2002b: 191). In contrast, affluent 
respondents were more likely to endorse an ‘employment-orientated vision of 
active citizenship’ (Kershaw et al., 2008: 184). These individuals tended to 
individualise responsibilities and focus on tax liabilities, financial contribution 
and economic self-sufficiency. An atomised conception of social life privileged 
dependency on familial, but not State resources. Many agreed that the 
responsibilities of social citizenship should differ according to age and ability, 
but this was tempered by a belief that ‘all able-bodied people should work’. 
Whilst affluent respondents gave informal voluntary help, activities tended to 
be ‘self-serving’. Overall, it would seem that individuals conform or struggle 
against the existing citizenship paradigm in ways that reflect their own 
experiences and thus conceptions of social justice and citizenship.  
7.4 Resistance and Resignation to the Dominant Citizenship 
Paradigm  
Amidst the hegemonic ideals and practices of social citizenship in the UK, 
there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the beliefs, motivations and outcomes 
of citizens. As illustrated above, affluence and deprivation represent two 
extreme ends of both the material continuum but also the value systems of 
those subject to its condition. The following section explores how citizens 
make sense of and respond to this phenomenon and the public and market 
institutions involved in its reproduction. Deprivation represents a paucity of 
social goods that are notionally guaranteed under the auspices of citizenship. 
In both a material and symbolic sense, those experiencing deprivation are 
aggrieved by the current function and outcomes of social policy. As a result 
many were critical of the current socio-economic and political system and felt 
they lacked core public provisions and goods to which they were entitled.  
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Some individuals challenged what they saw as a meagre level of financial and 
social worth attached to their role in society. One individual in receipt of 
Carer’s Allowance condemned the low level of social security she received to 
look after a relative. She asserted that ‘I am helping other people and that’s 
why I’m definitely worth as much as the Queen’ (Jackie, Female, RCC). Other 
respondents, who had since become unemployed, problematized the 
inadequate level of remuneration and recognition they had previously received 
for low-skilled work:  
There should be a system that respects people that have worked for 
many, many years. They’ve paid taxes, they’ve lost a job. Deal with 
them fairly. These people are not benefits frauds; these are 
hardworking people who keep this society, this country running and 
have for many, many years.  (Selina, Female, RCC) 
A number of respondents also felt there was a lack of consistent and 
constructive support available for those unable or attempting to transition into 
employment. Criticisms concerned poor public services and training, but also 
the derisory level of benefits provided to clothe, feed and house poor families. 
One respondent suggested that there was a lack of understanding on the part 
of politicians, policymakers and practitioners. To this respondent, those 
making decisions about welfare had little grasp of what it was like to live on a 
low income or benefits: 
I would say, like, all these people...you know, these big politicians and 
them. They need to come and live in our shoes, to find how life really 
is. Do you understand? Scandalous. It's really, really scandalous, 
honestly.  (Jade, Female, RCC) 
For some individuals experiencing deprivation, there was an attitude and 
approach of passive forbearance. Whilst these individuals were critical of the 
current system, they felt, to a great extent, powerless to affect change and 
challenge the dominant citizenship paradigm. These individuals felt that the 
terms upon which social rights were granted and responsibilities were 
conceived should be reformulated. However, the consuming nature of poverty 
in the private sphere appeared to prevent these individuals from 
communicating and acting upon their concerns in the public sphere (Bennett, 
1991: 330). As a result, some deprived respondents resigned themselves to 
(and indeed, withdrew from) the current citizenship paradigm: 
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Why would the government care about what we got to say…we’re down 
there [gesturing to the floor]…we’re nothing to them…this aint gonna 
change a thing… I don’t see the point. (Ashley, Female, RCC) 
These individuals tended to conform and perform according to the 
requirements and expectations set out by service and benefit providers. Some 
had faced benefit sanctions in the past and were therefore acutely aware of 
the repercussions of challenging state apparatus. This is demonstrative of 
how ‘poverty governance as a disciplinary regime’ has the capacity to regulate 
behaviours and create new forms of self-discipline and submission (Schram 
et al., 2010: 739). Despite its governmental capacity (Jones and Novak, 1999), 
a number of respondents experiencing deprivation actively resisted the 
dominant citizenship paradigm. These individuals contacted councillors, 
lodged complaints with housing associations and local authorities and entered 
into disputes with JobCentre Plus. All these respondents were currently 
engaged in some sort of activity to secure the social rights to which they 
believed they were entitled. In certain instances, they were successful. In 
others, respondents were ‘still fighting’: 
It’s like the bedroom window upstairs, we had to put a lock on it 
because my son could lift the handle up. So we asked if they could put 
a lock on it. ‘Well not really it’s a fire hazard’. So I says well, if..I don’t 
know if you heard about the boy that fell at [x place] from the Tower 
Block. I said ‘what’s it take for me to get something done in my house?’. 
For my son to open that window and fall out. He’ll end up dead. And it 
finally happened… I haven’t had a sink in my bathroom for ten years. I 
reported it, reported it, reported it and nowts been done about it. 
(Brooke, Female, RCC) 
These individuals were engaged in more procedural means of critiquing and 
extending the current benefits of social citizenship. Others took a more 
adversarial and dissident approach. One respondent diverged from the 
dominant ideal of an acquiescent and grateful claimant (Howe, 1985), to 
confront the decision of her benefit advisor. A decision was taken to withdraw 
her benefits and she challenged this on the basis of facts. This soon led to a 
verbal confrontation between claimant and advisor: 
I told him to "Fuck off," really, and I told him, "What do you think I'm 
going to do?" It might be something like three months at a time, like, 
what do you think I'm going to do? Not eat? Do you really, truly think 
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I'm not going to eat? I just told him, "Fuck off," and I walked out. (Amber, 
Female, RCC) 
This respondent was subsequently subjected to extreme material hardship. 
She recounted instances of looking for ‘food in bins’ and ‘not having heating 
on’. Nevertheless, she seemed happy with her decision to confront the benefit 
advisor rather than ‘just take it’. Some respondents were less adversarial but 
were still subversive in their approach to claiming their social rights. Two 
respondents said that they had previously claimed for social security whilst 
taking on undeclared part-time or temporary work. These individuals justified 
their actions by saying that they ‘couldn’t survive’ on their wages alone and 
that claiming provided some stability when transitioning in and out of work. 
This echoes existing qualitative findings that suggest ‘fiddling’ is primarily 
done out of economic necessity and includes a work ethic (MacDonald, 1994; 
Dean and Melrose, 1996). Arguably though, it also demonstrates an 
unwillingness to accept the terms and conditions of active citizenship that are 
felt in low-skilled, low-paid, precarious work. Marginality and exclusion typify 
the lives of those trapped in a low-pay, no-pay cycle (Shildrick et al., 2010). 
Benefit fraud within this context can be seen as an active rejection of (and 
remedy to) the existing citizenship discourse that insists work is the best form 
of welfare (Johnston, 2009). Regev-Messalem (2013) suggests that benefit 
fraud can be understood as ‘a socio-political struggle for inclusion and 
deservedness—as a political act that reflects an alternative concept of 
citizenship (Regev‐Messalem, 2013: 993). In this regard, there were multiple 
types and levels of ‘rational resistance’ (Jordan, 1998: 182) enacted by those 
experiencing deprivation.  
In rather different ways, and for equally different reasons, some affluent 
respondents also engaged in activities that attempted to challenge the existing 
citizenship paradigm. As previously stated, the contractarian basis of active 
citizenship had greater purchase for those able to identify and enjoy the 
benefits of engaging in the Social Contract. However, there were a number of 
notable exceptions where individuals attempted to reformulate citizenship 
structures according to their own value systems and advantage. Affluent 
respondents tended to raise concerns about the overbearance of the State 
and it’s infringement on civil liberties:  
They can be very difficult to get these things done because the minute 
you want to do them, there are hurdles put in your way.  (Michael, Male, 
VAC) 
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Many resigned themselves to these inconveniences. However, others were 
more proactive in seeking alternative ways of realising their own means and 
ends. Most commonly, affluent respondents did so in a way that exercised 
their pre-existing civil and political rights. Many engaged in formal volunteering 
and civic engagement to affect changes in public services and their local area. 
As noted in chapter five, these individuals were much more likely to feel that 
they could affect change and recounted several examples of where this had 
been possible. A number of affluent respondents were active members of local 
community and church groups. Some regularly attended neighbourhood 
meetings, one was a trustee of a local charity and another was a school 
governor at the school attended by their children. Rather than resisting and 
reacting against public and communal institutions, affluent respondents were 
more often actively engaged in altering citizenship structures from within. In 
this respect, the behaviours and attitudes of deprived respondents can be 
seen as a defence of basic liberties, whereas the actions of affluent 
respondents can be seen as an exercise and execution of basic liberties. 
Affluent respondents tended to work with the procedural grain of citizenship 
to alter its function or improve the quality of certain social rights. 
Whilst many affluent respondents expressed disaffection with ‘red tape’ and 
‘bureaucracy’, only a smaller number actually undertook activities to 
circumvent existing citizenship structures.  These individuals engaged in 
behaviours such as guerrilla planting, community fundraising, and undertaking 
repairs without the necessary approval and documentation from the local 
authority:  
All these railings down the park are always stained and look like crap, 
so why don’t we get some wire brushes and go and paint them all 
white?  Yeah, but you’ve got on high-vis jackets and health and safety 
and mission statement, 10 foot barriers, you know?  You kind of get 
bedded down then in all this stuff by the end of which the fence is just 
rusted and fallen away and people have fallen by the wayside who just 
kind of give up. And the alternative is, you know, if we want – if we 
actually really do want those things, let’s go and paint them in the dark, 
you know?  We’ll go at 2 O’clock in the morning and do – and in the 
morning, it’ll have just happened. (Michael, Male, VAC) 
Notably, all these individuals had substantial financial capital and resources 
at their disposal. Previous research suggests that those with a higher 
economic and social status are more effective at initiating and coordinating 
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collective action (cf. Clark et al., 2006). Overall, affluent respondents engaged 
in a variety of activities to either endorse or reshape the ethic and outcomes 
of social citizenship. The contractarian basis of rights and responsibilities was 
conducive and indeed endorsed by many respondents. However, some 
respondents engaged in activities to maximise their autonomy over public 
goods and their socio-economic and political lives. 
Chapter five illustrates that extant material inequalities reflect institutionalised 
and reflexive status hierarchies between ‘citizens’ and ‘non-citizens’. Based 
on the analysis above, it appears that these status inequalities gave rise to 
divergent strategies to make sense of and engage with the dominant paradigm 
of citizenship prevailing in the UK.  
7.5 From Welfare Deficits to Institutional Disengagement 
The shifting function and governance of social and economic policy has 
resulted in a variegated praxis and experience of social citizenship in the UK. 
In response to this fragmentation in the public realm, Ellison (2000) argues 
that there are two primary forms of engagement manifest in the social politics 
of late modernity: 
Actors will engage as citizens in one of two ways, depending on how 
the prevailing social and political context and the particular 
configuration of demands either promotes or inhibits collective action 
and the creation of new forms of belonging. First, citizenship can be 
understood as 'proactive engagement'. Here social actors are able to 
exploit a particular political 'conjuncture' to further their own interests 
(or those of others) through significant interventions in those 
dimensions of the public sphere which privilege or 'recognise' these 
particular types of action… Second, and perhaps more significantly, 
citizenship can be characterised as 'defensive engagement'. 'Defence' 
has always been an integral aspect of citizenship, but its meaning has 
been radically transformed from earlier associations with universalist, 
state collectivist and, above all, passive forms of defence against 
specified risks, particularly in the context of the socially protective 
Keynesian Welfare State, to an association with the defensive 
strategies of collective actors. 'Engagement' is used to denote the fact 
that citizens increasingly have to defend themselves against the 
erosion of their social rights created by the persistent and occasionally 
dramatic demands of rapid economic, social and political change 
(Ellison, 2000: 1.2-1.3). 
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Due to the increasing multiplicity of identity and relations, Ellison (2000) 
argues that ‘temporary solidarities’ may arise around specific policy issues 
that transcend entrenched social divisions. Nevertheless, Ellison (2000) also 
suggests that those with greater and fewer resources are more likely to enact 
different forms of engagement, ‘proactive’ and ‘defensive’ respectively. This 
tendency is not so much materially determined, but shaped according to the 
‘range of ‘discourses’ and ideologies’ that tend to coalesce around socio-
political and material categories.  
Whilst this may result in a ‘fractured social politics’, the above analysis 
suggests that this fragmentation is perhaps more fixed than anticipated. In 
certain instances, variegated citizenship may promote ‘increasingly porous 
social and political identities’ (Ellison, 2000: 1.5). However, thus far, this thesis 
has suggested that there are increasingly hermetic formations of identity and 
status, particularly for those marginalised according to the current citizenship 
paradigm. As citizen identities, status and economic outcomes become 
increasingly entrenched for these individuals, so do the proclivities of their 
engagement.  
Affluence and deprivation shape the attitudes and behaviours of individuals in 
patterned ways that can, in certain instances, further propagate inequalities of 
status and outcome. The power manifest in the status and outcomes of 
Validated Active Citizens equips these individuals with the necessary 
resources to proactively affect change and reformulate the terms of 
citizenship. By contrast, those excluded from the bases of citizenship status 
and entitlement resort to defensive actions and attitudes to reconcile their lived 
experiences with the failed promises of social citizenship. With this in mind, 
the fragmentation of social politics is becoming increasingly fixed according to 
status and material hierarchies arising out of citizenship practices and differing 
forms of engagement. This is particularly problematic for the future of welfare 
politics and outcomes because ‘defensive forms of engagement are more 
likely to be organised around social divisions already shaped by existing 
discourses, while proactive forms could push beyond these discursive 
parameters’ (Ellison, 2000: 7.3). 
As the causes and consequences of poverty and inequality become ever more 
complex and multifarious, it becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile these 
with pre-existing conceptual and ideological schema. As a result, existing 
discourses lack the theoretical and pragmatic tools to make sense of and 
address the challenges faced by post-industrial societies. Proactive forms of 
engagement that transcend current forms of thinking are not only likely to be 
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more tractable in political and policy terms, they are also more prone to 
privilege those that endorse the current citizenship paradigm. 
The effective utilisation of certain urban spaces and infrastructures by 
better-off groups through strategies of proactive (dis)engagement 
splinters not only service provision but further, represents a retreat from 
collective understandings of citizenship and social belonging. (Ellison 
and Burrows, 2007: 310) 
This is likely to further the individualisation of politics and welfare in future and 
reinforce the processes that lead to material accretion for some and welfare 
deficits for others. This poses significant challenges for the health of 
democracy and the legitimacy of social citizenship in its current and future 
form. 
Thus, ‘proactive’ and ‘defensive’ forms of engagement become particularly 
important for and by those suffering economic and social marginalisation. In 
spite of this, there was a high level of ‘institutional disengagement’ apparent 
amongst this group. This is perhaps unsurprising given that both the ability 
and inclination to ‘act as a citizen requires a sense of agency, the belief that 
one can act and affect change’ (Lister, 2003: 39). As illustrated in Table 7 in 
chapter five, Residual Contingent Citizens are much less likely to feel they can 
affect change or engaged in collective organisation or co-operation in their 
local area. Many of those deprived respondents participating in qualitative 
fieldwork were cynical about the interests and motivations of policymakers, 
practitioners and politicians. They were sceptical about the ability of these 
groups to understand and therefore assist in tackling the challenges they 
faced in personal, interpersonal and structural life. For deprived respondents 
that had been involved in forms of defensive engagement, attempts at 
resistance and protest were often met with little, if any, recognition or positive 
change (material or otherwise). Such experiences undermine citizen identity 
and agency and corrode the notion that it is possible to realise one’s right to 
have rights (Isin and Wood, 1999). Many of those defensively engaged were 
therefore concerned with short-term, remedial concessions. Consequently, 
the welfare politics of deprivation tended to centre on matters of survival, 
rather than questions of future progress (Murphy, 2014). At times, this 
included instances of defensive engagement whereby individuals sought to 
protect their ‘already precarious ability to prosper’ against ‘increased 
competition for scarce jobs and welfare services’ (Cook et al., 2011: 734). 
Voter turnout and formal civic engagement is particularly low amongst those 
in a position of socio-economic hardship (Pattie et al., 2003; Birch et al., 2013). 
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For example, in the 2010 general election ‘individuals in the highest income 
group were 43 per cent more likely to vote than those in the lowest income 
group’ (Birch et al., 2013: 8). However, Manning and Holmes (2013: 480) 
argue that this ‘disengagement is a critical rather than apathetic response to 
mainstream politics’. Indifference hardly ever characterised the attitudes and 
behaviours of respondents experiencing deprivation. These individuals vividly 
articulated conceptions of social citizenship, rights and duties that challenged 
the existing paradigm. However, this rarely translated into expansive forms of 
action and engagement. Whilst there was some evidence to suggest that 
these individuals were ‘preoccupied with material rather than post-material 
issues’ (Manning and Holmes, 2013: 481), deprived respondents also felt that 
civic and political processes were not conducive to either their material or 
post-material concerns. As a result, many expressed frustration that social 
politics and social citizenship failed to attend to their pressing and discursive 
needs and acted in ways that were most exigent on their time, health and well-
being. In short, welfare deficits appeared to lead to institutional 
disengagement with the procedural substance, if not the principles, of social 
citizenship. These individuals acted defensively where necessary, but 
withdrew or disengaged where it was not felt possible to affect change more 
broadly. 
7.6 Conclusion  
From the above analysis, it is clear that affluence and deprivation generate 
fault lines in the attitudes and orientations of individuals. This chapter has 
shown that these two groups tend to develop distinct discourses of citizenship 
that reflect their lived experience of socio-economic and status inequality.  
Affluent respondents tended to adopt a contractarian understanding of the 
relationship between rights and responsibilities. These individuals were more 
inclined to believe that that the social rights of citizenship should be predicated 
on one’s fulfilment of duties. They conceived of rights and responsibilities in 
atomised terms that underplayed the interconnectedness and 
interdependency inherent in private and public life. These individuals 
commended a framework of justice that focused on contribution, effort and 
desert. Successful and responsible citizenship was seen as principally related 
to one’s engagement with the paid labour market. A number of affluent 
respondents suggested that there needed to be a greater focus on the 
individual, rather than collective, responsibilities of social citizenship. Whilst 
some recognised the mitigating circumstances that might preclude someone 
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from the responsibilities of citizenship, they still felt that ‘in an ideal world’, 
citizenship responsibilities should be the same. By and large, affluent 
respondents endorsed the terms of social citizenship in a way that reflected 
their own positive experience of it. Where this was not the case, individuals 
attempted to alter citizenship structures from within or circumvent them all 
together by making use of their own capital to achieve particular ends.  
As a result of their lived experiences, deprived respondents tended to adopt a 
more universal and solidaristic conception of social rights. Deprivation 
appeared to induce principles of collectivism and mutual vulnerability to inform 
the content and function of public provision. Many were critical of the work-
centric approach to social citizenship and emphasised alternative forms of 
behaviour and contribution that could be deemed responsible. Care, dignity 
and respect were valorised and social reciprocity was seen as an important 
duty to others rather than the State. Overall, lived experiences of deprivation 
cultivated counter-hegemonic discourses that deviated from the ideals and 
practices venerated by affluent respondents. This heterodox conception of 
social citizenship was enacted through various behaviours that sought to, or 
by proxy, challenged the existing paradigm and outcomes of social politics.  
These divergent conceptions of social citizenship occurred alongside unique 
forms of (dis-) engagement. The fixed fragmentation of social politics has 
benefited those validated by the dominant citizen paradigm. Those able and 
desiring to proactively engage can alter the terms of social citizenship in ways 
that meet their material and discursive ends. By contrast, lived experiences of 
deprivation tend to lead to defensive forms of engagement that pursue short-
term substantive concessions without challenging the overall conception of 
social citizenship. This has a number of significant repercussions for the future 
direction and outcomes of social citizenship that ‘deprives the public sphere 
of insightful viewpoints and diminishes the overall functional effectiveness of 
liberal democracies’ (Galston, 2007: 638). Given these observations, we may 
reasonably anticipate an increase in inequality and poverty. This is 
anticipated, not just in spite of, but because of the way in which social 
citizenship works. The current citizenship paradigm privileges attitudes, 
behaviours and engagements in a way that reflects and reinforces extant 
material and status hierarchies in the UK. Without a substantial shift in the 
attitudes and engagement of citizens, this is likely to get worse.  
Given what is now known about the relationship between lived experiences, 
attitudes and engagement, the following chapter will consolidate these 
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findings to consider how these can be put towards tackling poverty and 
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Chapter 8: Deliberating the structural determinants of 
poverty and inequality: galvanising public opinion towards 
social policy ends  
 
8.1 Introduction 
Thus far, this thesis has explored how structured inequalities give rise to 
differing conceptions of social citizenship. In a number of important of ways, 
the rich really do differ from the poor (Kraus et al., 2012). Of course, diversity 
in public opinion is a valuable feature of any democracy, but welfare services 
and provisions are also supposed to serve an integrative function. The 
establishment of the welfare state was partly intended ‘to heal social divisions 
or at least mitigate social inequalities; not only in terms of material inequalities, 
but also in ideological and political terms’ (Mau, 2001: 3). However, social 
citizenship and its attendant systems of welfare have increasingly come to 
calcify rather than moderate material and attitudinal differentiation. When the 
fault lines of difference and the capacity to influence social politics are drawn 
based on existing socioeconomic divisions, the (political) legitimacy of social 
citizenship is compromised. In effect, social citizenship becomes a self-
reinforcing practice that reformulates itself in a way that continues to privilege 
some whilst penalising others. As a result, the channels of policy influence are 
broadened for those at the top and narrowed for those at the bottom.  
This poses a significant challenge to tackling poverty and inequality. If those 
controlling (and benefitting from) the current citizenship paradigm, endorse 
the features that give rise to poverty and inequality, how then can these 
structures be feasibly reformulated? By virtue of their status and rights, de jure 
(if not de facto) citizens are able to shape the nature and function of social 
citizenship, but the current configuration can only be altered with popular and 
political support. As highlighted at the beginning of this thesis, without 
collective commitment to policies that tackle deprivation and support inclusive 
citizenship practices, little substantive progress can be made (Harker, 2006). 
Whilst some suggest that the British public have resisted anti-welfare 
populism (Baumberg, 2014), there is strong evidence to suggest that popular 
welfare discourse now endorses the values and features of social citizenship 
that reproduce inequality (Coughlin, 1980; Raco, 2009; Donoghue, 2013). 
Endorsement of this welfare discourse should not comfort those concerned by 
the prevalence of poverty and inequality. A shift in the framing and discussion 
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of poverty and inequality is required. Without this, social policy is rendered 
ineffectual at tackling deprivation, and at times complicit in its propagation.  
Critical Social Policy scrutinises the politics and policies currently at play and 
offers an invaluable account intended to improve welfare outcomes. However, 
political and moral disagreements remain. The left-wing media and public tend 
to suggest that median voters and the institutional elite acquire dubious moral 
reasoning that fails to address the pressing questions of social justice (Manne, 
2014). Those opposed to progressive social policies tend to have 
countervailing concerns such as desert, individual responsibility and financial 
capability (Williams, 1984; Shirazi and Biel, 2005). At present, political and 
moral debate has become entrenched with neither ‘side’ conceding, nor 
indeed attending, to the concerns of the other. Presuming citizens are 
‘reasonable’, that is, ‘prepared to offer one another fair terms of social 
cooperation’ (Rawls, 1996: 54), it should be possible to engage in some 
measure of constructive deliberation surrounding poverty, inequality, 
redistribution and social citizenship. 
So far, this thesis has illustrated that those experiencing poverty and affluence 
tend to develop distinctive frames of reference that inform attitudes towards 
socio-structural dynamics, social citizenship and inequality. Whilst patterned 
value systems and ideological orientations may arise out of these distinctive 
frames of reference, this is neither necessary nor sufficient to conclude that 
being poor makes you left wing or being rich makes you right wing.  Of course, 
lived experiences and political views are entirely distinct categories of 
phenomenology and ideology. This chapter does not seek to conflate these 
two dimensions of socio-political life. Rather, it aims to explore the possible 
means by which to tackle poverty and inequality given the distinctive frames 
of references shaped by and shaping welfare policies and citizenship 
practices.  
Reflecting on the determinants of attitudinal divergence, this chapter explores 
how public attitudes can be ‘engineered’ to galvanise popular support for 
tackling poverty and inequality. To say that ‘solidarity’ or ‘recognition of mutual 
vulnerability’ can offer a challenge and tool to tackle deprivation is true 
(Turner, 2006; Taylor-Gooby, 2013a) but the general public first need to be 
effectively sensitised to the causes of as well as the effects of deprivation. By 
making the structural determinants of disadvantage clear to the general public, 
it is possible to constructively deliberate the means and ends of social 
citizenship and policy. This chapter starts by exploring the relationship 
between public attitudes and policy and then turns to examine the roots of 
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attitudinal disagreement around poverty and inequality. The following section 
reflects upon what is known about the determinants of difference and 
suggests how support for tackling poverty and inequality can be strengthened 
given what is known. The chapter closes by discussing what implications this 
has for the health and efficacy of social citizenship in a democratic, 
institutional and procedural capacity. 
8.2 The relationship between public attitudes and policy 
Public attitudes are one of the most widely researched topics in the social 
sciences (Brannon, 1976; Summers, 1977). Underlying a great deal of 
research in this area is a belief that there is a necessary and valuable 
correlation between the views of the general public and the actions and effects 
of public institutions (Backett-Milburn et al., 2003). As discussed in chapter 
two, an operational dynamic between attitudes and policy can be seen as the 
right and act of political citizenship (Bellamy, 2008). Citizen-centred policy 
enhances the political legitimacy of state action and reflects the institutional 
and democratic health of social citizenship (Dahl, 1973). However, some have 
problematized this relationship to suggest that attitudes are not necessarily a 
constructive dictate of policy and neither are they efficacious for achieving 
progressive social policy objectives (Bartels, 2005; Kelly and Enns, 2010). 
Attitudes antithetical to tackling poverty and inequality serve as a case in point 
that present challenges to policymakers, practitioners and academics (Taylor-
Gooby, 2013a). Whilst the link between attitudes and public policy should be 
critically considered, it is equally important to examine this relationship for all 
its instrumental worth. Certain public attitudes may or may not be conducive 
to tackling poverty and inequality, but if their bearing on public policy can be 
better understood, their influence on the political and policymaking processes 
can be enhanced, minimised or reformulated accordingly.  
Between 1997 and 2010, attitudes of the general public were increasingly 
integrated into the policymaking process in the UK. During this period there 
was a significant growth in ‘new ways of engaging in dialogue with citizens’ 
through polling, co-production, market research, public consultations and e-
participation strategies (Barnes et al., 2004: 270; Clarke, 2005). Alongside 
this, a litany of National Performance Indicators (NIs) were outlined in 2008 
(Audit Commission, 2011). NIs quantified and tracked the performance of 
public services and institutions and a significant minority of these were based 
on the attitudes and subjective impressions of the general public. Not only did 
this increase the accountability of public institutions but it also strengthened 
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the link between public attitudes and policymaking. Whilst attitudes expressed 
by the general public may not always be reflected in policy outcomes, public 
attitudes have played an increasingly prominent role in the policymaking 
process since 1997 (Bochel et al., 2008). Since 2010, a number of NIs have 
been scrapped, including many constructed from the attitudes and 
impressions of the general public. In some respects, this signifies a weakening 
of the link between attitudes and public policy (e.g. Jacobs and Shapiro, 
2000). Overall though, a growth in public participation and deliberative 
initiatives has intended to facilitate ‘democratic renewal’ (Barnett, 2002) and 
create accountable and responsive public services (Cabinet Office, 1999; 
Cabinet Office, 2014). 
These measures rest on an assumption that democratic structures enable a 
polity to affect institutional governance and the outcomes of social citizenship. 
Many have questioned whether these structures are suitably equipped or 
genuinely attentive to the needs and desires of the polity (SCIE, 2004; 
Williams, 2004). Others have demonstrated how attitudes and behaviours are 
actually shaped (and on occasion, regulated) by political and policymaking 
processes (Brooks, 1985; Barnett, 2002; Hacker, 2002). Having said that, it is 
perfectly possible that there is a mutual relationship between attitudes and 
policy whereby each shapes, reshapes and challenges the other. At present, 
there is some contestation over the nature and strength of the relationship 
between attitudes and public policies (Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005). This 
section explores that relationship to consider what can be established about 
the drivers and effects of policies designed (and in many instances, failing) to 
tackle poverty and inequality.  
Hills (2002) succinctly asks whether public policy is ‘following or leading public 
opinion’. The findings from his own analysis suggest there is generally a high 
level of correspondence between the attitudes of the general public and a raft 
of social security policies implemented under New Labour (Hills, 2002). Since 
then, a strong (and growing) body of evidence has demonstrated the 
‘importance of public opinion in explaining the evolution and sustainability of 
welfare states’ (Horton and Gregory, 2009: 76). Controlling for endogenous 
and exogenous factors, many of these studies are cross-national and 
demonstrate the strong predictive capacity of attitudes in shaping the nature 
and extent of activity across welfare regimes (Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005; 
Brooks and Manza, 2006; Wlezien and Soroka, 2012). Brooks and Manza 
(2006) argue that this explains the persistence of welfare state activity in spite 
of exigent pressures on post-industrial economies. However, many have 
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recognised the shifting focus of welfare, with retrenchment in some policy 
domains accompanied by expansion in others (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1994). 
Given the divergence in attitudes towards cash entitlements and public 
services (Lipsey, 1979; Wendt et al., 2011), it is important to make a distinction 
between transfer-orientated and service-orientated welfare activity (Kautto, 
2002; Swank, 2002; Bambra, 2005), so as to not oversimplify or overstate the 
relationship between policy and attitudes (Burstein, 2006). 
It is well established that there tends to be an electoral mandate for policy 
choices implemented by political administrations (e.g. Stimson et al., 1995; 
Harker, 2006; Page and Shapiro, 2010). However, less is known about the 
circumstances and conditions required for attitudes to affect policy change.  In 
this sense, attitudes are somewhat ‘ethereal, an invisible hand that guides and 
constrains policymaking across the political cycle’, but not in a systematic or 
predictable way (Horton and Gregory, 2009: 79). Whilst a relationship 
between attitudes and policy has been identified, there is less certainty about 
what enables and disables this relationship. Various studies have attempted 
to clarify how the attitudes-policy nexus can be affected. Based on their 
findings, three key inferences can be garnered from these studies. Firstly, the 
extent to which the public respond to policy domains determines the level of 
influence they have over political and policy direction. There tends to be a 
more direct relationship between policy preferences and change when the 
issue at hand is considered of ‘public importance’ (Wlezien, 2004). Of course, 
by their nature, all policy issues are of ‘public importance’, but they are not 
always publicly recognised as such. Policy areas that receive media, political 
and public attention are most likely to be affected by attitudes (Burstein, 2006). 
As a result, how socio-economic and political issues are framed will determine 
how and whether public attitudes towards inequality shape political and policy 
decision-making (e.g. Prabhakar, 2008). Soroka and Lim (2003) demonstrate 
that ‘issue definition’ alters the salience of policy domains and thus the 
strength of the relationship between public attitudes and policy decisions.  
Secondly, the opinion-policy link appears to be greatly affected by ‘the 
structuring role of institutions’ (Soroka and Wlezien, 2005: 665). Where 
political responsibility and accountability are diffuse, there is a weaker 
relationship between attitudes and policy decisions. Where the locus of 
responsibility is clear and direct, attitudes have a much more significant 
bearing on the policy process. Policy responsiveness tends to be higher in 
proportional democracies than it is in majoritarian democracies such as the 
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UK where ‘large parliamentary majorities make the governments more 
insulated from public pressure’ (Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005: 397).  
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the efficacy of political and procedural 
representation shapes the development and responsiveness of public policy. 
There is an assumption that ‘democracy is the continued responsiveness of 
the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political 
equals’ (Dahl, 1973: 1; Beitz, 1989). However, attitudes of the general public 
are not uniformly attended to. Evidence suggests policy shifts tend to reflect 
the policy preferences of those with a higher social or economic status (Gilens, 
2005; Bartels, 2006; Gilens, 2009; Giger et al., 2012; Kulin and Svallfors, 
2013). This representational bias is significant because there are clear 
attitudinal cleavages between socio-economic and cultural groups. Despite 
demonstrating a lack of attitudinal difference across a variety of policy 
domains, Soroka and Wlezien (2008) find that there are clear differences in 
attitudes towards welfare, poverty and inequality according to income and 
education. This corroborates much of the attitudinal research discussed in 
chapter five. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the attitudes of politically engaged 
citizens tend to have a greater impact on public policy than the attitudes of 
those that are less engaged (Griffin and Newman, 2005; Adams and Ezrow, 
2009). This goes some way to explain the high level of inequality in policy 
responsiveness that compromises a consistent link between the attitudes of 
all citizens and the actions of political administrations. Given the stratification 
of policy preferences and political representation, efforts to tackle poverty and 
inequality may be hindered rather than helped by the attitudes-policy dynamic.  
In a review of attitudinal data, Orton and Rowlingson (2007: 41) find that ‘there 
is certainly no evidence that people see the income gap in the UK positively, 
nor do they believe it is necessary for the country’s prosperity’. However, there 
appears to be incongruence between the beliefs and policy preferences of the 
general public (Bartels, 2005; Hedges, 2005; Roosma et al., 2013). In spite of 
increasing poverty and inequality, there has been a gradual reduction in 
support for ‘spending on the poor’ and a gradual increase in the belief that 
‘benefits are too high’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2013a). Having said that, there is also 
evidence to suggest that there is growing concern about income inequality 
and increasing support for government intervention (Rowlingson et al., 2010b; 
Park et al., 2013). These ostensibly contradictory findings are drawn from the 
same dataset (British Social Attitudes Survey) but focus on different questions 
to gauge public opinion towards welfare, poverty and inequality over time. 
Similarly to others, Rowlingson et al. (2010b) suggest that the framing of 
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questions is particularly important for explaining different levels of support: 
references to ‘the poor’, ‘poverty’ and ‘redistribution’ tend to reduce support 
for government intervention.  
Many have suggested that New Labour undertook a strategy of ‘redistribution 
by stealth’ and ‘selective universalism’ in an attempt to go with what they 
understood to be the grain of public opinion (e.g. Sefton, 2005). However, 
some have suggested that New Labour could have gone much further given 
the support for redistribution expressed by the general public (Hills, 2002). 
Whilst many claim welfare attitudes have hardened, the Coalition government 
and current Conservative government appear much further out of step with 
public opinion when it comes to questions of poverty, inequality and welfare. 
Since the ‘Great Recession’, support for redistribution has increased, 
concerns about income inequality have grown, and a greater proportion of 
people agree that the government should spend more on benefits (as 
demonstrated in section 8.4).  
In spite of this, the Conservative government remains committed to a 
reduction in social security expenditure for certain groups and a battery of 
welfare reforms. In an attempt to cultivate a political and public mandate, the 
Conservative government has framed the issue of welfare reform in terms of 
fiscal burden and drawn upon questions of desert and fairness (Edmiston, 
2014a). ‘Scrounging’ became the welfare issue of choice and media 
representations drew upon cultural stereotypes of the poor fostering a 
heightened climate of stigma attached to certain forms of social security 
receipt (Baumberg et al., 2012; Garland, 2015). This appeared to temporarily 
reduce public support for tackling poverty and inequality, but since then, public 
support has recovered, albeit with a radically different character (Pearce and 
Taylor, 2013). 
This demonstrates the resilience of public support for tackling inequality 
through welfare (Mau, 2001), but it also highlights the capacity for political 
rhetoric, policymaking and the media to affect the attitudes of the general 
public. Based on national and cross-national studies, there appears to be a 
degree of policy feedback whereby attitudes and policy preferences are 
affected by and constructed in relation to political action (Wlezien, 1995; 
Soroka and Wlezien, 2005; Wlezien and Soroka, 2012). Wlezien’s 
‘thermostatic model’ (Wlezien, 1995) suggests that there is a reciprocal 
relationship between public opinion and policy: as political administrations 
increase efforts and spending in a particular policy domain, support for 
spending in that area tends to decrease. Correspondingly, as governments 
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reduce welfare efforts, public demand for government activity increases. 
Whilst there is considerable evidence that demonstrates the ‘attitude-forming 
effects of institutions’ (Svallfors, 2010), it is not entirely clear that this 
relationship is always ‘thermostatic’.  
In certain instances, increased spending on welfare institutions and services 
can increase public support for poverty alleviation and redistribution (Jaeger, 
2006). Patterned attitudinal differences have been observed as a result of 
welfare regime outputs and activities (Svallfors, 1997). For example, the 
visibility and informational role of welfare institutions appears to cultivate a 
more consistent set of policy preferences that place welfare related issues 
high on the political agenda (Gingrich, 2014). In addition, welfare provision 
can also determine how individual characteristics and circumstances inform 
policy preferences (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012). Whilst some studies have not 
found a link between welfare activity and attitude formation (Papadakis and 
Bean, 1993; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003), more methodologically and 
conceptually refined studies suggest that ‘welfare regimes affect both the 
mean and the variance in public support for redistribution’ (Jæger, 2009: 12). 
Jæger (2009) finds that attitudes can be rank-ordered and explained 
according to welfare regime types, with conservative and social democratic 
welfare regimes expressing higher levels of support for redistribution and 
liberal welfare regimes indicating the lowest level of support. Similarly, Larsen 
(2007) offers an ‘institutional explanation’ of attitude formation: he suggests 
that differences in regime characteristics intervene on attitudes towards 
deservingness that, in turn, affect popular support for redistribution and 
poverty alleviation. From this, it is reasonable to conclude that the extent and 
nature of support for tackling poverty and inequality is shaped, at least in part, 
by the architecture and experience of welfare policy (Hacker, 2002)3. 
A recent study (Valentine, 2015) found that welfare reforms in the UK are 
reinforcing class prejudice and reducing support for redistributive policies. In 
this regard, there is potentially a ‘policy ratchet’ effect where progressive or 
regressive policies gain public support. From this basis, successive political 
administrations are compelled to work with the grain of public opinion and 
 
3 Of course, this is not to say that the UK always fits comfortably within the liberal 
welfare regime typology it is regularly assigned. Due to relatively high levels of 
social expenditure in certain areas and social insurance based systems of social 
security, the UK has also been identified as both a ‘hybrid’ and ‘Christian-
democratic’ welfare regime (Conservative) (Ebbinghaus, 2012). 
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continue with policies that may not sit well with partisan politics (Huber and 
Stephens, 2001; Ball, 2008; MacCoun, 2014).  
This reciprocal relationship can best be explained by the structuring function 
of governmental action. Welfare policies and institutions have the capacity to 
shape: 
the contexts in which people make subsequent judgements about 
welfare policy. Institutions can align or de-align the interests of 
particular groups in society, they can impose particular social identities 
on individuals and groups, they can mould the social relationships 
between individuals and groups, and they can help to generate social 
norms about fairness. Through these dynamics, they play a significant 
part in constructing and sustaining the very attitudes which, in turn, 
sustain them (Horton and Gregory, 2009: 81). 
Social policy can create, moderate or sustain socio-economic divisions. Policy 
preferences are not autonomous - they are constructed and mediated in 
relation to this phenomenon. As social divisions arise or dissipate, so do 
attitudinal cleavages around poverty and inequality. This process could be 
seen as a functional fallout of policymaking, but some have suggested that it 
is part of a ‘manipulative’ attempt to maintain a public mandate for 
ideologically-driven reforms (Hewitt, 1974; Brooks, 1985; Garland, 2015). 
Political and policy handling of ‘public issues’ shape attitudes and therefore 
determines the extent to which policymakers are constrained by the 
electorate. Misnomers and tactics of distraction and misdirection often 
characterise the execution of welfare reform (Kuklinski et al., 2000). Political 
administrations have regularly drawn upon narratives of social and moral 
breakdown, ‘irresponsibility’ and unemployment as a supply-side issue to 
justify increased conditionality and cuts to social security entitlement (Hancock 
and Mooney, 2013). The Conservative party have drawn upon this tactic 
particularly heavily since 2010. This may, in part, explain increased concerns 
about the deservingness of low-income social security claimants (Baumberg 
et al., 2012) and a purported (if only temporary) ‘hardening’ of attitudes 
towards welfare (Kearns, 2014).  
From the above discussion, it is clear that there is a dialectical relationship 
between attitudes and policy that becomes difficult to disentangle. 
Researchers are reluctant to assign causality but there is an emerging 
consensus that ‘public opinion tends to drive policymaking rather than vice 
versa’ (Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005: 380). Importantly though, public 
sentiment and support for tackling poverty and inequality can also be affected 
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by political discourse, action and institutions. Whilst policies negotiate 
between the attitudinal cleavages of a given polity, they are equally 
accountable for sustaining such differences. With this in mind, the following 
section explores the extent to which the policy and political debate concerning 
poverty and inequality has become entrenched.  
8.3 Poor debate: entrenched attitudes towards poverty and 
inequality 
Overall, the majority of the general public are against poverty and excessive 
inequality as a matter of principle (Coughlin, 1980; Kumlin, 2007; Park et al., 
2013). However, those on the left and right of the political spectrum differ 
dramatically in how they view and understand these phenomena (Park et al., 
2007). In fact, the Left and the Right quite consistently disagree on almost all 
questions surrounding poverty and inequality. They disagree on causes and 
effects, on policy solutions, and on the role and responsibility of individuals, 
government and the market (Park et al., 2007; Hickson, 2009; Pew Research 
Center, 2014). This discord arises out of competing ideological, moral and 
social priorities (Taylor-Gooby and Hastie, 2003). In many ways, these two 
‘sides’ are diametrically opposed in terms of how they believe the world should 









Table 9: Differences in attitudes by political affiliation 
 The Left The Right 
Poverty   
Causes Structural Individual 
Personal 
effects Infringement of rights Moral corruption 
National 
effects Social fissures Social breakdown 
Solution Redistribute & regulate market Labour supply initiatives 
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Inequality    
Causes Structural Individual and Functional 
Personal 
effects Creates disincentives Creates incentives 
National 
effects 
Poorer health, education, 
social relations, crime & 
social mobility 
Necessary & good for growth 
Solution  Redistribute & regulate market Support & equip market 
Social 
Security   







Control, Stigma by virtue of 
design, conditional De-commodification 
NB: There are a broad range of causes, effects and solutions proffered by both 
the Left and the Right. This table is intended to capture the tendencies, rather 
than the diversity of public opinion by political affiliation. 
As a result of these differences, the Left and the Right have reached 
something of a political and moral stalemate. Manichaean-like public and 
political discourse has fossilised the ethical and pragmatic debates 
surrounding poverty and inequality. Intense vilification has alienated and 
strengthened the resolve of both ‘sides’ with neither camp willing to accept nor 
listen to the concerns of the other (Ditto and Koleva, 2011). Attitudes have 
become hermetic – impervious to rational argument and consideration. 
Constructive deliberation is only possible through the verification and 
discussion of facts, but the manipulation of information is endemic in poverty 
and inequality debates (Taylor‐Gooby et al., 2003; White, 2013). Whilst the 
majority of people agree that that poverty and excessive inequality is a bad 
thing, there is much less agreement about how best to tackle it. Without 
collective commitment for policies designed to tackle deprivation, political 
administrations are less accountable for and thus responsive to the problem 
of poverty and inequality.  
In The Righteous Mind Jonathan Haidt (2012) argues that both those on the 
left and right want to ‘make the world a better place’, but that they have very 
different ideas about what this might look like and what it would and should 
take to make it happen. Drawing on a battery of moral and social psychology 
experiments, Haidt (2012) demonstrates that there are notable moral 
differences between the Left (liberals) and the Right (conservatives) across 
and within cultures4. For example, conservatives tend to exhibit lower levels 
 
4 Haidt also observes a moral distinction between libertarians and social 
conservatives which, for the sake of brevity, cannot be discussed here. 
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of empathy than liberals and are thus less likely to be concerned with 
questions of poverty, suffering and oppression (Davis, 1983; McCue and 
Gopoian, 2000; Iyer et al., 2012). However, this is not because questions of 
social justice do not concern conservatives. Rather, their ‘moral matrix’ 
fundamentally differs from that of liberals. According to Haidt (2012), there are 
six key moral foundations that underpin political and social attitudes. These 
are principles of: care/harm; fairness/reciprocity; in-group loyalty /betrayal; 
authority/respect; sanctity/purity and liberty/oppression. Self-identified liberals 
are much more likely to build their moral foundations on principles of care, 
social fairness, and liberty. The strongest and most consistent of these 
principles is based on caring for victims of oppression (Graham et al., 2009). 
The moral foundations of self-identified conservatives tend to be more diverse 
but principally centre on loyalty to one’s own group, deference to authority and 
purity of the self (Graham et al., 2009). Broadly speaking, conservatives care 
about institutions and tradition – they see social, moral and economic stability 
as necessary even if it comes at the expense of those at the bottom. By 
contrast, liberals are much less concerned about stability and are open to 
change – their policy preferences tend to prioritise the needs of marginalised 
groups even if this reduces the overall utility of the polity (McAdams et al., 
2008; Haidt, 2012).  
Haidt (2012) suggests that divergence in the moral foundations of liberals and 
conservatives can be explained by how these two political enclaves conceive 
of human nature. Despite evidence to the contrary (Henrich et al., 2001), 
conservatives tend take a homo economicus view of human nature. They see 
constraints, divisions, and institutions as a necessary mechanism that 
regulates and fosters social cooperation. This ensures that people do not free-
ride, cheat or act in a way that is detrimental to the collective. Without this, 
conservatives believe that self-interested instincts would damage moral and 
social capital (Graham et al., 2009). Liberals on the other hand, tend to take a 
more optimistic view of human nature. They believe that citizens, if left to their 
own devices, would flourish, assume responsibility and choose to cooperate 
for the benefit of the collective (Graham et al., 2009). 
These observed differences come some way to explain why those on opposite 
sides of the political spectrum struggle to understand, let alone agree with, the 
attitudes and concerns of the other. Haidt (2012) argues that this hyper-
partisanship inhibits the opportunity to constructively deliberate political 
issues. He suggests that partisans are stuck in a ‘moral matrix’: 
- 193 - 
Morality binds and blinds. It binds us into ideological teams that fight 
each other as though the fate of the world depended on our side 
winning each battle. It blinds us to the fact that each team is composed 
of good people who have something important to say  (Haidt, 2012: 
313). 
Initially, Haidt (2012: 288) wanted to use ‘research on moral psychology to 
help liberals win’, but he rather unsatisfactorily concludes that we should all 
simply agree to ‘disagree more constructively’. In spite of the conceptual tools 
he develops and the empirical findings of his research, he offers little 
indication of what ‘constructive disagreement’ might look like or how one might 
arrive at it. Whilst there may be some broader validity to his claim concerning 
the democratic health and vitality of social politics, he fails to account for the 
exigent power dynamics already at play that inhibit a ‘respectful and 
constructive yin-yang disagreement’ (Haidt, 2012: 312). As previously stated, 
there is a representational bias in the political and policymaking process that 
privileges those with greater capital and those on the right of the political 
spectrum. Haidt’s (2012) utopian vision of disagreement does not 
acknowledge the role of power in politics that impedes any prospect of 
complementarity. He also fails to recognise that certain issues may not be 
effectively advanced or resolved through bi-partisan deliberation. Whilst 
certain areas of ‘public policy might be improved by drawing on insights from 
all sides’ (Haidt, 2012: 295), there are equally policy domains that may be 
considered less appropriate for this approach. Effective redress of poverty and 
inequality necessitates redistribution of capital either during or after market 
processes. Those on the right of the political spectrum are less likely to 
consider poverty, suffering or marginalisation a moral priority. Equally, their 
policy preferences are derived through lived experiences and assumptions 
about human nature that reduce rather than increase support for antipoverty 
policies. Given the correlation between power, capital and political interest, it 
may also be reasonably assumed that the input of those on the right of the 
political spectrum hinders rather than assists effective policy development in 
this area.  
In spite of all this, a number of observations can be made from Haidt’s (2012) 
research. Not only in terms of how to disrupt the current political deadlock 
surrounding poverty and inequality, but also how to shift debates in a direction 
that might galvanise public support for tackling deprivation. Given the discrete 
moral concerns of those on the left and right, it may reasonably be assumed 
that disagreement and political polarisation on the issue of poverty and 
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inequality is inevitable. However, there are a number of ways in which poverty 
and inequality can be framed to cut across the concerns of those of the Left 
and the Right. In The Spirit Level,  Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) demonstrate 
that greater income inequality is associated with poorer social, economic and 
civic outcomes. Despite methodological criticism (e.g. Goldthorpe, 2010; 
Snowdon, 2010), the research has received a great deal of bipartisan policy 
and political attention. The authors suggest that societies with greater income 
equality tend to have better health, education and crime outcomes, stronger 
social relations and greater social mobility, trust and cohesion. Whilst 
questions of care and social fairness were a principle motivation of the study 
(Wilkinson and Pickett, 2014), The Spirit Level does not focus solely on these 
aspects of inequality. The authors also explore how inequality affects loyalty 
and authority and the functional legitimacy and stability of the existing 
socioeconomic order. As a result, Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) successfully 
frame the matter of inequality as a bipartisan issue that resonates, even if 
those considering it are focused on very different matters. This approach has 
proven successful: the thrust of the argument and findings of the study have 
been widely cited by senior political leaders, politicians and policymakers at 
both the national and international level (Devichand, 2010).  
Haidt (2012) demonstrates that proportionality matters across the political 
spectrum - both those on the left and right have strong intuitions about 
principles of reciprocity. However, each side tends to focus on the unearned 
resources of only one end of the income distribution. The Left tends to focus 
on the problem of the ‘undeserving rich’ and their purportedly unjust 
accumulation of capital (Rowlingson and Connor, 2011). Those on the right 
tend to focus on the ‘undeserving poor’ and their ostensible lack of contribution 
to wider society (Duncan Smith, 2013). At the core, is a common concern – 
this is simply directed at different groups. By sensitising the Right to the 
unearned resources received by those at the top, it has been possible to put 
inequality on the political, and at times policy agenda. The accumulation of 
wealth by those in the top 1% of the income distribution has received 
widespread attention and has been recognised as a socioeconomic quandary 
for political administrations – not only in terms of its repercussions for social 
justice but, due to profit shifting and base erosion, also its implications for 
economic growth and the financial sustainability of welfare programmes 
(McCall, 2013; Ostry et al., 2014; Soroka and Wlezien, 2014). It is now widely 
accepted that ‘getting filthy rich’ (Peter Mandelson quoted in Lister, 2011: 72) 
is a policy problem. 
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These two examples demonstrate how poverty and inequality can be 
discussed in a way that transcends and shifts existing political debate. An 
appreciation of the moral foundations that motivate partisan attitudes offers 
some indication of what will and will not be successful in attempting to increase 
public support for tackling deprivation. Emphasising the importance of care 
and social fairness will not resonate for those principally concerned with 
questions of authority, loyalty and stability. Equally, claims that we are all 
mutually vulnerable and interdependent in a system governed by the structural 
determinants of socio-economic outcome and agency will have little currency 
for those with such divergent life narratives and attitudes. Arguments 
conceived from an ‘ethic of care’, ‘solidarity’ or ‘mutual vulnerability’ 
(Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Turner, 2006; Torry, 2013) can make little progress in 
this regard. Those with attitudes subverting the objective of tackling poverty 
and inequality are resistant to these arguments for two reasons: their differing 
moral foundations and their lived experiences. Strategies that attempt to 
bridge across the moral priorities of left and right are particularly effective, as 
are issues that draw upon common bipartisan intuitions about reciprocity. 
However, there are inevitably limits to these approaches. If sustainable and 
constructive public support for anti-deprivation policies is to be generated, 
those with divergent attitudes need to be effectively sensitised to the structural 
causes of poverty and inequality. Moral foundations hinge on the life 
narratives and world system beliefs of individuals (Haidt, 2012). If these are 
challenged, it becomes possible to re-orientate the moral priorities of those 
who do not view poverty, suffering or oppression as a policy priority in the UK.  
8.4 Learning lessons from attitudinal divergence: galvanising 
public support for tackling deprivation 
Despite a widening gap between those at the top and bottom, there has not 
been ‘a proportionate response in popular attitudes, discourse or party politics’ 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2013a: 36). Mindful of the attitudes-policy nexus, Taylor-
Gooby (2013) suggests that this limits the range of policy options available to 
address poverty, inequality and unemployment. Given what is already known 
about the determinants of attitudinal difference, there are a number of ways in 
which public support for tackling poverty and inequality can be enhanced. This 
section considers five key factors affecting conceptions of social citizenship 
and proposes a range of measures that could help increase awareness of 
structured inequalities and galvanise public commitment to tackling 
deprivation. 
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Firstly, as discussed in chapter six and seven, the existing evidence suggests 
that the (non-) evaluative knowledge and information an individual possesses 
greatly affects their attitudes towards poverty and inequality. Support for 
redistribution and poverty alleviation is mediated by whether people attribute 
disadvantage to structural or individual factors (e.g. Bullock et al., 2003). In 
liberal welfare regimes such as the UK, there is a tendency to pathologise 
poverty and rationalise wealth (Woods et al., 2005; Tagler and Cozzarelli, 
2013). There is a propensity to believe that those who have ‘failed’ and 
‘succeeded’, have done so as a result of their own doing. Underlying this 
attitude is a belief that the existing citizenship configuration is conducive to 
socio-economic and cultural mobility (McNamee, 2009). However, when 
individuals experience or are confronted by the structural determinants of 
deprivation, they are more likely to express positive attitudes towards welfare 
recipients, draw upon systemic explanations of disadvantage and exhibit 
greater support for measures that tackle the causes and effects of deprivation 
(Reutter et al., 2006a; Owens and Pedulla, 2014). For example, subjective job 
insecurity increases demand for redistribution (Marx, 2014) and structural or 
fatalistic explanations of poverty induce greater support for social security 
(Niemelä, 2008). It appears then that ‘preferences for redistribution are 
malleable, rather than fixed’ (Owens and Pedulla, 2014: 1087) and lived 
experiences profoundly shape popular attitudes.  
With rising poverty and inequality, median voters are becoming increasingly 
divorced from the reality and causes of deprivation (Rodger, 2003). Bailey et 
al. (2013: 3) suggest that residential segregation has reduced ‘the knowledge 
accumulated in daily life’ that increases support for tackling social and 
economic divisions.  
If you are rich and the gap between you and the poor you see around 
you is so vast that no calamity you can imagine befalling you will put 
you into their circumstances, then any prudential reasons you might 
have for improving their lot disappear (Shapiro, 2002: 120). 
Without awareness and knowledge accumulated about the realities of 
deprivation, it is likely that social citizenship practices are set to become 
increasingly exclusionary. 
Egalitarian theorists and researchers have stressed the role of education in 
tackling inequalities (e.g. Tawney, 1964). In and beyond the classroom, the 
dissemination and appraisal of knowledge has the capacity to both propagate 
and moderate inequalities – not only in terms of outcomes, but also 
dialogically in the attitudes and expectations of individuals (Beckett, 2009). 
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The provision and distribution of detailed non-partisan information about the 
structural determinants of socio-economic outcome and agency is a crucial 
first step in challenging existing attitudes. With this in mind, the exploration 
and understanding of systemic disadvantage is a core project. However, a 
detailed examination and appreciation of structured inequalities is required at 
both ends of the societal spectrum. As demonstrated in recent years, the rise 
of ‘poverty porn’ runs the danger of desensitising the public, patronising the 
poor and misrepresenting the nature of deprivation (Jensen, 2014). It is of 
course important for people to understand the processes and mechanisms 
that result in periodic or perpetual disadvantage. In conjunction though, it is 
equally, if not more important, to raise public awareness about the inheritance 
and transference of privilege, wealth and ‘success’. Without this, the 
dissemination of information about structural disadvantage may well prove 
innocuous to the established order and runs the danger of reproducing anti-
welfare attitudes. Structured inequalities are not only propagated by but are 
reflected in educational, health and socio-economic outcomes (cf. Hills et al., 
2010). Public education of this fact has the capacity to encourage critical self-
reflection so that people reconceive of their own position, actions and 
outcomes, but also that of others marginalised and validated by the current 
citizenship praxis.  
The second factor affecting conceptions of social citizenship is that, whilst 
people are generally aware of rising poverty and inequality, a growing body of 
research suggests that the general public are highly misinformed about it and 
the policy solutions deemed feasible as a result. The UK general public tend 
to grossly overestimate and misunderstand the costs of welfare activity, social 
security expenditure, benefit fraud and expenditure on the unemployed and 
single parents (Taylor-Gooby, 2008; Horton and Gregory, 2009; Baumberg et 
al., 2012; TUC, 2013). They also overestimate the progressivity of welfare 
provision, expenditure and taxation (Taylor-Gooby, 2013b). When there is 
stratification in the treatment of different groups by the welfare system, people 
tend to recognise greater generosity to the middle classes but neglect the 
privation caused for lower income groups (Wilson et al., 2012). 
Media coverage and political rhetoric play a significant role in shaping these 
knowledge gaps and drawing a distinction between deserving and 
undeserving recipients of state assistance (Golding and Middleton, 1982; 
McKendrick, 2008; Dean, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2013a). The manipulation and 
misappropriation of information in welfare discourse overplays the fiscal 
burden of social security and mischaracterises the root causes of deprivation 
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(Garthwaite, 2011). In turn, this can lead to ‘collective preferences that are far 
different from those that would exist if people were correctly informed’ 
(Kuklinski et al., 2000: 790). Trust in the legitimacy and efficiency of public 
institutions leads to higher support for direct and indirect taxation (Torgler and 
Schneider, 2006). Inaccurate and misleading information decreases support 
for institutional action as it is seen as ineffectual in tackling poverty and 
complicit in transgressing societal norms of self-reliance and hard work (Kelly 
and Enns, 2010; Likki and Staerklé, 2015). Debunking ‘welfare myths’ about 
the means, costs, and effects of welfare helps improve knowledge about the 
causes of poverty and inequality and in turn the suitability of pre-distribution, 
redistribution and poverty alleviation (Class, 2013). Proactively challenging 
the use, abuse and misdirection of information around welfare and inequality 
can ‘change that knowledge in order to make more progressive policies 
possible’ (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2003: 19). 
Although the poor are more likely to recognise the systemic causes of 
disadvantage than the rich, both groups are similarly aware of rising poverty 
and inequality. Between 2006 and 2013, the proportion of the British public 
that believed poverty was increasing doubled (from 32 to 64 per cent) 
(Baumberg, 2014: 28). Between 2007 and 2012, the proportion believing that 
the income gap was too large rose from 76 to 82 per cent (Pearce and Taylor, 
2013: 60). From this, Pearce and Taylor (2013: 41) infer that there is ‘a 
widespread and enduring view that the income gap is too large, and 
considerable support for the proposition that the government should reduce 
income differences’. However, despite increasing concern about poverty and 
inequality, support for policies to tackle it do not appear to have shifted 
correspondingly. Between 2007 and 2012, the proportion agreeing that the 
government should redistribute income only rose from 32 to 41 per cent 
(Pearce and Taylor, 2013). This typifies a marked discrepancy between 
recognition of inequality as a policy problem and support for policy solutions. 
For example, between 2010 and 2014, the proportion of the population 
agreeing that cutting welfare benefits would damage too many people’s lives 
rose from 42 to 46 per cent and the proportion believing the government 
should spend more on welfare benefits rose slightly from 29 to 30 per cent 
(Taylor-Gooby and Taylor, 2015: 24). This incongruity is perhaps explained 
by how these policy problems are framed and handled by the media, public 
institutions and political discourse.  
This leads us to the third factor contributing towards attitudinal divergence. 
Institutional responses to socioeconomic events have the capacity to shape 
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attitudes and thus support for tackling inequality (Horton and Gregory, 2009). 
Mechanisms that attempt to tackle the structural causes of poverty and 
inequality in a covert way are particularly problematic in this instance. Working 
tax credits are one such example of social security policy that attempts to 
moderate rather than directly tackle inequalities arising out of the market. 
Some have argued that such strategies, including ‘redistribution by stealth’, 
work with the grain of public opinion (Hills, 2002; Lansley, 2014). However, 
whilst these activities may produce short-term and piecemeal results, they 
concomitantly fail to sensitise the general public to the structural causes of 
inequity. This makes it particularly difficult to justify and make the case for 
significant welfare expenditure and state intervention in times of fiscal 
austerity. For example, means-tested tax credits for low-income groups raise 
public consciousness in a narrow way that fails to offer a systemic explanation 
and response to a systemic problem. Whilst some active labour market 
policies more effectively engage with and attend to shifts in the production 
base and relations of a national economy, others tend to frame structural 
unemployment, almost exclusively, as a supply-side issue. This falls short of 
effectively responding to and framing exigent pressures facing post-industrial 
welfare systems. 
Without social policies that offer structural solutions to structurally determined 
poverty and inequality, progress is likely to be fragmented and ineffectual in 
the long term. Policies that attempt to directly intervene in socioeconomic 
processes tend to be politically controversial. However, if delivered and 
pitched appropriately, they have the capacity to highlight universal social risks, 
underline principles of mutualism and raise public consciousness about their 
necessity. By engineering social proximity and affinity between individuals 
from different socioeconomic groups, welfare institutions and policies are able 
to engineer compassion and a duty of virtue between fellow citizens (Gregory, 
2015). 
Social policies operate in a dialectic with societal values, ideological traditions 
and social divisions (Pfau-Effinger, 2005). Attitudes are not entirely 
determined by independent cognitive processes - social, political and 
economic context also play a significant role. These situational factors define 
and confine public support for tackling deprivation and welfare state 
intervention. Social and economic conditions have the capacity to (de-) 
sensitise the public to social risks and this appears to factor in their belief 
systems and attitudes. For example, in periods of high unemployment, support 
for redistribution and public assistance generally tends to increase 
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(Blekesaune, 2007). How political administrations choose to respond to such 
societal challenges will be predicated on a range of factors but ‘the 
understanding and articulation of these problems influences public attitudes 
towards welfare policies as well as toward specified groups of recipients’ 
(Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003: 425). Institutional (in-)action then frames 
the nature of social and economic ‘problems’ and can challenge or resonate 
with the attitudes of the general public. Within a liberal welfare regime such as 
the UK, the dynamic between attitudes and responses to deprivation can 
become mutually reinforcing so that there is a downward spiral in support for 
tackling poverty and inequality (Kelly and Enns, 2010). The increasing 
individualisation of poverty in public policy could be said to both follow and 
define the existing contours of public opinion (Hills, 2002).  
In the UK, the institutional and ideological legacy of social policy is reflected 
in a system of residual means-tested benefits for low-income groups and 
higher contributory payments for those engaged in decently remunerated 
work. This perhaps explains why support for welfare spending tends to be 
much higher in social democratic welfare regimes than in liberal welfare 
systems where the framing of and responses to social problems are so 
markedly different (Svallfors, 1997; Niemelä, 2008). In liberal welfare regimes, 
individuals that defend the provision of welfare tend not to draw on egalitarian 
arguments (Feldman and Zaller, 1992). In the absence of a strong egalitarian 
public and political discourse, these individuals tend to resort to expressions 
of sympathy and humanitarianism and problematize inequality of opportunity 
(Feldman and Zaller, 1992). These rebuttals to anti-welfare sentiment tend to 
sit much more comfortably within the existing confines of liberal welfare 
ideology that centres on individualism, meritocracy and recommodification 
(Bullock, 2008). Achterberg et al. (2014) argues that this goes some way to 
explain the apparent contradiction between increased neo-liberal sentiments 
and a growth in welfare state support. The case for state intervention is 
defended on reciprocal rather than redistributive grounds:  
It is the strong support for commodifying reform that explains the 
support for neo-liberal policies and that, at the same time, explains the 
high support for the welfare state: Because welfare states develop in 
the direction of increasing reciprocity, they receive high and increasing 
support. So, the new politics of the welfare state, the politics of 
retrenchment, is supported in public opinion when these policies 
strengthen reciprocity through recommodifying policy (Achterberg et 
al., 2014: 222). 
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Whilst this process can offer some mileage in galvanising support for tackling 
deprivation, the prevailing values in liberal welfare regimes ‘severely limit the 
development of a more encompassing ideological justification for the welfare 
state’ (Feldman and Zaller, 1992: 298). Any discourse promulgated in tackling 
deprivation needs to have traction with prevailing notions of justice and 
fairness but it must also challenge interpretation of these ideals if poverty and 
inequality are to be efficaciously addressed. A strong, detoxified egalitarian 
discourse could tap into and transform the existing attitudes-policy nexus 
around reciprocity. Importantly though, this would only succeed alongside a 
greater sensitisation to common risks, belonging and purpose. Doing so 
requires incremental and dialogical efforts to tap into and thus alter the 
existing moral foundations of the general public. 
With this in mind, differing moral concerns and foundations are the fourth 
factor informing public attitudes towards citizenship and welfare. As this 
chapter has already discussed, differing moral foundations underline the 
attitudes of those supportive of and against redistributive policies (Graham et 
al., 2009). Nonetheless, if the language used to deliberate and frame social 
issues is used carefully, it is possible to bridge between the moral priorities of 
different groups and identify shared moral concerns. Reciprocity is the most 
commonly shared principle between the Left and the Right (Haidt, 2012). It 
seems then, reinforcing principles of reciprocity in public discourse and policy 
could be a key lever in increasing support for welfare state activity. New 
Labour and the Coalition government both attempted to tap into the public 
value of proportionality by making social rights increasingly conditional on the 
fulfilment of responsibilities (Dwyer, 2010). The current Conservative 
government appears to be doing the same with the Welfare Reform and Work 
Bill 2015-16. However, ‘once the issue of reciprocity becomes simply, or even 
primarily, a question of how tough to get with welfare recipients, the left has 
already lost the battle’ (White, 2010: 26). The temptation to increase 
conditionality and thus proportionality stems from a politically-fuelled public 
belief that resources are often unjustly garnered by those who have failed to 
contribute to society. In this regard, Hoggett et al. (2013) suggest that a 
‘politics of resentment’ appears to drive a great deal of anti-welfare populism.  
It is possible to cut through this interpretation of fairness in three ways. Firstly, 
rather than focusing solely on paid work as a form of societal contribution, the 
notion of reciprocation needs to be expanded to incorporate care, domestic, 
voluntary and societal labour (Deacon, 2007). Those opposed to policies 
tackling poverty and inequality struggle to recognise the mutuality occurring in 
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daily life (see chapter six). By raising awareness of the non-economic 
contributions made by individuals, it is possible to dissipate concerns about 
unearned resources. Secondly, public education about the systemic 
determinants of agency and the true extent of benefit fraud might help 
challenge public beliefs fuelling the ‘politics of resentment’ (Hoggett et al., 
2013). Finally, greater media and public attention needs to be directed at the 
unearned resources and reliefs received by those at the top end of the income 
distribution. This taps into principles of fairness shared across the political 
spectrum and does successfully increase public support for a more 
progressive (and enforced) taxation system (Boudreau and MacKenzie, 
2014). By recognising those that already proportionally contribute to society 
and enforcing those that currently do not, reciprocity in its various 
manifestations, can enhance the legitimacy and popularity of policies that 
tackle poverty and inequality.  
The attitudes of some individuals will be impervious to these activities because 
principles of fairness are superseded by other concerns. Those worried about 
the fiscal burden of welfare activity and the stability of the existing 
socioeconomic order may well concede a lack of fairness according to the 
reciprocity principle but ultimately defer to the constraints and pragmatics they 
feel override other moral issues. In this instance, it is necessary to draw upon 
instrumental arguments against poverty and inequality. Research indicates 
that poverty and inequality place a greater financial burden on public services 
and damage economic growth in the long term (Griggs and Walker, 2008; 
Ostry et al., 2014). In addition, a growing body of evidence suggests the 
current (poorly enforced) taxation system threatens the financial sustainability 
of post-industrial welfare regimes through profit shifting and base erosion (cf. 
Dharmapala, 2014). Greater dissemination of these facts could increase 
support for redistribution and greater macro-economic governance based on 
instrumental grounds.  
The fifth and final element of attitudinal divergence to be considered is the 
presence and condition of deprivation itself. As illustrated in chapter seven, 
lived experiences of poverty alienate low-income individuals from the 
policymaking and political process. At best, these individuals tend to resort to 
defensive forms of civic engagement (Ellison, 2000), and at worse they 
withdraw from social politics altogether (Pattie et al., 2003). A lack of 
institutional and procedural participation from low-income groups indicates 
‘severe limitations to the impact of rising inequality on public and political 
discourse’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2013a: 37). Overall, electoral turnout in the UK has 
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fallen considerably in the last 30 years: from 76 per cent in 1979 to 65 per cent 
in 2010, falling to just 59 per cent in 2001 (Birch et al., 2013). During this 
period, there has been a marked divergence in voter turnout amongst different 
income groups. There were very minor differences in voter turnout during the 
1987 UK general election. However, during the 2010 UK general election, it is 
estimated that just over 50 per cent of those in the lower income quintile voted, 
compared to over 75 per cent of those in the top income quintile; put simply, 
‘individuals in the highest income group were 43 per cent more likely to vote 
than those in the lowest income group’ (Birch et al., 2013: 8). This undermines 
the legitimacy and notion of democratically informed public institutions and 
policies. Political citizenship confers an equal ‘political voice’ to all citizens. 
The relative dearth of ‘political voice’ present from those experiencing 
deprivation points to an unequal representation in the political and 
policymaking process between rich and poor. This is particularly problematic 
because of the attitudinal divergence arising out of lived experiences of 
poverty and affluence.  
Despite finding a dispersal of attitudes across policy domains, Soroka and 
Wlezien (2008) identify clear attitudinal cleavages related to welfare across 
socio-economic groups. A broader examination of policy preferences finds 
much clearer attitudinal divisions between socio-economic groups (Gilens, 
2009). Generally, there tends to be much higher support for policies tackling 
poverty and inequality amongst lower-income groups (Park et al., 2007; 
Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). In a review of 10 OECD countries, Pontusson 
and Rueda (2010) find that political and policy responsiveness to rising 
inequality depends on the level of political mobilisation of low-income groups. 
The authors found that left wing party politics is responsive in as much as the 
polity dictates (Pontusson and Rueda, 2010). Without meaningful institutional 
and procedural engagement from low-income citizens, democratic 
responsiveness is limited and biased towards those benefiting from the 
current socio-economic order. In this sense, inequality in representation 
breeds inequality in the life chances and outcomes of those already 
marginalised. This deepens social and political divisions and severely limits 
the capacity for increased publicly expressed support for tackling deprivation. 
Lister (2007a: 451) argues that marginalised citizens need to be reinserted 
into the policymaking process to cultivate ‘a politics of redistribution and of 
recognition and respect’. Inclusive, collaborative and open democratic spaces 
come some way to incorporate the experiences and attitudes of ‘the poor’ into 
policy decisions (Lister, 2007a). Political and institutional change can only 
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occur through politically active citizenship and representative democracies 
(Green, 2012). The redistribution of political power enhances the legitimacy of 
public institutions and their sensitivity to socioeconomic challenges. 
Importantly though a paradigm shift is required in the substance, language 
and framing of politics. There are not only classed divisions in voter turnout 
but also in political awareness, partisanship and knowledge. Comparison 
between socio-economic class groups (DE and AB) reveals that lower social 
classes are less likely to: be interested in politics (30 versus 60 per cent); know 
at least a fair amount about politics (35 versus 66 per cent); and be absolutely 
certain to vote (38 versus 63 per cent) (Hansard Society, 2014: 35, 37, 41). In 
addition, individuals in social class DE have a weaker sense of partisanship 
compared to individuals in social class AB (26 versus 34 per cent) and are 
also more likely to say they are not a supporter of a political party (43 versus 
23 per cent) (Hansard Society, 2014: 46).  
Without trust or interest in the political process, the policy preferences of those 
affected by deprivation cannot be meaningfully represented. This highlights 
the importance of making political and social issues resonate with those most 
affected by poverty and inequality. Marginalised groups in the UK feel their 
concerns are not being addressed by political figures and the policymaking 
process and this goes some way to explain their institutional disengagement 
(Holmes and Manning, 2013). To address the political disaffection of lower-
income groups, political institutions must negotiate and engage with all citizen 
groups so political discourse and policy reflects and responds to their 
concerns. In addition, increased awareness about instances of policy efficacy 
could enhance trust in public institutions and politics more generally. This may 
encourage greater political mobilisation and participation of lower-income 
groups and improve public support for tackling poverty and inequality. 
8.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed a number of ways in which it is possible to 
overcome attitudinal difference and increase support for tackling deprivation. 
By raising awareness about the structural determinants of socioeconomic 
outcome and agency, drawing on areas of mutual policy and moral concern, 
and reformulating the political language surrounding poverty and inequality, it 
is possible to re-orientate public discourse and consciousness in this area. 
There are of course limits to attitudinal transformation. Existing public and 
political debate has become entrenched. The problem of poverty and 
inequality has proven divisive with conflicting and countervailing moral 
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priorities informing the policy preferences of different groups. As this thesis 
and chapter have illustrated, there are a range factors driving attitudinal 
divergence. These factors generate distinctive frames of reference 
surrounding poverty, inequality and the relationship between the state, 
market, and individual (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003). The moral 
concerns and priorities of some individuals will mean their attitudes are 
somewhat impervious to attitudinal transformation. In addition, daily partisan 
media coverage and political rhetoric that misinforms the general public about 
the realities of deprivation can mitigate efforts made otherwise (Baumberg et 
al., 2012). Public policies and debate often misdirect and detract from the 
issues of substantive significance in this area and can skew perceptions about 
the capacity of the nation state to pursue progressive social policies.  
This is not only pertinent to tackling deprivation. It is also a necessary process 
by which to safeguard the democratic health of social citizenship in an 
institutional and procedural capacity. Dynamic and informed public debate 
nurtures a sense of common purpose and commitment to the project of social 
citizenship (Young, 2000). Without it, willingness to cooperate and participate 
diminishes (Torgler and Schneider, 2006). As this thesis has illustrated, 
socioeconomic inequality reflects existing divisions in citizenship status, 
identity and outcomes. Accessible and accurate deliberation can reinvigorate 
social politics to challenge and reshape the mechanisms that currently 
structure deprivation. This includes the vagaries of the global market 
economy, but also, the public institutions that legitimise and reproduce 
inequality. Social politics is a constitutive and necessary feature of social 
citizenship that enables marginalised groups to reshape the socioeconomic 
and political landscape according to their own lived experience. Whether this 
takes the shape of a more ‘deliberative democracy’ or an ‘agonistic pluralism’ 
(Habermas, 1996; Mouffe, 1999), the presence and execution of such a 
process demonstrates the efficacy and legitimacy of public institutions and 
social citizenship. Without it, social policy can fail to respond to the attitudes 
and needs of the deliberative citizenry.  
In light of the ways in which structural inequality has intervened on institutional 
(dis-) engagement (see section 7.5), it is perhaps worthwhile returning to the 
concept of deliberative democracy discussed in chapter two. The assumption 
that deliberative citizens are capable of coalescing around ‘consensual norms’ 
assumes an active, effective and concise political agency exercised by all 
stakeholders (Habermas, 1996). However, as demonstrated in chapter 7, 
political agents are often engaged in multiple and conflicting political projects 
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(Clarke et al., 2014). In addition, the success of these projects differs 
according to their focus and the character of agency that is exercised and 
accommodated within particular political parameters. In light of this, some 
degree of political struggle or agonistic pluralism appears necessary to 
account for and address the inequalities arising in social politics (Mouffe, 
2005). Somewhat ironically, the character and strategy of this political struggle 
may well be most effective if it is grounded in consensual norms that 
undermine the logic of structural inequality. The role of the deliberative citizen 
in such a setting may well endorse the practices of citizenship that give their 
social democratic ends legitimacy.  
As explained in chapter two, the robust relationship between public attitudes 
and social policy is both a necessary mechanism and prospect for 
transforming the existing citizenship configuration.  
Citizen beliefs and assumptions about the relevant issues are important 
in determining the scope and direction of policy debate. A more 
querulous citizenry will measure new policies against its understanding 
of what is possible and what the impact of changes will be on the 
services it receives and on the taxes it pays, and will be more likely to 
respond electorally to governments in terms of its understanding. This 
process is itself reflexive. Governments will take into account their own 
understanding of public responses in formulating and presenting 
policies (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2003: 5). 
Importantly, political ideology and social policy has to be pre-emptive as well 
as responsive to public concerns and issues. The policymaking process needs 
to read public opinion but also be insulated from short-term political interests. 
In doing so, it becomes possible to lead public opinion in a way that makes 
genuine progress possible.  
With this in mind, what agenda does this set for the Social Policy Academy? 
Firstly, it requires further research on how communicative frames affect public 
opinion, what role knowledge plays in attitudinal formation and whether 
political and policy efficacy can specifically increase support for policies 
tackling deprivation. Secondly, and more importantly, it requires the 
dissemination, and effective communication of existing research that focuses 
on the causes and reality of poverty, affluence and inequality. Critically, this 
dissemination needs to extend beyond the existing confines of academic and 
political debate. Enlightened conversation between ideological or 
epistemological ‘friends’ enriches knowledge, but it achieves very little 
(discursively or substantively) in terms of tackling deprivation.  
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If social policy research is to have the desired ‘impact’ that academic authors 
aspire to, the findings of social policy research need to reach and resonate 
with those that ‘matter’. That is, those that are currently marginalised or 
disengaged from existing public and political debate, those who currently 
control it and those whose attitudes are currently antithetical to tackling 
poverty and inequality. In doing so, social policy research on the realities of 
deprivation can assist in the political mobilisation of marginalised citizens, 
increase public consciousness and informed discussion, and transform 
attitudes related to deprivation. This is only possible if the findings of social 
policy research use language and thematic frames that resonate across the 
polity. This requires a variety of simultaneous communicative strategies that 
account for and attend to the lived experience, knowledge and concerns of all 
citizens. Of course, this is by no means a fixed or finite project, with 
determinate activities leading to a clearly defined process or outcome. Rather, 
it is an undertaking that is both reflexive and inter-subjective in its attempts to 
shift public discourse and consciousness surrounding poverty and inequality. 
Through gradualist means, a re-orientation and sensitisation towards the 
structural determinants of deprivation would enhance the legitimacy and 
efficacy of social citizenship practices. 
Finally, as Ellison (1999a: 81) points out, ‘the increasingly fractured nature of 
contemporary social politics’ compels welfare theorists to move beyond the 
binary distinction between universalism and particularism. Social 
fragmentation in post-industrial societies makes it difficult to garner 
sustainable support through a universalist ethos. Equally, particularism runs 
the risk of descending into ‘unlimited relativism’ (Ellison, 1999: 69) that fails to 
address multi-dimensional inequalities. Ellison (1999: 81) argues a 
‘deliberative approach to social policy’ is needed that both embraces and 
accounts for difference by incorporating all stakeholders in welfare policy 
processes and discourse. Ellison (1999) suggests this offers the most 
promising strategy to develop inclusive institutions able to meaningfully 
capture and address inequalities in post-modern societies. To evade the 
‘unlimited relativism’ that a politics of difference can engender, this 
deliberative approach needs to account for the patterned stratification of 
status, identity and resources arising out of citizenship practices. As illustrated 
in chapter three, the variegated praxis of social citizenship configures welfare 
in such a way that propagates rather than smooths out material and status 
differentials between citizens. Chapters five, six and seven demonstrated that 
this development has resulted in hermetic formations of citizenship identity, 
experience and status between Validated Active Citizens and Residual 
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Contingent Citizens. As such, a fragmentation of social politics is occurring 
alongside calcified status and material hierarchies that result in differing forms 
of engagement. To address this development and safeguard the 
emancipatory potential of social citizenship, marginalised individuals and 
behaviours need to be re-inserted into public discourse surrounding welfare. 
This is essentially the right to difference or recognition (Lister, 2007a) within 
the parameters that that a plural and inclusive welfare system seeking to 
tackle deprivation allows. As stated by Ellison this may serve to ‘better 
legitimate particularist patterns of resource distribution, paradoxically fostering 
greater social inclusion’ (Ellison, 1999: 57). 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined the relationship between inequality and social 
citizenship through the everyday accounts of notionally equal citizens. The 
study has demonstrated that individuals make sense of their material and 
figurative position within society in different and patterned ways according to 
their lived experience. Social citizenship as an institutional and relational 
practice has the capacity to both include and exclude. The mores promulgated 
through welfare institutions and policies structure the experiences and 
outcomes of citizens. Having said that, the distributional and figurative effects 
of this are far from linear or one-dimensional. As noted by previous studies, 
public attitudes towards welfare, citizenship and inequality are often ‘complex, 
ambiguous and contradictory’ (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007: 40). Within the 
context of rising inequality, the experiences and beliefs of the general public 
are no less complicated (Humpage, 2008b; Roosma et al., 2013). The ‘poor’ 
have been known to deny their poverty and participate in ‘othering’ strategies 
that devalue their own economic and social position (Flaherty, 2008; Shildrick 
and MacDonald, 2013). In addition, ‘rich people’ have said that they ‘struggle’ 
to meet their household needs and tend to critique but also maximise their 
receipt of social services and transfers (Hamilton, 2003; Matthews and 
Hastings, 2013). In this respect, attitudes and behaviours can often appear 
inconsistent. However, this thesis has shown that citizens make sense of and 
legitimise their own relationship to the state and others through manifold 
cognitive and social processes. 
Citizens occupy multiple private and public spaces. The identities and 
associations that develop as a result can be weak, diffuse and fleeting but 
they can also be concentrated, lasting and strong (Isin and Wood, 1999). The 
diverse subject positions acquired in contemporary everyday life give rise to 
complex attachments and orientations. This complexity is enacted at the 
individual and collective level and a ‘person inevitably sees the world from the 
vantage point of that position’ (Davies and Harré, 1990: 46). This, in part, 
explains the ‘fragmented social politics of the public sphere’ that has 
developed in late modernity (Ellison, 2000: 1.3). As a series of ‘existential 
‘engagements’ through which new identities, interests and belongings 
develop’ (Ellison, 2013: 53), social citizenship and attitudes towards it are 
underpinned by countervailing and shifting subject positions. Importantly 
though, this thesis has shown that structural inequality, or rather ‘unequal 
citizenship’, has intervened in patterned ways to form divergent experiences 
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and attitudes of the rich and the poor. Whilst distinctive frames of reference 
arise from structural inequality, these still develop alongside shifting identities 
and interests. Within this context, it becomes particularly difficult to identify 
and develop coherent solidarities around a shared conception of the common 
good (Ellison, 2013: 61). Beyond those currently valorised by the existing 
citizenship configuration, the capacity of marginal claims and identities to 
supervene on structural inequality becomes considerably limited.  
With this in mind, this thesis has captured and considered the significance of 
the grassroots views of the ‘poor’ alongside those of the ‘rich’. It has done so 
by examining how the modalities of social citizenship in the UK cohere with 
lived experiences and attitudes towards it. Section 9.1 of this chapter distils 
the findings of the thesis and outlines some of the ramifications for social 
policy. Section 9.2 reflects upon the relative value of the methods and 
research findings of this study. Finally, section 9.3 outlines the research 
agenda emergent from this thesis.  
9.1 Summary of research findings and policy implications 
This mixed-methods study drew upon secondary quantitative data analysis of 
the 2005 Citizenship Survey and qualitative interviews with 28 individuals to 
explore how lived experiences of inequality affect conceptions of social 
citizenship. The study explored the experiences, attitudes and behaviours of 
two distinct groups: unemployed individuals, living below the poverty line in 
deprived areas and wealthy employed individuals living in affluent areas. 
These two groups were identified as Residual Contingent Citizens and 
Validated Active Citizens respectively. 
Despite broad support for social citizenship, this thesis has demonstrated how 
lived experiences of inequality cultivate divergent attitudes towards welfare, 
rights and responsibilities. Through the voices of those experiencing 
deprivation and affluence, this thesis has shown how everyday accounts and 
actions of citizens contribute towards a ‘normative struggle, a political struggle 
– a struggle over the visions of collective life that we want to embrace and 
enact’ (Bosniak, 2001: 239). Chapter two developed this notion of citizenship 
as a relational and horizontal practice. Through a schematic consideration of 
the existing theoretical literature, chapter two established the particular 
significance of public attitudes and participation for explanatory accounts of 
social citizenship. From this it was possible to explore how this study might 
incorporate new empirical insights into both explanatory and normative 
accounts of citizenship and inequality. 
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Chapter five explored how the topographies of social citizenship are reflected 
in the experiences and identities of those experiencing deprivation and 
affluence. Due to the material and symbolic significance of deprivation, 
chapter five demonstrated how Residual Contingent Citizens are less likely to 
feel they have social rights. Perhaps most importantly though, these 
respondents were also less likely to feel like they were social citizens. For 
these individuals, the promises of equal membership and status were 
undermined by lived experiences of inequality. By contrast, affluent citizens 
were more likely to feel like they had ‘a stake in society’. This material and 
symbolic authentication affirmed their belonging and identity as Validated 
Active Citizens within a ‘work-biased construction of citizenship’ (Lister, 
2002a: 107). 
Chapter six illustrated how deprivation and affluence generate unique forms 
of knowledge about the relationship between socio-economic structure and 
agency. The phenomenology of poverty appeared to increase awareness of 
the exogenous factors that impinge on individual agency. As such, the ‘poor’ 
exhibited a richer ‘sociological imagination’ and were better able to identify 
and appreciate the ‘exercise of agency within structural inequality’ (Orton, 
2009). By virtue of their position, affluent respondents were more likely to 
believe individuals could affect or overcome systemic features to serve their 
own interests. As a result, affluent respondents were more likely to 
individualise hardship and affluence by pointing to the agentive capacities of 
individuals to affect their socio-economic circumstance. This appears to inform 
lay accounts and conceptions of social citizenship, in particular attitudes 
towards welfare, rights and responsibilities.  
In chapter seven, affluent respondents were found to advance a more 
contractarian ideal of social citizenship that underplayed personal, social and 
economic interdependency. Welfare was supported, but was conceived in 
rather residual and conditional terms. In this respect, Validated Active Citizens 
tended to endorse a conception of social citizenship that reflected their own 
engagement with it as an ideal and practice. By contrast, Residual Contingent 
Citizens demonstrated a more solidaristic conception of social citizenship that 
recognised mutual vulnerability, alternative forms of civic contribution and a 
collective principle informing the provision of public welfare. The divergent 
moral repertoires drawn upon by these two groups comes some way to 
explain their engagement and identification (or lack thereof) with existing 
citizenship structures and ideals. Affluent respondents were much better able 
to affect change in their local area and public services. As a result, they were 
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more inclined to proactively engage with systems of participation and 
representation to meet their material and discursive ends. Those experiencing 
deprivation were less likely to feel that civic and political institutions were 
conducive to either their material or ‘post-material’ concerns (Manning and 
Holmes, 2013) and this lead to defensive forms of (dis-) engagement focused 
on short-term concessions (Ellison, 2000). A tendency towards defensive 
forms of institutional (dis-) engagement, by those failed by the existing 
citizenship configuration, poses a particular challenge for political institutions 
and systems of public deliberation. Without robust and sustained instances of 
civic engagement by all citizens, there is a danger that social citizenship as a 
relational and distributional practice comes to serve and reflect the interests 
of those gaining most from structural inequality. The repercussions of this and 
the other research findings established in this thesis are briefly considered 
below.  
In recent years, there have been considerable and regressive cuts to public 
social expenditure (Lupton et al., 2015). Against the backdrop of fiscal 
austerity, the increasing ‘individualisation of the social’ has altered the welfare 
landscape (Ferge, 1997; Valentine, 2015). Chapter three demonstrated how 
this has manifested itself in the changing rights and responsibilities of social 
citizenship. A variegated praxis of social citizenship is threatening the status 
and claims making of low-income working-age unemployed individuals. Within 
this context, rather than functioning to mitigate structural inequality, social 
citizenship can serve as an institutional and discursive system of division and 
inequality. 
As noted at the outset of this thesis, ‘welfare myths’ and ‘zombie arguments’ 
about the costs and effects of welfare provision sustain both public support for 
welfare reforms and cuts to public social expenditure (MacDonald et al., 
2014a). Given the attitudinal divergence observed between the ‘rich’ and 
‘poor’, chapter eight considered the logic and limits of public opinion and how 
it might be possible to galvanise public support for policies tackling deprivation 
and structural inequality. Beyond, the rhetorical strategies that might be 
employed to tackle structural inequality, the findings of this thesis raise a 
number of questions for social policy design and delivery.  
It is widely recognised that ‘public support towards social welfare programmes 
for the less well-off is the essential basis for a robust welfare state’ (Sumino, 
2014: 109). Without this, the capacity to structure and sustain an effective 
welfare system is considerably undermined. Economic and social stratification 
reduces support for redistributive policies (cf. Kelly and Enns, 2010). As social 
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and economic lives become increasingly fragmented by inequality, individuals 
begin to lose empathy for one another (Bailey et al., 2013). The dynamics 
between social policy, public opinion and inequality make it particularly difficult 
to maintain public support for redistribution that intervenes on structural 
inequality in this instance (Brooks et al., 2006).  
This inevitably shapes conceptions of social citizenship and attitudes towards 
welfare but most importantly the policy preferences that fall out as a result. As 
support for welfare becomes increasingly individualised, so do the 
mechanisms of need provision tackling poverty and inequality. Chapter three 
demonstrated that social security has become less effectual at targeting 
resources where they are most needed. Those at the bottom of the income 
distribution have seen the proportion of their income secured through social 
security decrease significantly over time. By comparison, those in the middle 
and at the top of the income distribution have seen their total share of income 
derived through cash benefits increase (see Figure 4 in chapter three). In this 
instance, it appears that an increasingly individualised conception of welfare 
leads to and sustains an increasingly individualised function of welfare: where 
social security is secured and allocated according to the existing distribution 
of capital. As many have illustrated, those with the most social and financial 
capital at their disposal are the biggest beneficiaries of public services (e.g. 
Matthews and Hastings, 2013).  Various studies have also shown that those 
most able to wield political power over social policies and provision are the 
greatest beneficiaries of public services (Le Grand and Winter, 2000; Manow, 
2009). Chapter seven considered how wealthier individuals are better able 
and thus more inclined to affect the terms upon which public services and 
social transfers are designed and delivered. As a result, welfare provision runs 
the danger of serving the interests of those most capable of affecting change 
rather than the interests of those who most need it. Unequal engagement 
threatens the efficacy of redistributive policies and this is borne out by the 
regressive cuts to public social expenditure and welfare reforms instigated 
since 2010 (Brewer et al., 2011; Avram et al., 2013). 
The individualisation and residualisation of welfare for those most in need of 
it, is particularly problematic because those with the most power to reformulate 
welfare provision are becoming increasingly divorced from the factors that 
shape inequality. Chapter six explained how exposure to or experience of 
deprivation increases knowledge about the structural determinants of 
inequality. With this in mind, it becomes particularly important to raise 
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awareness about the causes of poverty and inequality through welfare 
instruments and policies.  
Between 1997 and 2010, the redistributive ambitions of New Labour were, to 
some extent, constrained by public opinion (Dean, 2013). Welfare reforms 
were pursued in a way that went with the grain of public opinion and the 
increasing distinction between deserving and undeserving welfare claimants 
(Horton and Gregory, 2009). Meanwhile, a process of ‘redistribution by stealth’ 
took place to tackle poverty through intensified, but surreptitious, means-
testing (Sefton, 2009). Tax credits played a particularly significant role in 
moderating, but not directly tackling, the causes of structural inequality. This 
‘softly, softly’ approach to social policymaking failed to raise public 
consciousness about the factors that necessitate such state intervention. Low-
profile programmes of poverty alleviation damaged public understanding 
about the socio-structural dynamics and factors that contribute towards 
inequality. Without collective awareness about the structural determinants of 
inequality, collective support for redistribution is weakened. As Piachaud 
(2001: 448) noted, ‘there are limits to redistribution by stealth, and a clear, 
explicit recognition of the need for more redistribution, as well as public 
explanation and defence of it, are necessary’. Without this, the long-term 
sustainability of an inclusive welfare state is threatened. 
Using social citizenship as a framework, this thesis has explored the relational 
nature of deprivation and affluence, and the implications of this for policy 
design and coordination (Jordan, 1996: 82). This thesis has shown that lived 
experiences of inequality are structured by institutional arrangements and the 
changing dynamics of social stratification that are exercised by and against 
individual citizens. In this sense, lived experiences (and their effect on 
conceptions of social citizenship) can been understood as a reflection of 
macro-institutional structures. This points to the policy relevance and 
credibility of lived experience. The following section considers the objective 
significance of lived experience in this regard. 
9.2 The Objective Significance of Lived Experience  
Whilst definitions and measures of poverty are often relative to the standards 
prevailing in society, the existence of poverty is frequently understood as 
ontologically independent. It has therefore been argued that objectivity in 
poverty research occurs when ‘a definition is independent of the feelings of 
poor people’ (Roll, 1992: 12). A significant body of research has explored 
subjective perceptions of poverty (Danziger et al., 2000; Dunlap et al., 2003; 
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McIntyre et al., 2003; Saunders et al., 2006; Hooper, 2007; Ridge, 2011). 
However, these studies are generally recognised as capturing qualitative 
experiences, rather than quantifying the nature, of deprivation and inequality. 
These studies often operate within epistemological confines that restrict their 
capacity to explore the social relations that are constitutive of poverty (Harriss, 
2007). As a result, the phenomenological significance of deprivation and 
inequality has often been overlooked in mainstream poverty research 
(Charlesworth, 2000; Van der Merwe, 2006). 
Psychosocial studies and well-being research (Goffman, 1963; Tomlinson et 
al., 2008; Chase and Kyomuhendo, 2014), by virtue of their interdisciplinarity, 
seek to ‘rethink some key popular and disciplinary constructions of the welfare 
subject and the scope of social policy’ (Stenner and Taylor, 2008: 443). 
Affective states that were once considered part of the private or emotional 
sphere are now being attended to in comparative poverty research to 
understand how institutional arrangements can affect individual experience 
and behaviour across a range of contexts in similar ways. Underlying research 
in this area is a basic recognition that affective states cannot be understood 
in isolation from the circumstances in which they arise. For example, in 
response to being bitten by a dog, an individual may violently retaliate, cry, 
run away, or do nothing. Irrespective of the (in-) action taken, the individual’s 
affective state, experience and action can only be understood in relation to the 
actions of the dog and the broader context within which they arise. Similarly, 
the affective states and experiences of ‘poor’ people are significant 
independent of socio-economic structures - but their meaning, cause and 
consequence can only be fully understood in relation to the social policies and 
market forces that shape contextual and material circumstance.  
Recent work on the psychology of scarcity demonstrates this point well. Mani 
et al. (2013) find that compared to better-off individuals, worse-off individuals 
are more likely to make bad decisions and mistakes. A reasonable conclusion 
may be that individuals are worse off as a result of their poor decision-making. 
However, Mani et al. (2013) demonstrate that scarcity arising from socio-
political and economic systems, greatly affects an individual’s psychological 
capacity for good decision-making. Arguably, lived experiences are an 
objective reflection of institutional and structural arrangements as much as 
they are an individualised affective state or subjective perception.  
The fact that subjective perceptions and lived experience cannot be fully 
understood in isolation from structural or relational schema does not 
undermine their objective significance. Indeed this interdependency 
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demonstrates the importance of theorising the relationship between subjective 
experience, material circumstance and institutional arrangements. This 
produces new forms of poverty knowledge ‘more capable of taking account of 
the relational complexities of subjectivity’ (Taylor, 2011: 789). As previously 
stated, subjective perceptions do not always correspond with material 
circumstances or social positions (Flaherty, 2008; Shildrick and MacDonald, 
2013): 
people who are poor try not to admit it to themselves exactly because 
the admission of ‘failure’ adds to the misery they feel from their 
objective situation. Thus in interviews poor people, lower class people, 
are often able to characterise the situation of others like themselves in 
lively detail, but they often seek to distance themselves personally from 
that common plight (Rainwater, 1990: 3). 
Findings such as this do not undermine the credibility of subjective 
perceptions and lived experiences in poverty research. Neither do they 
necessarily represent a discord between the structural and affective realities 
of deprivation. As the quote above illustrates, poverty denial could very well 
be an articulation of the relational nature of poverty. Reference groups, 
cultural praxes, normative frameworks, agentive choice, and other complex 
determinants of experience will shape lived experiences of and affective 
responses to material hardship. By exploring how people navigate and give 
meaning to a social, political and economic system, it is possible to see how 
the substantive and figurative significance of social citizenship is undermined 
for those experiencing inequality.  
Citizenship is by no means the only framework through which to explore the 
significance of lived experience, but it does proffer three inter-related 
conceptual benefits. Firstly, the ‘equality of status’ premise of citizenship 
makes the analysis of structural inequalities meaningful independent of 
normative critiques of poverty and vulnerability. Secondly, citizenship is based 
on principles of common membership that govern the relations between polity, 
state and market. In this way, poverty can be understood, not as a peculiarity 
of market processes, but as a systemic feature of citizenship arrangements. 
Finally, despite differences across domestic and international settings, 
citizenship offers a common conceptual and analytical framework through 
which to explore the distributional effects of institutions within and across 
national boundaries.  
Grounding poverty analysis and debate in lived experiences can be 
transformative for those facing poverty and those seeking critical and 
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efficacious policy solutions to address it (Dutro, 2009). One challenge is to 
make the rich micro-level data that is drawn from such research ‘policy 
relevant’ (Brock, 1999). The structural macro-level data that tends to treat the 
poor as a unit of observation needs to be refined and complemented by 
poverty definitions, experiences and solutions that originate from poor people 
themselves (Marti and Mertens, 2014). By integrating disparate paradigms 
and methods of poverty research, it is possible to develop new understanding 
about the existence and nature of poverty, as well as effective poverty 
prevention and alleviation strategies.  
A number of studies have combined objective and subjective measures to 
arrive at a definition of poverty (Mack and Lansley, 1985; Deleeck and Van 
den Bosch, 1992; Eroğlu, 2007). However, fewer studies have accounted for 
the objective significance of lived experience. That is, qualitative and mixed 
methods studies of poverty often fail to treat lived experiences and subjective 
perceptions as a manifestation and reflection of structural relations (e.g. 
Novak, 1996). Such an approach would offer new insights into measuring 
poverty and vulnerability but most importantly it would also offer a new 
methodological framework through which to assess the efficacy of poverty 
alleviation processes in a comparative context. Rather than assessing the 
efficacy of welfare regimes on their own terms (i.e. via different structural 
welfare arrangements), the lived experience of citizens helps uncover the 
extent to which the dominant praxis of social citizenship operates effectively 
to tackle or at least temper poverty and vulnerability. These benefits can only 
be reaped by integrating mixed methods to overcome the limitations of purely 
quantitative or qualitative research. In this sense, qualitative and quantitative 
methods  
are fundamentally complements, not substitutes – and certainly not 
rivals. They mutually inform each other, to everyone’s 
benefit….Developing powerful and effective diagnoses of the causes 
of poverty, and appropriate treatments to reduce poverty, requires both 
well-designed quantitative investigation and giving a genuine voice to 
poor people (Robb, 2002: xii-xiii). 
Mixed methods can strengthen the credibility and external validity of lived 
experiences. Whilst lived experiences tend to be part of the qualitative 
paradigm, this thesis has demonstrated that researching lived experiences of 
deprivation could be seen as a methodology in its own right. A number of 
recent studies have made significant contributions in this arena (e.g. Chase 
and Kyomuhendo, 2014). Understanding the causes and consequences of 
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poverty is contingent on capturing the socio-economic and political relations 
that shape the nature of inequality. A methodological approach that can 
examine these relations comes some way towards an ‘objective’ measure that 
captures the complexities of poverty and inequality in a systematic way.  
9.3 Future Research Agenda 
This thesis has contributed towards the existing literature and evidence on the 
relationship between inequality, social citizenship and public attitudes. In light 
of the limitations and research findings of this study, there are three key areas 
that require further consideration.  
Firstly, this thesis has drawn upon a strong and varied body of evidence that 
explains attitude formation and divergence in relation to welfare and 
inequality. A myriad of qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods studies 
examine the relationship between social policy, inequality and public attitudes. 
Many of these offer conflicting accounts about the causes of attitudinal 
formation and divergence. This thesis has challenged some of the dominant 
‘welfare myths’ and assumptions surrounding welfare attitudes, the primary 
one being that conceptions of social citizenship are principally derived from 
personal and economic self interest. Whilst this thesis has succeeded in this 
respect, it has not been able to reconcile the conflicting evidence and 
interpretations on welfare attitudes. As such, there is a clear need to distil and 
consolidate the existing research and evidence in a way that develops a 
systematic theory of welfare attitudes and their relationship to inequality.  
Secondly, this thesis has demonstrated the value of exploring lay accounts of 
social citizenship from the perspective of the ‘poor’ and the ‘rich’. However, 
this thesis would benefit from both a deeper and broader examination of how 
lived experiences of inequality affect conceptions of social citizenship. 
Broader in the sense that the study would have benefited from interviewing 
more people across a range of institutional contexts. Extending qualitative 
fieldwork beyond Leeds and the surrounding area would strengthen the 
inferences made about the relationship between inequality and social 
citizenship in the UK. Deeper in the sense that a comparative element would 
refine some of the claims made about how the institutional architecture of 
welfare and inequality shapes the lived experiences, outcomes and attitudes 
of citizens. In 2013, the researcher secured funding to replicate this study in 
New Zealand. Following this thesis, the researcher will undertake a 
comparative analysis to consider the relationship between inequality and 
social citizenship in liberal welfare regimes more generally. The intention is to 
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replicate the study across a range of welfare regimes and institutional contexts 
to consider how differences in public discourse and institutions structure, but 
are also structured by, inequality and welfare attitudes. 
Building on the ‘horizontal’ understanding of social citizenship advanced in 
this thesis, the third key research agenda to emerge from this research is the 
need to develop an explanatory account of the relationship between 
inequality, social citizenship and public attitudes. Chapter two highlighted the 
tendency to conflate normative with explanatory theories of social citizenship 
in social policy academia. This thesis offers empirical insight into the dynamics 
arising from the relationship between inequality and social citizenship, in 
particular, what role public opinion has to play in this. However, more attention 
is needed to develop a systematic, applied theory of the relationship between 
inequality and social citizenship. This theory should account for the multiple 
cognitive, institutional and procedural ways in which the relationship between 
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Appendix A 
Citizenship Survey 2005: Survey Questions  
Appendix A details the specific wording of the survey questions of the 2005 
Citizenship Survey (Kitchen, 2006) that were examined for the purposes of 
this thesis.  
A.1  Attitudes towards social rights and responsibilities 
 
10.1  Which of the rights, if any, listed below do you think you should have 
as someone living in the UK? [Eshould] 
(1)  To have access to free education for children  
(5)  To be looked after by the State if you cannot look after yourself  
(7)  To be treated fairly and equally  
(8)  To have free health-care if you need it  
(9)  To have a job  
(10)  None of the above  
 
10.2 And which do you think you actually have now? [Ehave]   
(1)  To have access to free education for children  
(5)  To be looked after by the State if you cannot look after yourself  
(7)  To be treated fairly and equally  
(8)  To have free health-care if you need it  
(9)  To have a job  
(10)  None of the above  
 
10.3  Which, if any, do you feel should be the responsibility of everyone 
living in the UK? [EResp] 
(2)  To behave morally and ethically  
(3)  To help and protect your family  
(4)  To raise children properly  
(5)  To work to provide for yourself  
(6)  To behave responsibly  
(9)  To help others  
(10)  To treat others with fairness and respect  
(12)  None of the above  
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A.2 Experiences and subjective impressions of local area 
3.1.2 How strongly do you feel you belong to your immediate 
neighbourhood? [SBeneigh] 
(1) Very strongly 
(2) Fairly strongly 
(3) Not very strongly 
(4) Not at all strongly 
(5) Don't know 
  
3.1.5 To what extent would you agree or disagree that people in this 
neighbourhood pull together to improve the neighbourhood? [SPull] 
(1) Definitely agree  
(2) Tend to agree 
(3) Tend to disagree 
(4) Definitely disagree 
(5) Don't know 
(6) Nothing needs improving 
3.1.7 Would you say that .... [STrust] 
(1) many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted, 
(2) some can be trusted, 
(3) a few can be trusted, 
(4) or that none of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted? 
(5) Just moved here 
3.1.12 How likely is it that people in your neighbourhood would participate if 
they were asked by a local organisation to help solve a community problem? 
[SProb] 
 
3.1.13 To what extent you agree or disagree that people in this 
neighbourhood are willing to help their neighbourhood. [SHelp] 
(1) Strongly agree 
(2) Agree 
(3) Disagree 
(4) Strongly disagree 
(5) Don’t know 
 
4.8 Do you agree or disagree that you can influence decisions affecting your 
local area (15-20 minutes walk)? [PAffLoc] 
(1) Definitely agree 
(2) Tend to agree 
(3) Tend to disagree 
(4) Definitely disagree 
(5) Don’t know 
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A.3 Behaviours associated with civic engagement 
A.3.1 Civic activism, consultation and participation  
7.1 In the last 12 months have you done any of the following things? Please 
include any activities you have already told me about. Please do not include 
any activities related to your job. [Civact1] 
(1) Been a local councillor (for the local authority, town or parish) 
(2) Been a school governor 
(3) Been a volunteer Special Constable 
(4) Been a Magistrate 
(5) None of these 
 
7.2 In the last 12 months have you done any of the following things? Please 
include any activities you have already told me about. Please do not include 
any activities related to your job. [Civact2] 
(1) Member of a group making decisions on local health services 
(2) Member of a decision making group set up to regenerate the local area 
(3) Member of a decision making group set up to tackle local crime problems 
(4) Member of a tenants’ group decision making committee 
(5) Member of a group making decisions on local education services 
(6) Member of a group making decisions on local services for young people 
(7) Member of another group making decisions on services in the local 
community 
(8) None of these 
 
4.5 And in the last 12 months have you taken part in a consultation about 
local services or problems in your local area in any of the ways listed on this 
card? [PConsul] 
(1) Completing a questionnaire (about local services in the local area) 
(2) Attending a public meeting (about local services in the local area) 
(3) Being involved in a group set up to discuss local services or problems in 
the local area. 
(4) None of these 
 
6.1.1 Which of the following groups, clubs or organisations have you been 
involved with during the last 12 months? That's anything you've taken part 
in, supported, or that you've helped in any way, either on your own or with 
others. Please exclude giving money and anything that was a requirement of 
your job. [Fgroup] 
(1) Children's education/ schools 
(2) Youth/children's activities (outside school) 
(3) Education for adults 
(4) Sports/exercise (taking part, coaching or going to watch) 
(5) Religion 
(6) Politics 
(7) The elderly 
(8) Health, Disability and Social welfare 
(9) Safety, First Aid 
(10) The environment, animals 
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(11) Justice and Human Rights 
(12) Local community or neighbourhood groups 
(13) Citizens' Groups 
(14) Hobbies / Recreation / Arts/ Social clubs 
(15) Trade union activity 
(16) Other 
(17) None of these 
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A.3.2 Personal behaviours  
 
2.1 Thinking of all the people living in your household, have you given any 
of them practical help or support, in the last month? Please exclude any 
financial help. [Hgive] 
2.2 Thinking of all the people living in your household, have any of them 
given you practical help or support in the last month? Please exclude any 
financial help. [Hreci] 
2.4 Which of these relatives do you have contact with at least once a month? 
(If applicable) Please include your husband’s/wife’s/partner’s relatives. 
[FConnr] 
2.5 Thinking of all the relatives not living with you, have you given any of 
them practical help or support in the last 12 months. Please exclude 
financial help. [FGive] 
2.7 And again, thinking of all the relatives who are not living with you, have 
any of them given you practical help or support in the last 12 months. 
Please exclude any financial help. [FReci] 
6.4.1 In the last 12 months have you done any of the following things, 
unpaid, for someone who was not a relative? [Ihlp] This is any unpaid help 
you, as an individual, may have given to other people that is apart from any 
help given through a group, club or organisation. This could be help for a 
friend, neighbour or someone else but not a relative. 
(1) Keeping in touch with someone who has difficulty getting out and about 
(2) Doing shopping, collecting pension or paying bills 
(3) Cooking, cleaning, laundry, gardening or other routine household jobs 
(4) Decorating, or doing any kind of home or car repairs 
(5) Baby sitting or caring for children 
(6) Sitting with or providing personal care (e.g. washing, dressing) for 
someone who is sick or frail 
(7) Looking after a property or a pet for someone who is away 
(8) Giving advice 
(9) Writing letters or filling in forms 
(10) Representing someone (for example talking to a council department, or 
to a doctor) 
(11) Transporting or escorting someone (for example to a hospital, or on an 
outing) 
(12) Anything else 
(13) No help given in last 12 months 
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Appendix B 
Qualitative Fieldwork 
B.1 Profile of Leeds 
Drawing on the latest data available from the 2011 Census it is possible to 
consider the demographic, economic and household profile of Leeds and 
compare this against the rest of England and Wales. Based on the data 
outlined below, it is clear that the population and characteristics of the Leeds 
City region are broadly similar to the rest of England and Wales: 
Demographic, Economic 
and Household Profile 
Proportion of reference 
population 
Leeds England and Wales 
Male 49.0% 49.2% 
Female 51.0% 50.8% 
Mean age of population 37.6 39.4 
White 85.1% 86.0% 
Mixed/Multiple Ethnic Groups 2.6% 2.2% 
Asian or Asian British 7.8% 7.5% 
Black/African/Caribbean/Black 
British 3.4% 3.3% 
Owner Occupied 58.6% 64.3% 
Rented 39.9% 34.4% 
Economically active 69.5% 69.7% 
Economically inactive 30.5% 30.3% 
Higher managerial and 
professional occupations 10.4% 10.3% 
Never worked' and 'long-term 
unemployed' 6.0% 5.6% 
Household is not deprived in 
any dimension 41.7% 42.3% 
Household is deprived in 1 
dimension* 32.2% 32.6% 
Household is deprived in 2 
dimensions 19.5% 19.3% 
Household is deprived in 3 
dimensions 5.9% 5.2% 
Household is deprived in 4 
dimensions 0.7% 0.5% 
 Source: (ONS, 2014) 
 
*These dimensions are based on four selected household characteristics: 
- Employment (any member of a household not a full-time student that is either 
unemployed or long-term sick) 
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- Education (no person in the household has at least level 2 education, and no 
person aged 16-18 is a full-time student) 
- Health and disability (any person in the household has general health 'bad or 
very bad' or has a long term health problem) 
- Housing (household's accommodation is either overcrowded, with an 
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B.2 Interview Schedule 
Outline of the questionnaire: 
Section Approximate Timing 
Behaviours 8 minutes 
Experiences 8 minutes 
Case Studies 20 minutes 
Attitudes 34 minutes 
Total  70 minutes 
 
Using this questionnaire: 
Key Questions Timings 
Underlined = Title 
Italics = Interviewer to read out  
CAPS = Instructions for interviewer 
Bullet = prompt 




The researcher will ask questions and use the prompts to guide where necessary 
 
- THANK PARTICIPANT FOR AGREEING TO TAKE PART, INTRODUCE 
SELF AND EXPLAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH REFERRING TO 
INFORMATION SHEET. 
- COLLECT PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM AND EMPHASISE THE 
ANONYMITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF ANYTHING THAT THEY SAY 
ADHERING TO THE PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM SIGNED AND THE 
DATA PROTECTION ACT.  
- NOT LOOKING FOR SPECIFIC ANSWERS: NO RIGHT OR WRONG 
RESPONSES – ENCOURAGE HONESTY AND OPENNESS FROM 
PARTICIPANT. 
- PERMISSION TO AUDIO RECORD - ALL CONFIDENTIAL. 
 
Topic areas, questions and probes Timing 
1. Behaviours 8 mins  
Do you watch the news? Why/Why not? 
Do you vote? Why/Why not? 
Do you regularly help friends, family or neighbours with any of the 
following activities? 
PRESENT SHOWCARD AND ASK RESPONDENT TO LIST 
LETTERS A-M APPLICABLE TO THE HELP THEY GIVE 
FRIENDS/FAMILY/NEIGHBOURS. 
ONLY ASK TO RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWER A-L 
If you did not provide this help, how do you think it would affect the 
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PRESENT SHOWCARD AGAIN AND ASK RESPONDENT TO 
LIST LETTERS A-M FOR THE FOLLOWING QUESTION 
Do you receive any of the following help from friends, family or 
neighbours? 
ONLY ASK THE NEXT TWO QUESTIONS TO RESPONDENTS 
WHO RECEIVE HELP 
If you didn’t receive this help, how do you think it would affect your 
day to day life? 
Do you think more people should give help to each other in these 
ways? 
Why do you say that?  
 
 
2. Experiences 8 mins  
To what extent do you agree that you have enough money to have 
a good quality of life? 
- Why do you say that? 
In comparison to everyone in the UK, do you think you have a low, 
middle or high income? Now, thinking about your local area... 
Do you feel that you are part of a community here? 
- Why do you say that? 
If you wanted to, do you feel that you could make a change in your 
local area or approach someone about an issue? 
- Perhaps a club, society, school, local council (bins)? 
- Why do you say that? 
ONLY ASK TO RESPONDENTS THAT ARE EMPLOYED 
Do you think that it’s unfair that some people do not work? *  
- Why do you say that? 
ONLY ASK RESPONDENTS WHO ARE UNEMPLOYED. 
APPROACH EXPERIENCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN A WAY 
THAT FITS THE BIOGRAPHY OF RESPONDENT/CONTENT OF 
DISCUSSION SO FAR. 
You were recruited on the basis that you are currently 
unemployed. I just want to ask a few questions about that. 
Would you like to work?  
- Why do you say that? 
Are other things more important to you? 
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- Why do you say that? 
3. Case Studies  
20 
mins 
Along with the information sheet and participant consent form, I 
sent you a sheet of four case studies. If it is okay, we will begin by 
discussing each of these in turn. I will read out each case study and 
then ask you a few questions on it. If you have anything that you 
would like to add at any point, please let me know. READ OUT 
EACH CASE STUDIES AND POSE QUESTIONS IN TURN. 
RANDOMISE THE ORDER IN WHICH THE CASE STUDIES AND 
SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS ARE DISCUSSED. 
Becky 
Should Becky be forced to work rather than volunteer? Why/Why 
not? 
The government states that people should look for work as a 
condition of being entitled to benefits (JSA)  
Should Becky looking after her children or volunteering be counted 
as work? Why/Why not? 
How responsible is Becky for her situation? 
*Please interpret the question how you think it is meant? 
- Why do you say that? 
Aimee  
Should Aimee still receive benefits from the government? Why/Why 
not? 
How responsible is Aimee for her situation? *  
- Why do you say that? 
PRESENT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON AIMEE 
Does this change how you feel about Aimee? If so, how? 
James  
Do you think James’s family should receive Tax Credits from the 
government? Why/Why not? 
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- Why do you say that? 
Robert 
Is Robert‘s concern about the tax he will have to pay reasonable in 
the light of his circumstances?   
Is it fair that Robert earns more than James? IF YES, PROBE 
ABOUT JAMES HAVING LEARNING DIFFICULTIES AND 
ROBERT BEING BORN VERY INTELLIGENT WITH SUPPORT 
FROM PARENTS 
- Both working same hours – what is valued: 
effort/intelligence/benefit (economic or otherwise) to 
society? 
How responsible is Robert for his situation? *  





What do you understand a social citizen to be? 
To what extent do you feel like a social citizen? 
Social Rights 
To what extent do you feel you have social rights as someone living 
in the UK? Has this had any effect on your life? 
Do you think everyone living in the UK should be entitled to 
benefits? Why/Why not? 
Do you think everyone living in the UK should be guaranteed a 
minimum level of income? Why/Why not? 
Social Responsibilities 
REFER TO THE CASE STUDIES IF NECESSARY 
What do you think it means to be a “responsible” person living in 
the UK? 
- What sort of behaviours do you think show someone to be 
responsible? 
- Anything else? 
What behaviours do you think the government expects of people 
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- Anything else? 
Do you feel that this is fair? 
Do you think there are other behaviours that the government should 
recognise as “responsible”? 
Do you think everyone living in the UK should have the same 
responsibilities as a social citizen? Why do you say that? 
Do you think there are factors which limit an individual’s ability to 
fulfil these responsibilities? 
Do you think responsibilities as a citizen are important? If so, why? 
- Integration/fairness/finance 
Conditionality and Fairness 
There has been a lot of stuff in the news, talking about restrictions 
to benefits. David Cameron, the leader of the Coalition government, 
has said that people on benefits should not be able to earn more 
than the average wage. 
What do you think about this?  
IF RESPONDENT DOES NOT FEEL THAT THEY CAN ANSWER 
THE QUESTION WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT THE AVERAGE 
WAGE IS – LET THEM KNOW 
Why do you think that? 
According to an Ipsos MORI survey conducted in September 2011: 
76% of people agree that there are some groups of people who 
claim benefits that should have their benefits cut.  
What do you think? * Why/Why not? 
According to government figures, 0.7% of money spent on benefits 
is fraudulently claimed.  
Does this surprise you? Why/Why not?  
What percentage of your tax do you think goes towards 
unemployment benefit? 
Less than 1% of taxes go towards unemployment benefit - Does 
this surprise you? 
Thinking about the last few questions – how do you feel about this? 
What about as a “social citizen”?  
Role of the Government and Citizens 
To what extent do you think that we have a collective responsibility 
to other citizens? 
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- Institutional or moral 
To what extent do you think that we have a responsibility to help 
and care for others? 
- Family/friends/strangers? 
Do you think other people have a responsibility to do anything for 
you as someone living in the UK?  
- Not your family or friends, but other citizens? 
- Why do you say that? 
Do you think the government has a responsibility to do anything for 
you as someone living in the UK?  
- Why do you say that? 
Do you think the government fulfils those responsibilities you 
mentioned previously?  
- Why do you say that? 
 
 
CLOSE BY STATING THAT YOU VOUNTEER AT CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAU 
AND IF THERE ARE ANY ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE DEALT WITH THEY CAN 
SPEAK TO A TRAINED ADVISER THERE - OFFER A LEAFLET WITH 
INFORMATION AND DETAILS. THANK RESPONDENT FOR THEIR TIME AND 
PARTICIPATION.  
 
Case Studies (Vignettes) 
 
Becky: lives alone with her two children. At 18, Becky got good grades and 
wanted to go to University but was worried about the cost and debt that she 
might face. Instead, Becky got a secretarial job in a small company hoping to 
work her way up. After one year, Becky was made redundant and fell pregnant 
shortly after. Since then, Becky has been unable to find a job. Becky split up 
from her boyfriend five years ago and has relied on benefits and occasional 
help from her parents ever since. She lives in social housing and has done for 
four years. Becky would like to work but has been unable to find a job that is 
flexible enough for her to gain career prospects and also care for her children. 
Becky volunteers three times a week whilst her children are at school. The 
Job Centre has told Becky that she needs to get a job as some of her 
entitlement to Income Support will soon finish. 
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Aimee: and her partner claim Incapacity Benefit. Aimee has claimed benefits 
on and off for 15 years. Aimee began claiming benefits when she had a bad 
back, and although she can now go dancing, these days, she has got used to 
being on benefits and is stuck in a bit of a rut. She was unable to cope with 
her children because of her drinking and her two children are now in care. 
Aimee’s entitlement to Incapacity Benefit has recently stopped and she now 
must look for work in order to claim another benefit (JSA).  
Aimee(2): spent the majority of her childhood in care and went to four different 
secondary schools. She was heavily bullied and therefore attended school 
very little. Aimee left education at 16 with few qualifications and little idea of 
what she might like to do in the future. She wanted to become a social worker, 
but did not get onto the course. Aimee then went onto work as a cleaner. 
James: left school with one O-level and has always felt that he is better at 
practical ‘hands-on jobs’ than being in an ‘office job’. At 46, James lives with 
his wife and 4 children. He works for a large supermarket and does a lot of 
shift work, working nights and evenings. He works very hard and has recently 
taken on an extra part-time cleaning job. As a result, he is not always able to 
help his children with school work. James’s family receive Child Tax Credit 
and Working Tax Credits which help a lot but they are often short at the end 
of the month. The rising cost of food and energy means James is in debt as 
he cannot always afford to pay the bills. He wants more hours at work to pay 
this off but cannot get any more at the moment. James’s wife does not work 
as she feels the cost of childcare would be too much to make it worthwhile.  
Robert: is very clever and did very well at school. He received a great deal of 
support and help from his parents with school work. Robert went to University 
and received financial support from his parents when moving for his first job. 
Since starting his first job, Robert has always worked hard, often staying late 
in the office and taking work home at the weekends. He earns a lot from his 
job and has private health insurance. He has decided to buy a second property 
and rent this out to tenants. He is concerned about how much Tax he will have 
to pay when he eventually sells this second property. He is worried that he 
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SHOWCARD 1 
 
(A) Keeping in touch with someone who has difficulty 
getting out and about 
 
(B) Doing shopping, collecting pension or paying bills 
 




(D) Decorating, or doing any kind of home or car 
repairs 
 
(E) Babysitting or caring for children 
 
(F) Sitting with or providing personal care (e.g. 
washing, dressing) for someone who is sick or 
frail 
 
(G) Looking after a property or a pet for someone 
who is away 
 
(H) Giving advice 
 
(I) Writing letters or filling in forms 
 
(J) Representing someone (for example talking to a 
council department, or to a doctor) 
 
(K) Transporting or escorting someone (for example 
to a hospital, or on an outing) 
 
(L) Anything else 
 
(M) No help given 
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Research on Social Citizenship: attitudes and experiences 
Thank you for expressing an interest in taking part in this research. Before you decide 
whether you will agree to be interviewed, it is important that you understand what the 
research is about and what it will involve. The information below provides some 
important details, so please take the time to read this. If you have difficulty 
understanding anything or would like this information in a different format, please feel 
free to contact me at any time.  
What is the purpose of the project? I am currently undertaking research on Social 
Citizenship to understand the attitudes and experiences of the general public. This 
research will contribute towards my PhD thesis and will offer some fresh insights into 
how people feel about and act in their social community.  
Why have I been chosen? You are being contacted because I am hoping to speak 
to a range of people, based on where they live, their income and whether or not they 
are employed. I would like to learn about your experiences and thoughts. 
What do I have to do? I only ask for an hour and a half of your time to interview you 
at a time and place that is good for you. You can see the interview questions before 
the interview if you would like. 
Do I have to take part? You do not have to take part in the research and can cancel 
or leave the interview at any time. You will be given a summary of the research 
findings and able to comment on them. You can remove your information from the 
research until 01/4/2014.  
Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential? Your information will 
always remain confidential and anonymous meaning that only I know what you have 
said. By law, I must keep your information private and confidential.  
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? If you tell the 
research team about anything that might negatively affect the safety or well-being of 
someone then action must be taken. The relevant authorities may be contacted to 
deal with this issue. 
Will I be recorded, and how will the recording be used? With your permission, 
your interview will be recorded. The recording will only be used for the purposes of 
this research and only the independent research team will be able to access the 
original recording.  
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet, it is very much 
appreciated. Please feel free to get in contact if you would like to take part in the 
research or have any questions or concerns, please contact Daniel Edmiston on 
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Social Citizenship: attitudes and 
experiences 
Participation Consent Form 
 Add your 
initials next to 
the statements 
you agree with  
I confirm that I understand the information explaining the 
above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask 
questions about the project. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and 
without there being any negative consequences. In addition, 
should I not wish to answer any particular question or 
questions, I am free to decline. The researcher can be 
contacted on 07507351830 or at 
socialcitizenship@gmail.com. 
 
I understand that my name will not be linked with the research 
materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the 
research documents that result from the research. I 
understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. 
 
I agree that any disclosure that I make negatively affecting the 
well-being of an individual or collective group will need to be 
followed up by contacting the relevant authority so that they 
may deal with this issue in the appropriate manner. 
 
I agree for the data collected from me to be used in relevant 
future research. 
 
I agree to take part in the above research project and will 
inform Daniel Edmiston should my contact details change. 
 
 
Name of participant  
Participant’s signature  
Date  
Name of lead researcher  Daniel Edmiston 
Signature  
Date*  
*To be signed and dated in the presence of the participant.  
Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the 
signed and dated participant consent form, the letter/ pre-written script/ information sheet 
and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and 
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dated consent form should be kept with the project’s main documents which must be kept 
in a secure location. 
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Appendix C 
Secondary Quantitative Analysis: Additional Results 
C.1  Binary logistic regressions exploring socio-economic 
determinants of attitudinal and experiential difference 
For the binary logistic regressions undertaken, the null hypothesis is that the 
probability of giving an affirmative response to the dimensions outlined in 
section 4.4 is the same across a range of socio-economic conditions, social 
identity characteristics and subjective impressions. The following predictor 
variables have been used in a series binary logistic regressions:  
 
Predictor Classification & Coding Predictor Classification & Coding 
Overall 
Deprivation 
0 = Validated Active 
Citizen, 1 = Residual 
Contingent Citizen 
Sex 0 = Male, 1 = Female  
Income 
Deprivation 
0 = affluent, 1 = 
deprived Age Continuous = 18-64 
Employme
nt Status 




0 = Below (1-3), or, 1 = Above 








0 = at least some can be 
trusted, 1 = many can be 
trusted 
Feel have 
Rights Index of Rights = 0-5 
Able to  
influence 
0 = disagree can influence 
decisions affecting area, 1 = 
agree can influence decisions  
Education 
0 = No qualifications, 




Amount of informal voluntary 
help given in last 12 months: 
continuous 0-12, 1 point for 
each activity 
Race 0 = White, 1 = BME   
 
Where appropriate, a predictor variable of whether a respondent feels they 
have a corresponding right has been included. Two logistic regressions were 
undertaken for each dimension of social citizenship, one just with the 
compound selection criteria and one with all the other predictor variables. 
Tables C.1 to C.6 show the logistic regression coefficient, Wald test, and odds 
ratio for each of the predictors. A .05 criterion of statistical significance was 
used to consider which predictor variables are shown to have significant 
partial effects. 
 
Table C.1: The right to be looked after by the State 
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Overall deprivation -.669 22.137 <.001 .512 .388 .677 
Constant 1.834 380.858 <.001 6.262   
Income Deprivation .056 .131 .718 1.058 .779 1.437 
Employment Status .035 .058 .809 1.035 .781 1.372 
Area Deprivation .210 2.465 .116 1.233 .949 1.603 
Feel have Rights .232 18.674 <.001 1.261 1.135 1.401 
Feel have right to be 
looked after by State .617 14.956 <.001 1.854 1.356 2.535 
Education .123 14.571 <.001 1.131 1.062 1.205 
Race -.602 13.570 <.001 .548 .398 .755 
Sex -.119 1.052 .305 .888 .708 1.114 
Age .014 9.285 .002 1.014 1.005 1.024 
Number in 
household -.044 .126 .723 .957 .750 1.221 
Trust in 
neighbourhood .163 1.594 .207 1.178 .914 1.518 
Able to  influence -.058 .237 .626 .944 .748 1.191 
Given informal 
voluntary help .066 4.955 .026 1.069 1.008 1.133 
Constant -.698 4.466 .035 .497   
 
Table C.2: Rights should have – To have a job 
 












Overall deprivation .433 10.987 .001 1.541 1.193 1.991 
Constant .839 141.324 <.001 2.314   
Income Deprivation .317 4.244 .039 1.373 1.016 1.856 
Employment Status .225 2.394 .122 1.253 .942 1.667 
Area Deprivation .409 10.052 .002 1.506 1.169 1.939 
Feel have Rights  -.059 1.520 .218 .942 .857 1.036 
Feel have right to a 
job 2.500 283.562 <.001 12.184 9.108 16.300 
Education -.071 4.945 .026 .931 .875 .992 
Race .070 .149 .699 1.073 .751 1.533 
Sex .307 7.898 .005 1.360 1.097 1.684 
Age .011 5.710 .017 1.011 1.002 1.020 
Number in 
household .222 3.355 .067 1.249 .985 1.584 
Trust in 
neighbourhood .073 .361 .548 1.076 .848 1.365 
Able to  influence -.084 .554 .457 .920 .738 1.146 
Given informal 
voluntary help .009 .107 .743 1.009 .957 1.063 
Constant -.512 2.582 .108 .599   
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Table C.3: Responsibility should have – To work to provide for oneself 
 













Overall deprivation -1.496 70.011 <.001 .224 .158 .318 
Constant 2.811 402.560 <.001 16.634   
Income Deprivation -.742 13.943 <.001 .476 .323 .703 
Employment Status -.334 3.917 .048 .716 .514 .997 
Area Deprivation -.362 4.635 .031 .697 .501 .968 
Feel have Rights .476 99.156 <.001 1.610 1.466 1.768 
Education -.070 2.895 .089 .932 .859 1.011 
Race .007 .001 .974 1.007 .670 1.512 
Sex .006 .002 .969 1.006 .758 1.334 
Age .010 3.272 .070 1.010 .999 1.022 
Number in 
household .045 .083 .774 1.046 .768 1.425 
Trust in 
neighbourhood -.006 .001 .970 .994 .719 1.375 
Able to  influence -.277 3.525 .060 .758 .567 1.012 
Given informal 
voluntary help .019 .293 .588 1.020 .951 1.093 
Constant 1.429 11.944 .001 4.175   
 
Table C.4: Responsibility should have: To help others 
 













Overall deprivation -.228 1.464 .226 .796 .550 1.152 
Constant 2.378 418.134 <.001 10.780   
Income Deprivation .207 1.025 .311 1.230 .824 1.837 
Employment Status -.168 .817 .366 .845 .586 1.218 
Area Deprivation .043 .063 .802 1.044 .748 1.456 
Feel have Rights .443 81.402 <.001 1.558 1.415 1.715 
Education -.014 .105 .746 .986 .908 1.072 
Race .139 .347 .556 1.149 .724 1.822 
Sex .242 2.672 .102 1.274 .953 1.704 
Age .028 20.924 <.001 1.029 1.016 1.041 
Number in 
household 
.193 1.370 .242 1.212 .878 1.674 
Trust in 
neighbourhood 
.037 .051 .821 1.038 .751 1.435 
Able to  influence -.135 .790 .374 .874 .648 1.177 
Given informal 
voluntary help 
.175 16.708 <.001 1.191 1.095 1.295 
Constant -.604 2.113 .146 .547   
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Table C.5: Actually have right to be looked after by the State 
 













Overall deprivation -.161 1.987 .159 .851 .681 1.065 
Constant .511 58.318 <.001 1.667   
Income Deprivation .144 1.547 .214 1.155 .920 1.450 
Employment Status .137 1.592 .207 1.147 .927 1.419 
Area Deprivation -.131 1.761 .184 .878 .724 1.064 
Education .027 1.221 .269 1.027 .979 1.078 
Race .024 .032 .858 1.024 .788 1.331 
Sex -.320 14.274 <.001 .726 .615 .857 
Age .007 4.148 .042 1.007 1.000 1.014 
Number in 
household 
-.102 1.215 .270 .903 .753 1.083 
Trust in 
neighbourhood 
.219 5.320 .021 1.244 1.033 1.499 
Able to  influence .192 4.801 .028 1.211 1.020 1.438 
Given informal 
voluntary help 
-.027 1.708 .191 .973 .934 1.014 
Constant .100 .187 .665 1.106   
 
Table C.6: Actually have right to be treated fairly and equally 
 















Overall deprivation -.722 37.429 <.001 .486 .385 .612 
Constant 1.032 196.615 <.001 2.807   
Income Deprivation -.072 .351 .554 .931 .735 1.180 
Employment Status -.237 4.496 .034 .789 .634 .982 
Area Deprivation -.128 1.553 .213 .880 .719 1.076 
Education .018 .496 .481 1.018 .968 1.071 
Race .136 .940 .332 1.145 .871 1.507 
Sex -.049 .301 .583 .952 .799 1.134 
Age .013 13.361 <.001 1.013 1.006 1.021 
Number in 
household 
.103 1.099 .295 1.108 .914 1.344 
Trust in 
neighbourhood 
.246 6.035 .014 1.279 1.051 1.557 
Able to  influence .444 22.526 <.001 1.558 1.298 1.872 
Given informal 
voluntary help 
-.052 5.656 .017 .950 .910 .991 
Constant .135 .311 .577 1.145   
 
